Luciana Ioana Amaral

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action by summary judgment against the Waterloo Police Board, its chief, and two police officers.

The appellant alleged that the police unlawfully disclosed to her employer that she was married to a federal parolee, causing her to lose her job as a supervisor at a halfway house.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in law or principle.

The court found that the police officer's disclosure to the parole officer was made for lawful purposes under the Police Services Act and Municipal Privacy Act, and that there was no breach of duty of care or privacy rights.

The court considered whether Fluid Hose & Coupling Inc. was an insured under a builders’ risk insurance policy and thus immune from a subrogated action for property damage.

The court found that the policy’s broad language included Fluid Hose as a subcontractor, barring the action against it.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, instead fixing costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ), as an additional insured under an AIG policy, applied for an order entitling it to appoint independent counsel at AIG's expense for two underlying actions and for reimbursement of pre-tender legal and administrative expenses.

AIG acknowledged its duty to defend but asserted its right to select counsel and denied pre-tender costs.

The court dismissed HMQ's application, finding that AIG's "split file" protocol adequately addressed any "party-based" conflict of interest and that HMQ failed to establish a "coverage-based" conflict.

The court also held that pre-tender defence costs were not recoverable due to voluntary payment wording in the policy.

The City of Markham applied for a declaration that Intact Insurance Company had a duty to defend the City in a main action arising from a slip and fall incident.

The City also sought an order allowing it to appoint its own counsel at Intact's expense due to a conflict of interest, and reimbursement for past legal expenses.

The court found that Intact had a duty to defend the City as an additional insured under VTA Construction Limited's policy, as the claims arose from VTA's operations.

A real conflict of interest was identified due to VTA's cross-claim attempting to shift liability to the City, thus entitling the City to independent counsel.

Intact was ordered to pay all defence costs, including past expenses, on a full indemnity basis, as it was impractical to apportion costs between covered and uncovered claims.

On appeal from a trial judgment finding the municipal defendants liable for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident on a rural road during winter conditions.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's interpretation and application of the Municipal Act, 2001 duty to clear roads of snow and ice.

The trial judge found the road in a state of non-repair and held the municipality failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or correct the condition.

The appellants argued the trial judge applied an unreasonably high standard of maintenance for a Class 4 rural road, erred in requiring the application of straight salt rather than sand/salt mixture, and excluded relevant evidence regarding financial costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, set aside the liability findings, and ordered a new trial on liability issues while upholding the damages assessment.

A municipal councillor brought a defamation action against the mayor and several councillors arising from a public council statement and related legal opinion criticizing the councillor’s blog posts about senior municipal staff.

The court held the statements were not defamatory and were substantially true in substance, as the plaintiff’s blogs contained disparaging criticism of staff contrary to the municipal code of conduct.

Even if defamatory, the publications were protected by qualified privilege because they were a measured response to the plaintiff’s public letter to the editor and were made to correct the public record.

The court found no evidence of malice and noted the defendants relied in good faith on legal advice before publishing the statement.

The action was dismissed.

During a civil jury trial, the court addressed a dispute between counsel regarding the form of jury questions on damages.

The plaintiff argued that the jury should only be asked about general, aggravated, and punitive damages, while the defendants submitted that the questions should reflect the damages discussed in the charge, including general, nominal, and contemptuous damages.

The court held that there was no prejudice to the plaintiff in directing the jury to consider the specific types of damages addressed in the charge.

The jury questions would therefore separately reference general, nominal, and contemptuous damages to align with the jury instructions.

During a jury trial in a defamation action arising from statements published by municipal officials, the plaintiff sought a jury instruction permitting an adverse inference from the defendants’ failure to call two municipal officials as witnesses.

The court reviewed the principles governing adverse inference where a party fails to call a witness, including the requirement that the witness be under the exclusive control of the party and that the evidence not be otherwise available.

The court found the witnesses were equally available to both parties and were not under the defendants’ exclusive control.

As a result, the circumstances did not justify the rare step of instructing the jury that an adverse inference could be drawn.

In a defamation action brought by a municipal councillor concerning a statement published by town council and later republished by a newspaper, the plaintiff sought to introduce similar fact evidence relating to a separate defamation action previously commenced and later discontinued by one of the defendants.

The plaintiff argued that the earlier litigation had been characterized as SLAPP litigation and was relevant to establish malice.

The court held that the prior action had minimal probative value in determining whether the impugned statement was defamatory or whether available defences applied.

The court further concluded that admitting the evidence risked sidetracking the jury trial into collateral issues unrelated to the pleadings.

The motion to admit the similar fact evidence was therefore dismissed.

During a defamation trial involving a municipal councillor and the mayor along with other councillors, the plaintiff sought to introduce a report by the municipal Integrity Commissioner into evidence.

The defendants objected to its admissibility.

The court ruled the report inadmissible, finding that it did not meet the necessity and reliability criteria for the principled exception to hearsay.

The court noted that under the Municipal Act, the Integrity Commissioner is not a compellable witness, meaning the defendants would be unable to cross-examine him.

The court concluded that admitting the report would be highly prejudicial and could lead the jury to afford the untested opinion undue weight.