Mark L. Edwards

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for civil fraud and ordering him to pay $30,526 plus costs.

The respondent had paid the appellant's CRA tax lien to clear title to a jointly owned family residence transferred to her pursuant to a family law settlement, and subsequently sued him after he declared bankruptcy, alleging his failure to disclose the tax debt constituted fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding the trial judge erred in law by applying a test for fraudulent non-disclosure rather than the strict four-part test for fraudulent misrepresentation, and made palpable and overriding errors of fact unsupported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering the estate of Doreen Duffey to pay $11,862.31 to the estate of Frederick Duffey.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in interpreting the will regarding funeral expenses and characterizing certain house expenditures as capital rather than repairs.

The Divisional Court found no error in the judge's interpretation of the will or characterization of the expenses.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of a conceded $939.00 deduction, and otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed a final costs order requiring him to pay $25,000 to the respondent following the settlement of their matrimonial proceedings.

The trial judge had based the costs award on a finding that the respondent had proposed the fundamental framework of parallel parenting and the appellant had unreasonably rejected it.

The Divisional Court found this to be a palpable and overriding error, as the appellant's earlier offer had actually proposed parallel parenting, while the respondent's initial offers sought weekend access.

The costs order was set aside, and no costs were awarded for the trial or the appeal.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering her eviction so the landlords' daughter could move into the unit.

The tenant argued she was denied procedural fairness and that the Board erred in applying the genuine intention test and refusing relief from eviction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error in the Board's application of the genuine intention test under s. 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, and no error in refusing relief under s. 83(3).

The defendant, Daniel Costa, was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath to homicide detectives.

The Crown conceded that Costa could not be convicted of perjury due to the application of s. 131(3) of the Criminal Code, as he was not legally required, permitted, or authorized to make the statement.

The Crown then sought to continue the prosecution on the basis that attempt to obstruct justice was an included offence of perjury as described in the indictment.

The court denied the Crown's request, finding that attempt to obstruct justice was not necessarily included in the perjury charge as worded, and that the accused did not have fair notice of this potential charge.

In a medical malpractice claim where liability was admitted by Dr. Singh, the defendant brought a motion for updated documentary disclosure from the plaintiffs regarding damages.

The plaintiffs resisted, arguing the demands were excessive and disproportionate.

The court applied the principles of relevance and proportionality under the Rules of Civil Procedure, granting some production requests (e.g., updated OHIP summaries, tax returns, family doctor records, primary treating specialists) while denying others deemed unnecessary or marginally relevant (e.g., welfare records, non-primary psychological treatment records, sweeping hospital records, private activity records).

The court emphasized the need for cooperation, communication, and common sense in litigation, shifting the cost of obtaining ordered records to the defendant.

The Regional Municipality of York sought an order of mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash a disclosure order made by a Justice of the Peace and to compel the continuation of a trial.

The disclosure order required the prosecution to provide information on previous charges against the respondent from 1995 and 1996, which the applicant argued constituted a collateral attack on unappealed 2013 orders to comply under the Building Code Act.

The court found that the disclosure order was indeed a collateral attack on the 2013 orders, which the respondent had failed to appeal, and therefore granted the applicant's request.

The plaintiff commenced an action seeking damages for slander.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under the Protection of Public Participation Act, 2015 (anti-SLAPP legislation).

The parties could not agree on a timetable leading up to the motion, particularly because the defendant failed to attend her scheduled examination for discovery due to medical reasons.

The court fixed a timetable for the delivery of materials, completion of discoveries, cross-examinations, and factums leading up to the scheduled motion date.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 and theft by conversion after borrowing $150,000 from an acquaintance under the pretense of opening a restaurant.

Instead of using the funds for the business, the accused spent the money on personal expenses, a luxury vehicle, and gambling, eventually declaring bankruptcy.

The court found that while the initial receipt of the funds may have been innocent, the accused's subsequent use of the money for gambling and personal expenses with the knowledge that it put the lender's pecuniary interests at risk constituted dishonest conduct and theft by conversion.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The plaintiff, involved in two motor vehicle accidents, accepted Rule 49 offers from two sets of defendants.

The court was tasked with determining the appropriate award of partial indemnity costs and disbursements, and their apportionment between the defendants.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $37,500 plus HST and disbursements at $45,000 inclusive of HST, and ordered the defendants to pay these costs equally, rather than proportionally to their settlement offers.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, a former employee and son-in-law, who defrauded the plaintiffs' accounting firm of $342,170.22 by diverting client payments to a sham bank account.

The defendant sought to amend his statement of defence to plead that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, arguing the plaintiffs ought to have discovered the fraud earlier.

The court granted the amendment but found no evidence to support the limitation defence.

Summary judgment was granted for the full amount of the diverted funds, plus $50,000 in punitive damages for the defendant's deceitful and high-handed conduct.

A Mareva injunction was also extended to assist with enforcement.

The Crown brought an application for the forfeiture of a $50,000 recognizance against a surety after the accused absconded to Pakistan on the morning of his sentencing for sexual assault.

The surety, the accused's wife, argued for partial forfeiture due to financial hardship and lack of fault.

The court applied the 'pull of bail' principle, finding that the surety failed to strictly supervise the accused and that absconding is the most serious breach of a recognizance.

The court ordered the full $50,000 forfeited, but stayed enforcement for 45 days to allow the accused an opportunity to voluntarily return to Canada.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from arrest to the projected end of the trial was approximately 32 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court deducted three periods of defence delay, including time when defence counsel was unavailable for offered trial dates, a scheduling error by defence counsel, and a frivolous mistrial application regarding an interpreter.

After these deductions, the net delay fell below the 30-month ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, a juror sent a note to the trial judge reporting that another juror had shared a story with the panel about a friend who was falsely accused of a similar offence.

The trial judge conducted an inquiry in accordance with the process set out in R. v. Giroux.

The judge discharged the offending juror under s. 644 of the Criminal Code for reasonable cause, finding she could be influenced by her friend's experience and had failed to disclose this during jury selection.

The juror who reported the incident was retained, as she had appropriately followed the court's preliminary instructions.

During a personal injury class action trial arising from a VIA Rail derailment, a class member sought to qualify a chartered accountant as an expert witness to quantify past and future wage loss.

The defendants opposed the qualification, arguing the expert lacked objectivity and his evidence was unnecessary.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the Mohan framework and found the expert's evidence was not necessary, as he merely accepted the class member's uncorroborated figures without independent analysis.

The court also found the expert failed to establish a basic threshold of objectivity, rendering him improperly qualified.

The expert evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal based on a continuous period of employment that included time with a previous, separate company.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by concluding the previous employer's obligations flowed through to the appellant.

The evidence demonstrated the two companies were separate corporate entities and the respondent had resigned from the first to join the second.

The damages award was reduced to reflect only the period of employment with the appellant.

The appellant appealed his voyeurism conviction, challenging the trial judge's finding of "explicit sexual activity" and the treatment of a witness's statement as an informal admission.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that one photograph unequivocally depicted explicit sexual activity and that the trial judge correctly considered the witness's "acknowledged evidence" as an informal admission in the context of a directed verdict motion.

The Crown applied for an order under section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code to permit the adult complainant, S.L., to testify behind a screen or outside the courtroom in a sexual assault trial.

The application was based on the complainant's expressed discomfort and anxiety at seeing the accused while recounting intimate and sexual history.

The court, considering factors under section 486.2(3) including the nature of the charges and the relationship, granted the order for S.L. to testify behind a screen, finding it appropriate and without prejudice to trial fairness or the accused's right to cross-examination.

Nuzhat Mamoon, a first offender, was convicted of defrauding eight vulnerable individuals of $98,400 through a breach of trust, leveraging her perceived status as a wealthy, religious businessperson and her charitable organization.

The court considered aggravating factors including the duration, planning, number of victims, significant impact on victims, and abuse of community regard.

Mitigating factors were limited to no prior record.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, imposing 18 months' incarceration, a three-year probation order with specific prohibitions, and a restitution order for the full amount.

The offender, a 64-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of sexually assaulting his former partner by forcing anal intercourse.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a suspended sentence due to the offender's life-threatening C. difficile infection.

The court found that while a 22-month sentence would normally be fit, the offender's unique and severe medical condition meant incarceration would seriously compromise his life.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years of probation, including strict house arrest conditions to protect the public from infection.