Michael A. Moon

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the application judge erred in dismissing his second bail application, which was based on an alleged material change in circumstances, including new evidence from the preliminary inquiry and a new release plan.

The reviewing judge found no error in the application judge's assessment that the Crown's case remained strong and the new release plan was inadequate.

The court also held that while Gladue principles apply to bail, the applicant failed to adduce evidence to support such an analysis.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him and that the trial judge erred in upholding confidential informant privilege.

The police arrested the appellant based on a tip from a confidential informant and their own observations of the appellant appearing to hold a gun tucked into his pants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the informant's tip combined with police observations provided reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court also upheld the trial judge's ruling on informant privilege, noting the appellant did not demonstrate that disclosure was necessary to prove his innocence.

The appellants were committed to stand trial for first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They applied for certiorari to quash the committals, arguing a denial of natural justice because they were not permitted to make submissions on post-offence conduct evidence.

The reviewing judge found a denial of natural justice but dismissed the application, concluding the appellants suffered no prejudice as committal was inevitable.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that a reviewing judge has inherent jurisdiction to refuse certiorari where no prejudice occurs, and found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to support the committals.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his 22-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting a co-accused's videotaped K.G.B. statement for the truth of its contents, specifically challenging the application of the balance of probabilities standard to the issue of voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof and made no errors in finding the statement voluntary.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge correctly found a conditional sentence would not adequately address denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed a ruling by Justice Archie G. Campbell.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that the error in question was within jurisdiction and therefore not subject to certiorari.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was too light for a serious offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion given the very favourable pre-sentence report.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

One appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence, while the other argued the trial judge made inconsistent findings regarding his control of the weapons and role in the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge's findings were not inconsistent and that the convictions were supported by the totality of the circumstantial and identification evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the admissibility of a certificate.

The Court of Appeal held that a discrepancy regarding the date on which the certificate was prepared was immaterial and did not render the certificate inadmissible.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in concluding that the discrepancy could constitute evidence to the contrary.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.