Marcella Henschel

The defendant pleaded guilty to break and enter of a dwelling house, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and breach of a firearms prohibition order.

The defendant broke into a residence in Markham, was chased by the homeowner's son, and dropped a bag containing stolen wallets and cannabis.

Police subsequently executed a search warrant on the defendant's residence and located a loaded, sawed-off shotgun with the serial number removed in the defendant's bedroom closet.

The defendant was subject to a lifetime firearms prohibition order and a probation order prohibiting weapon possession at the time of the offences.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years in the penitentiary, with credit for pre-sentence custody and enhanced credit for harsh detention conditions.

The accused, a young Aboriginal first offender, was convicted of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml of blood.

She brought constitutional challenges under sections 15 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The section 15 challenge alleged that Ontario's failure to proclaim curative discharge provisions violated equality rights by discriminating against Aboriginal offenders.

The section 12 challenge alleged that the mandatory minimum sentence was grossly disproportionate, particularly given the requirement to enter a conviction and the applicant's Aboriginal background and Gladue principles.

The court dismissed both constitutional challenges and imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine, a 15-month driving prohibition, and two years probation with mandatory alcohol counselling.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal of two accused on multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences.

The accused Barker conceded committal on most counts except simple possession of fentanyl.

The accused Duncan challenged committal on all counts.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused on trafficking charges related to cocaine transactions with an undercover officer on December 19, 2018, and on possession for purpose of trafficking charges related to drugs found in a rental vehicle.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit Duncan on possession charges related to prescription pills found in his bedroom.

However, the court discharged Duncan on all firearms offences, finding insufficient evidence of his possession of a firearm found in the basement.

The court committed Barker on all firearms offences based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the shoebox where the firearm was found.

The accused pleaded guilty to careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a serious motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of his passenger.

The accident occurred on February 21, 2017, when the accused was driving northbound on Keele Street in Vaughan at an excessive speed in heavy rush hour traffic.

He attempted to pass a slowing vehicle, lost control of his vehicle, which rolled and was struck by an oncoming vehicle.

The passenger, Alwyn Lloyd, a 27-year-old father and husband, died as a result of his injuries.

The court imposed a $1,000 fine, 18 months probation with a requirement to perform 50 hours of community service and attend counselling, and an 18-month driving suspension.

The accused was charged with trafficking and possession for the purposes of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following his arrest on August 8, 2018.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings for delay.

Although the net delay of 15 months and 24 days fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases, the court found this was a rare and clear case warranting a stay.

The defence demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings while the Crown caused significant delays through unavailability and serious non-disclosure of search warrant materials for ten months.

The court granted the stay, finding the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The accused was convicted of communicating with a person believed to be under 18 years of age via telecommunication for the purpose of facilitating obtaining sexual services for consideration, contrary to s. 172.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of one year imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under s. 12 of the Charter, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate when applied to the specific circumstances of the offender and struck it down as unconstitutional.

The court imposed a sentence of five months imprisonment followed by two years probation.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg/100 ml.

The defence brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The trial judge found that while the "forthwith" requirement for field sobriety tests was met, the officer lacked reasonable grounds to make a breath demand under section 254(3) because the officer should not have relied on the failure of field sobriety tests given the accused's disclosed medical conditions affecting his ability to stand and his vision impairment.

The trial judge also found the accused was denied access to necessary medication during detention.

The breath samples were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving without properly wearing a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on the officer's testimony that he observed the seatbelt not across the appellant's chest and flapping in the wind, despite the appellant testifying he was wearing the seatbelt at all times and wearing it when stopped.

The appeal court found the trial justice failed to properly apply the W.(D.) principles regarding burden of proof and credibility assessment, and that the officer's evidence was insufficiently reliable to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt given the fleeting observation period and other corroborating evidence.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

Private investigators observed the accused driving erratically and called 911.

The arresting officer stopped the accused and noted an odour of alcohol, but no physical signs of intoxication.

Breath tests revealed a blood alcohol concentration significantly over the legal limit.

A forensic toxicologist testified that anyone with such readings would have an impaired ability to drive.

The court found that despite the lack of physical symptoms, the erratic driving and expert evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired.

The defendant was convicted following trial of multiple human trafficking, prostitution, and child pornography offences committed against two victims: M.C., a 19-year-old woman, and T.T., a 16-year-old minor.

The defendant recruited and exploited both victims for sexual services, exercising control through physical violence, threats, coercion, and isolation.

He posted explicit photographs of both victims online to advertise sexual services.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 9 years; the defence proposed 3 to 5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years, with all counts concurrent, less credit for 108 days of pre-sentence custody on a 1.5:1 basis, resulting in a net sentence of 5 years, 6 months, and 21 days.

Ancillary orders included a non-contact condition, DNA databank order, 10-year firearms prohibition with lifetime prohibition on restricted firearms, lifetime sex offender registration, and forfeiture of $860 to the victim.

The accused was charged with human trafficking, child pornography, assault, and related offences involving two victims in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged that the accused recruited and exploited the victims, exercised control over their movements and finances, posted advertisements for their sexual services, and created and distributed child pornography involving a minor.

The accused was found guilty on 14 of 15 counts.

The court found that the accused knowingly recruited both victims for exploitation, exercised control through coercion and implied threats, withheld identification documents, assaulted one victim, received financial benefits from their sexual services, and created and distributed child pornography.

The court rejected the defence argument that the accused had an honest but mistaken belief regarding the minor's age, finding instead that he was wilfully blind to her age and failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain it.

The appellant appealed his conviction for knowingly making a false or misleading statement to obtain payment for chiropractic services in violation of section 447(2)(a.3) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant challenged the conviction on multiple grounds: that the information was laid outside the limitation period under section 449 of the Insurance Act; that section 449 was unconstitutional as violating sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter; and that his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The appellant also appealed his sentence of a $10,000 fine, 12 months' probation, and $175 restitution.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the information was properly laid within the limitation period, that section 449 was neither vague nor overbroad and did not engage Charter protections, and that the delay was reasonable under the Jordan framework.

The sentence was found to be fit.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's only witness, a police officer, testified that he read the accused an approved instrument demand under s. 254(3) rather than the required approved screening device demand under s. 254(2)(b).

The defence conceded all elements of the offence except whether a proper demand was made.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish that a proper demand was made and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, one count of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, careless storage of ammunition, possession of property obtained by crime, and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The accused challenged the validity of search warrants executed at his residence, a storage unit, and a vehicle, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the Information to Obtain and found that the warrants were properly issued based on sufficient grounds.

The court also found that even if there were Charter violations, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused was arrested in his vehicle in his driveway after police observed him attend a residence believed to be a drug stash house.

A search incident to arrest yielded 0.2 grams of cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe the accused was in possession of a controlled substance, rendering the arrest unlawful and the search unauthorized.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and simple assault committed against his former domestic partner in her home on multiple occasions between March and July 2016.

The accused also pleaded guilty to breaching a section 810.2 recognizance by failing to keep the peace and be of good behavior, and by failing to report as required.

The court imposed a global sentence of 2 years and 11 months prior to credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 701 days to serve.

The sentencing emphasized the serious nature of domestic violence, the accused's extensive criminal history including prior violent offences, and the need for specific and general deterrence.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

Following a traffic stop and failed approved screening device test, the accused was arrested and advised of his right to counsel.

He requested to speak with his lawyer, Daniel Kayfetz.

After waiting only 20 minutes without reaching the lawyer, police contacted duty counsel without consulting the accused.

The accused was placed in a privacy room where police believed he spoke with duty counsel, but the accused testified he did not speak to anyone.

When asked to provide a breath sample, the accused refused, stating he had not spoken to a lawyer.

The court found that police breached the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel of choice, and excluded the evidence of refusal under section 24(2).

The court also found that even without exclusion, the Crown had not proven an unequivocal refusal beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle "over 80" contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The applicant brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of observations, statements, and breath test results.

The court found no breaches of the applicant's Charter rights.

The court held that the officer was authorized to conduct sobriety screening measures prior to making an approved screening device demand, that the right to counsel was limited during these screening measures in accordance with s. 1 of the Charter, that the applicant's right to counsel of choice was not violated by directing him to duty counsel when he did not identify a specific lawyer, that the officer had reasonable grounds to make both the ASD and breath demands, and that the detention was not arbitrary.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought production of third-party records relating to an approved screening device (ASD) used during his investigation for impaired driving and driving over 80.

The Crown and York Regional Police opposed production on the basis that the applicant failed to establish that the records were "likely relevant" under the O'Connor framework.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant provided no evidentiary foundation to establish that the ASD was not working properly or that there was any error in its operation.

The court held that historical ASD records could not advance a claim that the investigating officer knew or ought to have known that the device was unreliable, and that the application amounted to an impermissible fishing expedition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a roadside stop and breath testing.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of breath evidence under sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple breaches: a seven-minute delay in providing rights to counsel, denial of access to counsel of choice, arbitrary detention contrary to section 9, and failure to provide a further opportunity to consult counsel following the decision to detain for a show cause hearing.

The court found a breach of the right to counsel of choice but dismissed all applications for stay or exclusion of evidence, finding the accused guilty as charged.