Marc R. Labrosse

Valoris for Children & Adults of Prescott-Russell sought summary judgment to find the child, A.J., in need of protection and to place him in Extended Society Care for adoption.

The parents opposed, arguing for genuine issues requiring a trial, including the inconclusive nature of medical evidence regarding A.J.'s injuries and alleged Society misconduct.

The court found A.J. was in need of protection due to serious unexplained injuries, the father's history of physical discipline, and the parents' failure to engage with the Society to address protection concerns, especially after moving out of jurisdiction.

The motion for Extended Society Care was granted, as no less intrusive alternatives were viable and permanency was required for the child.

The court ordered weekly access for the parents, an increase from the Society's proposed monthly access.

The Estate Trustee sought directions from the court regarding the interpretation and distribution of two estates following the murder of the testators by their adopted son.

The central issue was the application of the criminal forfeiture rule (slayer rule) and whether the estates should be held in trust for the murderer's potential unborn children or accelerated to alternate beneficiaries.

The court applied the implied intention approach, ruling that the murderer was disentitled from any benefit.

It further determined that the gifts to the murderer's unborn issue should also fail due to public policy and the absence of living issue at the time of disentitlement, thereby accelerating the distribution of the estates to the next lineal beneficiaries (the testatrix's brothers), subject to specific annuity provisions.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was over 37 months, but the court deducted 9 months and 18 days as a discrete event due to the applicant's former counsel accepting employment with the Federal Crown.

The net delay of 27 months and 24 days fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was otherwise unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The plaintiff, Ocean Dredging DM Inc., brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant, Kehoe Marine Construction Ltd., from breaching a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and to compel the defendant to negotiate subcontracts for a marine dredging project.

The court found that the relief sought was mandatory in nature, requiring a strong prima facie case.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding that the MOU was an agreement to negotiate with many outstanding terms, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the defendant.

The defendant brought a motion to consolidate a civil action with a family court application.

The civil action involved a dispute over whether a $250,000 transfer of funds from the plaintiff to the defendant was a loan or a gift, while the family court application involved the enforcement of a separation agreement and equalization of net family property.

The court applied the factors for consolidation under Rule 6.01 and found that while there were common questions of fact, the balance of convenience favored allowing the civil action to proceed to a summary trial independently.

The motion to consolidate was dismissed.

The respondents brought a motion to strike an oppression remedy application under Rule 21.01(1)(b), arguing the applicant trust lacked standing, the respondents were not affiliates under the OBCA, the claim offended the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, and the applicant had no reasonable expectation regarding the respondents.

The court found that while a trust is not a justiciable entity and the respondents were not affiliates, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle did not strictly bar the claim due to the closely held nature of the corporation.

However, the application failed to plead facts establishing a reasonable expectation vis-à-vis the third-party respondents.

The motion to strike was granted, but the applicant was given 45 days to amend the pleadings.

François Mwadi brought a motion against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) seeking various remedies related to child support overpayments and enforcement.

The motion was dismissed.

This endorsement concerns the costs of that dismissed motion.

The FRO sought substantial indemnity costs, and Iulia Mihalache, the beneficiary, also sought full indemnity costs as a self-represented party.

The court found that Mwadi's motion, while ultimately unsuccessful, was not brought in bad faith, partly due to the complexity of the FRO's arrears statements.

The court awarded the FRO $3,500 in costs and Iulia Mihalache $750 for her useful documentation and minimal court presence, rejecting their higher claims and the FRO's request for substantial indemnity.

Colleen Cahill, charged with multiple provincial and federal offences including theft, break and enter, and administration of justice offences, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on primary and secondary grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice granted judicial interim release, finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances, particularly given Cahill's HIV-positive status and chronic lung disease, which placed her at significant risk in detention.

The court determined that her proposed release plan, involving supervision by the John Howard Society and continuation of a methadone program, sufficiently mitigated the risks of non-attendance and reoffending, and that her release would not undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The three offenders were convicted of firearms trafficking and related offences.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unconstitutional post-verdict delay.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the delay fell below the 5-month presumptive ceiling established in Charley after deducting defence delay and the discrete event of a constitutional challenge.

On sentencing, the court found the mandatory minimum under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code had been struck down and was inapplicable.

Saberi and Montgiraud, both youthful first offenders with lower moral blameworthiness, received conditional sentences of 20 months.

Bruce, who facilitated three separate transactions and possessed drugs for trafficking, received a custodial sentence of 22 months.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from his cell phones, arguing that the search warrant was issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on a search conducted by French police without verifying its legality.

The court found that the ITO contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence, including corroborative information from the French authorities, to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The court held that an affiant is not required to establish foreign law compliance as a precondition for a search warrant in Canada.

The application to exclude evidence under section 8 of the Charter was dismissed.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking lost rental revenue from the defendants for breaching a commercial lease by failing to pay rent and timely reinstate a demising wall.

The defendants counterclaimed for overpayment of rent and argued the plaintiff breached an oral agreement for lease assignment and failed to mitigate damages.

The court found no binding oral agreement for lease assignment and that the defendants breached their obligation to reinstate the wall.

However, the plaintiff also failed to adequately mitigate damages.

The court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff for five months' lost rent and allowed the defendants' counterclaim for overpaid rent.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a police officer on leave serving as union president, was suspended and barred from police facilities following criminal charges.

He sued, alleging interference with his union duties.

The court found that the essential character of the dispute arose either under the collective agreement or the disciplinary regime of the Police Services Act.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction and the action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment and confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The appellant argued that the 28-day delay between the signing of the Community Treatment Plan and the issuance of the CTO breached the Mental Health Act.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's finding that the renewal was made in conformity with the Act, concluding there was no undue delay given the administrative processes involved.

The moving party and responding party are siblings and the sole heirs to their father's estate.

The moving party, acting as the estate trustee, submitted a passing of accounts for the period he acted in that capacity.

The responding party objected to several specific expenses claimed by the moving party, including legal fees, property taxes, and surveying costs.

The court reviewed ten contested items, approving some as legitimate estate expenses while reducing or rejecting others, particularly legal fees related to the litigation between the siblings and an unnecessary surveying cost.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her Statement of Claim to include a new cause of action under a second life insurance policy, beyond the presumptive two-year limitation period.

The court found that the plaintiff met the discoverability criteria under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the relevant underwriting documents were not disclosed until the defendants served their Affidavit of Documents.

However, the court refused the amendment, concluding that the proposed new cause of action was legally untenable because the insured had a clear duty to disclose a material change in health (a seizure) before the delivery of the policy, and the alleged ambiguity in the insurance documents was without merit.

During a sentencing hearing for three offenders convicted of firearms offences, the Crown argued the court should conduct a fresh constitutional analysis of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, despite previous Superior Court decisions declaring it unconstitutional.

The court held that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act effectively removes the provision from the statute books.

Therefore, the previous declarations of invalidity are binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the mandatory minimum sentence is of no force and effect.

The offenders were found guilty of recruiting two minors for the purpose of exploitation and advertising sexual services.

At sentencing, they challenged the constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 279.011 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the s. 7 overbreadth challenge but found that the mandatory minimum violated s. 12 as it was grossly disproportionate to the offenders' lower level of moral blameworthiness, and it could not be saved under s. 1.

The mandatory minimum was struck down, and the offenders were sentenced to 18 months and 11 months respectively.

The self-represented respondent mother brought a motion seeking third-party records from the RCMP and the applicant father's family doctor, leave to file a late Response to Request to Admit, and a trial adjournment.

The court dismissed the request for medical records as a fishing expedition and refused the trial adjournment, noting the mother's delay and the lack of evidentiary basis.

The request for RCMP records was adjourned due to improper service.

However, the court granted the mother leave to file her late Response to Request to Admit, finding it raised triable issues and her delay was explained by her self-represented status.

The applicant brought a motion against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) seeking reimbursement for alleged child support overpayments and an order to enforce a temporary support order.

The court reviewed the applicant's calculations and the FRO's statement of arrears.

The court found the applicant's evidence incomplete and inconsistent with employer records, concluding he failed to prove an overpayment.

The motion was dismissed, as the FRO had also already credited the applicant's account for the temporary support order.

The applicant's pleadings were struck, and the matter proceeded as an uncontested trial.

The respondent sought to sever the joint tenancy of the matrimonial home, vest the applicant's interest in her name, obtain reimbursement for a $35,000 advance on equalization, and vacate a charging order registered by the applicant's solicitor against the home.

The court granted the vesting order, finding the applicant had already withdrawn his equity.

The court dismissed the claim for reimbursement of the $35,000 advance due to lack of evidence regarding repayment terms.

The court vacated the charging order, finding it was obtained without full disclosure of the parties' financial circumstances and in breach of a prior non-encumbrance order.