Mary Lou Benotto

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following a guilty plea for sexual interference.

He argued the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his ability to manage his risk in the community using sex-drive reducing medication (Lupron) and sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress on the medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge reasonably concluded that the mere possibility of taking medication did not adequately reduce the high risk he posed to the public.

The court also dismissed the application to adduce fresh evidence, noting it was not credible due to the appellant's manipulative nature and was more appropriately a matter for parole authorities.

The United States sought the appellant's extradition for fraud-related charges.

Canadian authorities conducted a parallel investigation, obtaining a production order and search warrant under the Criminal Code, and shared the information with American authorities without filing a report to a justice under s. 489.1.

The appellant sought disclosure of the Canadian evidence to pursue Charter claims, which the extradition judge denied.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's findings that the Canadian investigation was valid and information sharing was lawful, but referred the matter back to reconsider the effect of the failure to report under s. 489.1 in light of recent jurisprudence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, arguing that the search warrant for his residence was unconstitutional.

The warrant was based largely on information from a confidential informant.

The appellant contended that the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) did not provide reasonable grounds for the warrant and that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of the ITO affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the redacted ITO provided sufficient grounds when read as a whole and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing cross-examination to protect the informant's identity.

The appellant employee deleted and took confidential information upon the breakdown of her employment.

The respondent employer sued and moved for an injunction.

The parties negotiated a settlement, but a dispute arose over whether the agreement included a full forensic sweep of the appellant's devices.

The respondent insisted on the sweep and adjourned its injunction motion, while the appellant claimed the respondent had repudiated the settlement.

The motion judge found a binding settlement without the forensic sweep term and held the respondent had not repudiated it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's insistence on the term and its steps to preserve the status quo via the injunction did not objectively evince an intention not to be bound by the settlement agreement.

The Crown appealed an 18-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting his wife and assaulting his wife and children over a period of years.

The sentencing judge had considered the cultural impact of the family's move from Iran to Canada as a factor in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that cultural practices that are criminal in Canada do not mitigate criminal conduct, particularly in domestic violence cases.

Finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit and noting the respondent's lack of remorse, the Court increased the global sentence to four years and ordered the respondent's reincarceration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as his 18-month consecutive sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant deposited a shank in a fellow inmate's pocket at a detention centre.

The sole ground of the conviction appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and rejecting the appellant's claims that counsel coerced him not to testify or failed to pursue evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 18-month consecutive sentence fit given the appellant's horrendous criminal record, even when considering the totality principle.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing their mid-trial application to cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual activity under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, and in failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of her prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence.

The Court also held that a limiting instruction was unnecessary as the prior consistent statements were responsive to the defence's allegation of recent fabrication.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, voyeurism, and breach of probation, as well as his six-year sentence.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant choked the complainant, had sexual intercourse with her while she was unconscious, and videotaped the activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence or error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of increasing the pre-sentence custody credit to a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in 25.5 months of credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in finding him a party to the offence.

During a concerted beating of the complainant by three men, one of the appellant's co-assailants stabbed the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the appellant was the lead attacker, continued the beating after the co-assailant announced his intention to use the knife, and did nothing to stop the stabbing.

The court held this conduct fell within the scope of party liability under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The young person appealed findings of guilt for robbery, weapons dangerous, and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the robbery conviction, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable based on the appellant's proximity to the robbery, flight from police, and recent possession of stolen property.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to apply the Kienapple principle, staying the findings of guilt for weapons dangerous and possession of stolen property to avoid multiple convictions.

The appellant challenged a sexual assault conviction, sought to adduce fresh evidence, and appealed sentence.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, that the W.(D.) framework was misapplied, that the evidence was misapprehended, and that the complainant's frailties were inadequately assessed.

The court held that any possible similar fact reasoning error was curable under s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code, refused to admit the proposed fresh evidence under the Palmer test, and found no error in principle or demonstrable unfitness in the eight-month custodial sentence.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed, although leave to appeal sentence was granted.

The appellant, a former university professor, appealed a jury verdict finding him liable for defaming the respondent in his blog posts.

The appellant had abandoned the trial on the second day and called no evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his arguments regarding fair comment, limitation periods, and freedom of expression, noting his failure to lead evidence.

The court also upheld the trial judge's order for a broad permanent injunction, finding it justified by the appellant's persistent defamatory campaign and likelihood of continuation.

The appellant, who claimed to have a spiritual healing gift from God, was convicted of sexual assault and breaching recognizance conditions after touching a client's breast without consent during healing sessions.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias, and erred in finding he breached his recognizance and committed sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge managed the trial fairly, the presumption of impartiality was not rebutted, and the convictions were supported by credible evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for ten offences, including attempted aggravated assault and discharge of a firearm, arising from an incident at an auto repair shop.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, the presumption of possession for a driver, and attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the identification charge adequate, applying the curative proviso to a minor error regarding possession, and upholding the attempted murder instruction based on the appellant's conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing death.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the mens rea, that his language rights were violated, and that a probation condition banishing him from Prince Edward County was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the objective mens rea standard from R. v. Beatty, the appellant had explicitly waived a French trial, and his counsel had consented to the banishment condition at sentencing.

The appellants brought a motion before the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion as unfounded, noting that the moving party would have the opportunity to challenge the lower court's decision at the scheduled appeal hearing.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the respondents, payable before the appeal is heard.

The appellant failed to appear in court for the hearing of his appeal, claiming he was advised by court staff that the appeal was not proceeding.

The court rejected this explanation but granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal.

The court noted the appeal would have failed on its merits regardless, and awarded costs of $13,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a restricted firearm, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to set aside his guilty pleas prior to sentencing.

He claimed he lacked the cognitive capacity to understand the pleas due to medical issues and that he received ineffective assistance from both his original trial counsel and the counsel who brought the application to set aside the pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the 'limited cognitive capacity' test and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's refusal to set aside his guilty plea to aggravated assault, arguing the plea was not unequivocal and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge had found the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that trial counsel was effective.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge and finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice arising from his trial counsel's conduct.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to make an explicit finding on the actus reus for the alleged assault, specifically whether the encounter with his father was non-consensual.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made no explicit finding that the fight was non-consensual, and the SCAC judge erred in concluding otherwise.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.