Michael A. Moon

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000.

The trial was scheduled for November 13-15, 2018.

The accused's counsel sought to delay proceedings by arguing that a pending appeal of a Superior Court jurisdictional ruling created an automatic stay of proceedings.

The court rejected this argument, finding no automatic stay exists and that the trial would proceed as scheduled unless superseded by a higher court order.

The court imposed strict deadlines for filing any pre-trial motions and issued a bench summons to ensure the accused's attendance at trial.

The applicant sought writs of prohibition and procedendo, with certiorari in aid, arguing that the trial judge in the Ontario Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to try offences in the Central East Region when the alleged offences occurred entirely in the Central West Region (Mississauga/Peel).

The applicant contended that without a sufficient geographical connection or a Chief Justice's order, the trial judge lacked jurisdiction, despite acknowledging province-wide jurisdiction in potentia.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the trial judge had jurisdiction.

The court clarified that regional divisions are administrative, not jurisdictional, and while the Crown generally prosecutes where the offence occurred, the court's jurisdiction is province-wide.

Concerns about "forum shopping" were noted but deemed not to affect jurisdiction, leaving open options for a change of venue or administrative transfer.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal stabbing of his estranged wife in her home.

The Crown sought a 20-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence sought 12 to 15 years.

The court considered the extreme brutality of the attack, the domestic context, and the offender's lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

Applying the Shropshire principles, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 17 years, the top end of the usual range for spousal murder.

The accused was tried for first-degree murder after the victim was found with 138 stab wounds.

During the trial, the defence sought to have the trial judge instruct the jury on self-defence and provocation, arguing that the victim may have attacked the accused first with a knife found at the scene.

The trial judge applied the air of reality test and concluded there was no evidential foundation for either defence, noting that the placement of the knife was staged and there was no evidence of the victim initiating an assault or provoking the accused.

The request to include the defences in the jury charge was denied.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused during a prior plea inquiry where a guilty plea was ultimately rejected by the court.

The Crown intended to use these statements to cross-examine the accused if the defence of duress was raised.

The court ruled that statements made during a rejected plea inquiry are inextricably linked to the aborted plea and are inadmissible, as admitting them would undermine trial fairness and have a chilling effect on plea negotiations.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a portion of a prior court transcript containing a judge's comments ordering an assessment of the accused's fitness to stand trial.

The defence argued the comments provided context to the accused's prior admissions of guilt.

The court ruled the judge's statements were inadmissible, finding they did not provide context to the accused's statements and that admitting them without the subsequent psychiatric assessment finding the accused fit to stand trial would mislead the jury.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following the stabbing death of his estranged wife.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused brought an application for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to go to the jury.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's prior statements, motive, and post-offence conduct provided sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the murder was planned and deliberate.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for trafficking in fentanyl and using a forged prescription.

The conviction was based entirely on circumstantial evidence of identity.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of three counts of using a forged document and three counts of trafficking in fentanyl, sentencing him to six years imprisonment less eighteen months credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that another person could have impersonated him using fake identification.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence of identity was sufficient and that the trial judge properly applied the legal standard for convictions based on circumstantial evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-year sentence was fit and proportionate to the appellant's role in the trafficking ring.

The Crown and defence brought multiple pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder case.

The court ruled on various procedural and evidentiary issues, including denying the Crown's request to shackle the accused and the defence's request to sit at counsel table.

The court permitted the defence to introduce alternate suspect evidence, finding an air of reality to the claim.

The court allowed the Crown to introduce post-offence conduct evidence regarding changes in hairstyle and phone numbers, but excluded bad character evidence regarding prior firearm possession due to its prejudicial effect.

The court also found a section 7 Charter breach due to the police's unacceptable negligence in losing a witness interview DVD, but ordered alternative remedies rather than excluding the witness's evidence.

The applicant, an innocent bystander injured during a police shooting, sought an order of mandamus to compel the Director of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) to conduct a proper investigation and lay charges against the officers.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction, arguing the matter should be heard by the Divisional Court.

The Superior Court of Justice held that because the SIU is a creation of a provincial statute (the Police Services Act), the application must proceed by way of judicial review before the Divisional Court under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The application was dismissed without prejudice.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of in-court statements made by the accused, Nelson Tayongtong, on two separate dates (March 11 and March 17, 2015).

The Defence opposed, arguing the statements were made to persons in authority, that the accused lacked an operating mind, or that their admission would lead to an unfair trial by revealing mental health issues.

The court found that the statements were not made to persons in authority, thus the confessions rule did not apply.

Even if it did, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had an operating mind.

The court also determined that the statements could be redacted to avoid disclosing mental illness to the jury.

Consequently, the in-court statements were ruled admissible.

The appellant appealed her conviction on multiple counts including fraud over $5,000, personating a police officer, transferring proceeds of crime, and criminal organization offences.

She also appealed her sentence of 32 months' imprisonment plus a fine of $225,400 or three years' imprisonment in lieu.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of expert evidence regarding proceeds of crime and money laundering, no error in the jury charge on circumstantial evidence, and no error in principle in the sentencing.

The trial judge properly extrapolated the amount of fraud from a four-day monitoring period.

The applicant, Susan Zreik, brought two applications: one seeking extraordinary remedies (mandamus and certiorari) and declaratory relief against the SIU Director, and another raising constitutional issues involving the Attorney General of Canada.

This endorsement addresses preliminary jurisdictional arguments, with the Attorney General of Ontario and the SIU Director contending the Divisional Court is the proper forum for Application #1, and the Attorney General of Canada disputing its status as a party in Application #2.

The court adjourned the jurisdictional arguments to a case management meeting, directing the parties to file supplementary materials addressing compliance with criminal rules for extraordinary remedies and jurisdictional challenges for constitutional issues.

This endorsement addresses numerous pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

Key rulings include denying the Crown's application for prisoner restraints, dismissing defence applications for accused to sit at counsel table and for an immediate opening statement after the Crown.

The court granted internet access for counsel, denied a challenge to the jury array based on an erroneous questionnaire but outlined vetting procedures, permitted a race-based challenge for cause with specific questions, ordered a 14-member jury with two alternates, and granted the exclusion of unsworn jurors during selection.

Further, the court dismissed an application to exclude cell phone numbers provided to probation officers, granted the introduction of alternate suspect evidence, permitted eyewitness identification evidence regarding males on video, allowed evidence of post-offence conduct (haircut change, phone number changes), and dismissed an application to exclude evidence due to a lost police interview, offering alternative remedies.

An application to admit discreditable conduct evidence against one accused was dismissed, while the Crown was permitted to call a detective multiple times with prior notice.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit prior inconsistent statements made by a recanting witness to a police agent in a courthouse holding cell.

The witness had previously been granted leave to be cross-examined under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay to assess threshold reliability.

The court admitted the first part of the statements, finding sufficient procedural and substantive reliability as the witness confirmed making them and was available for cross-examination.

The second part of the statements was excluded due to poor audio quality and incomplete utterances, which undermined the jury's ability to assess their truth and accuracy.

Prior to a first-degree murder trial, the defence brought an application to permit the in-custody accused to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The Crown opposed the application, citing institutional incident reports demonstrating the accused's history of violence and non-compliance while in custody.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the incident reports established a significant risk to courtroom security.

The court also noted that security concerns were heightened due to anticipated hostility between the accused and certain Crown witnesses.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude audio files found on his Blackberry cell phone.

The files contained rap lyrics referencing a firearm of the same calibre as the murder weapon.

The accused argued that the seizure of the phone, the search warrant, and the delayed report to a justice violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found no Charter breach in the initial seizure or the type of warrant used.

Although the Crown conceded a breach regarding the delayed report to a justice, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also upheld the validity of the search warrant and found the probative value of the rap lyrics outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The applications were dismissed.

The Crown applied under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act for leave to cross-examine a reluctant witness, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, on prior inconsistent statements made to an undercover informant, Mr. Darren Watts, during a first-degree murder trial.

The witness had recanted his prior statements during examination-in-chief, claiming he was "high" and couldn't recall.

The defence opposed, arguing no material inconsistency and challenging the circumstances of the statements.

The court found material inconsistencies and granted leave, determining that the interests of justice favoured allowing cross-examination, as the statements were relevant to the identity of the shooter, the credibility of another witness, and the motive for the shooting, and their reliability was not fundamentally undermined by the witness's claims of impairment or the informant's conduct.

The court ruled on whether to provide a Vetrovec caution to the jury for three witnesses (Mr. Borden, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, and Mr. Watts) in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected to cautions for Mr. Borden and Mr. Moy-Lingomba, arguing that such cautions are for the Defence's benefit and should be omitted if the Defence requests.

The Crown conceded that a caution was not needed for Mr. Watts.

The court determined that a trial judge's duty to ensure trial fairness and assist the jury supersedes a tactical decision by the Defence when a Vetrovec caution is necessary or mandatory.

Given Mr. Borden's overwhelming credibility issues and the centrality of his evidence to the Crown's case, a Vetrovec caution was deemed mandatory.

For Mr. Moy-Lingomba, who also had overwhelming credibility issues and whose evidence was critical to both the Crown (motive) and Defence (third-party suspect), a "mixed Vetrovec" caution was deemed mandatory to assist the jury in assessing inculpatory and exculpatory statements.

The defendant, Sheldon Ranglin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a proposed application to exclude evidence related to a three-way phone call.

The defence challenged the validity of a production order for Maplehurst Correctional Facility phone records, opposed the introduction of July 3, 2015 phone records due to alleged inconsistencies with witness testimony, and sought an adjournment of cross-examination due to outstanding disclosure.

The court summarily dismissed the application, finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Maplehurst pay phone records and thus no standing to challenge their admission.

The other issues were deemed matters for cross-examination or future application.