William Alexander Kyle

The defendants brought summary judgment motions to dismiss an action alleging slander of title and slander of credit arising from a PPSA registration.

The court held that the discoverability issue was suitable for summary judgment and that, once a limitation defence was raised, the plaintiff bore the evidentiary burden of showing the claim was not statute-barred.

The record established that the plaintiff or his solicitor knew, or ought to have known, of the registration and its alleged consequences more than two years before the action was issued.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the statutory presumption of knowledge or identify a discoverability date within the limitation period.

The action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The defendants moved to enforce a settlement agreement, arguing that a binding agreement had been reached on January 16, 2018, for $120,000, inclusive of interest and legal fees, payable in monthly installments.

The plaintiff, Worldwide Security Ltd., opposed, attempting to add a term for 5% annual interest on the declining balance.

The court found that a binding agreement was reached prior to the plaintiff's proposed amendment, with no further terms to be negotiated.

The defendants' motion to enforce the settlement was granted, and the plaintiff's summary judgment motion and claims against two individual defendants were dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering the estate of Doreen Duffey to pay $11,862.31 to the estate of Frederick Duffey.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in interpreting the will regarding funeral expenses and characterizing certain house expenditures as capital rather than repairs.

The Divisional Court found no error in the judge's interpretation of the will or characterization of the expenses.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of a conceded $939.00 deduction, and otherwise dismissed.

The homeowners brought a motion to discharge a construction lien registered against their property, arguing the lien was no longer valid because the action had remained idle after being set down for trial, the lien claimant corporation had been dissolved, and the homeowners acquired rights during the period of dissolution.

The court held that the lien remained perfected under s. 37(1)2 of the Construction Lien Act because the action had been properly set down for trial within the statutory period, and strict compliance with the statute was sufficient.

The temporary dissolution of the lien claimant corporation did not render the lien a nullity because revival under the Business Corporations Act operates nunc pro tunc, subject only to substantive rights acquired during dissolution.

The court also rejected the homeowners’ claim that procedural rights arising under the Rules of Civil Procedure during dissolution superseded the lien.

The request for security for costs was denied due to lack of evidentiary support and delay.

The appellant appealed a series of orders, including a receiving order, made in bankruptcy proceedings against him.

He sought to adduce fresh evidence demonstrating that the bankruptcy proceedings were initiated by the petitioning creditors for an improper purpose, specifically to eliminate him as an adversary in ongoing civil litigation.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, which revealed that the appellant was solvent, that there were no amounts owing on a mortgage on his home, and that the bankruptcy was orchestrated for an improper purpose.

The appeal was allowed and all bankruptcy orders, including the receiving order, were set aside.