Court File and Parties
Court File No.: Newmarket 18-06468 Date: 2020-01-12 Ontario Court of Justice
Between: Her Majesty the Queen ā and ā Artin Dawood
Before: Justice Marcella Henschel
Heard on: December 6, 2019
Reasons for Judgment released on: January 12, 2020
Ruling on s. 11(b) Application
Counsel:
- Rose Ghaly, counsel for the Crown
- Reid Rusonik, counsel for the accused Artin Dawood
HENSCHEL J.:
A. Overview
1On August 8, 2018 Artin Dawood, the applicant, was charged with trafficking and possession for the purposes of trafficking, contrary to ss. 5(1) and 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. It is alleged that on August 8, 2018 the applicant left his residence in Brampton carrying a black backpack and was observed by surveillance officers meeting with three different individuals at different places in the greater Toronto area, engaging in what the police believed were hand-to-hand drug transactions. The police observed the individuals approach the applicant's vehicle and then walk away placing something in their pockets. The officers believed the applicant was trafficking in a controlled substance, and, following the third transaction, the applicant was arrested. When he was searched incident to arrest, the police located 65.5 grams of cocaine in the black backpack in his vehicle. The cocaine was packaged in individual portions, supporting the investigators belief that it was for sale. Two rolls of cash were also located.
2On August 9, 2018 following the applicant's arrest a search warrant was executed at the applicant's home which he shared with five others. Approximately three ounces of cocaine was located in the applicant's bedroom along with four bundles of Canadian currency.
3The applicant's first trial dates were adjourned shortly after it was set because no Crown was available on the dates that had been scheduled for trial. The applicant's second trial dates were adjourned because of significant non-disclosure by the Crown. In advance of his third trial dates, the applicant filed an application to stay the proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time. The application was heard on December 6, 2019, in advance of the third scheduled trial dates of January 13 and 14, 2020.
4The "total delay" from the date the information was sworn on August 9, 2018 until the scheduled end date of the trial, January 14, 2020 is 17 months and 6 days (524 days). On December 6, 2019, I concluded that the "net period" of delay was 15 months and 24 days. Although this delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, I concluded that the defence took meaningful steps that demonstrated a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have and held that the case was one of the rare but clear cases where, despite the "net delay" falling below the presumptive ceiling, a stay of proceedings was warranted. As a result, the charges were stayed. These are my reasons.
B. Summary of the Law
5In Jordan the Supreme Court of Canada established a new framework for consideration of s. 11(b) Charter applications. The Supreme Court summarized the new framework as follows:
There is a ceiling beyond which delay becomes presumptively unreasonable. The presumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases in the superior court (or cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry). Defence delay does not count towards the presumptive ceiling.
Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the burden shifts to the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown's control in that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied. If the exceptional circumstance relates to a discrete event, the delay reasonably attributable to that event is subtracted. If the exceptional circumstance arises from the case's complexity, the delay is reasonable.
Below the presumptive ceiling, in clear cases, the defence may show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish two things: (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings; and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
For cases currently in the system, the framework must be applied flexibly and contextually, with due sensitivity to the parties' reliance on the previous state of the law.
6In Jordan, the Supreme Court made clear that the framework is structured to encourage efficiency by all parties at each stage of the proceedings and to combat a culture of complacency. Under the new framework the length of time from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial equals the "total period" of delay. Delay attributable to the defence must be subtracted from the "total period" of delay to determine the "net delay".
7Defence delay does not count towards the presumptive ceiling and includes periods of delay implicitly or explicitly waived by the defence and defence caused delay. Where an accused's acts either directly caused the delay or the acts of the accused are shown to be a deliberate and calculated tactic employed to delay the trial, including frivolous applications and requests, it will be subtracted from the period of "total delay" and will undermine a claim of unreasonable delay.
8Defence delay includes periods of time when the Crown and the Court are ready to proceed, but the defence is not. Although actions that are legitimately taken to respond to the charges will fall outside of defence delay, when what prevents the matter from proceeding is simply that the defence is not available to proceed when the Crown and the Court are, this constitutes defence delay and will be subtracted from the "total delay".
9Once "net delay" is determined, if the period of "net delay" falls below the presumptive ceiling, the imposition of a stay will be rare and limited to clear cases. In such cases, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable by establishing that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and that (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
10The meaningful steps requirement is intended to cause the defence to be proactive in streamlining proceedings and moving the case forward. While the defence is not required to act perfectly it must act reasonably and must demonstrate more than token efforts (such as simply putting on the record that a speedy trial is desired) directed at obtaining a quick trial. It falls to the defence to show that it "attempted to set the earliest possible hearing dates, was cooperative with and responsive to the Crown and the court, put the Crown on timely notice when delay was becoming a problem, and conducted all applications (including the s. 11(b) application) reasonably and expeditiously".
11Factors relevant to the assessment of whether a case has taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have include i.) the complexity of the case, ii.) local considerations, and iii.) whether the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings. In considering the reasonable time requirements of the case, trial judges should also employ the knowledge they have of their own jurisdiction, including how long a case of that nature typically takes to get to trial in light of the relevant local and systemic circumstances. Determining whether a case markedly exceeds what is reasonably required is not to be a matter of precise calculation. Rather, the Supreme Court emphasized that trial judge's should "step back from the minutiae and adopt a bird's eye view of the case".
C. History of Proceedings, Analysis, and Conclusions
12Throughout the proceedings the defence took meaningful steps that demonstrated a sustained effort to expedite the case. Following his arrest on August 8, 2018, the applicant was held for a show cause hearing. The information was laid on August 9, 2018. Duty counsel assisted the applicant at his show cause hearing which proceeded on August 9, 2018 and he was released that day on a recognizance with a surety and conditions. The matter was adjourned from August 9, 2018 to August 30, 2018, so that disclosure could be prepared.
13By August 30, 2018, the second appearance (first out-of-custody appearance), the applicant had retained counsel. A designation was filed by an agent for counsel and initial disclosure and the screening form were provided by the Crown. The matter was adjourned for 35 days to October 4, 2018 for counsel to review disclosure and to hold a crown pre-trial.
14By the third appearance, October 4, 2018, counsel had reviewed disclosure and held a crown pre-trial and a judicial pretrial was set. The court offered October 9, 31, and numerous dates in November for the pre-trial to be held but counsel was not available on any of the dates offered until November 22, 2018. As a result, the pre-trial was scheduled 49 days later, on November 22, 2018. The Crown was available on the earlier available pre-trial dates offered. Because the Crown and Court were ready to proceed with the pre-trial on October 9, 2018 but the defence could not accommodate the pre-trial until November 22, 2018, only five days of the 49 days between October 4, 2018 and November 22, 2018 count towards the presumptive ceiling, and 44 days is attributable to the defence and must be subtracted from the "total delay". This is not a case where a single earlier pre-trial date was offered, and counsel was unavailable. Rather, the Crown was available on multiple dates offered by the court and it was the defence counsel's ongoing lack of availability that lead to the delay in setting the pre-trial. While the defence unavailability was explained by another ongoing trial, it is nonetheless defence delay when multiple dates are offered, and the Crown and court are ready to proceed but the defence cannot due to other court commitments.
15On November 22, 2018 the pre-trial was held and a two-day trial was scheduled for March 20 and 21, 2019. Earlier dates of March 12 and 13, 2019 were offered by the court, but were not available to the defence.
16In the judicial pre-trial the defence and Crown agreed to focus the issues such that the only issue to be litigated at trial was the legality of the arrest and search incident to arrest that lead to the seizure of the 65.5 grams of cocaine from the backpack that was in the vehicle on August 8, 2018. The defence conceded that if the evidence was ruled constitutionally admissible the defence would concede that the charge had been made out. In return, the Crown agreed not to proceed on the trafficking count. All parties understood that the Crown was proceeding in respect of the applicant's alleged possession of 65.5 grams of cocaine seized from the backpack. Clearly, this focused approach significantly reduced the time required for trial and assisted in securing trial dates within four months of the pre-trial.
17One month after the first trial date was set, on December 20, 2018, the Crown requested that the March 20 and 21, 2019 trial dates be adjourned because no Crown was available to prosecute the case on those dates due to other conflicting matters. Although it is unclear whether the conflicting matters were set before or after the trial dates were set in this matter, what is clear is that the Crown chose to prioritize other prosecutions over the applicant's trial and chose to seek an adjournment of the trial dates when the defence was ready to proceed as scheduled. The defence made clear that the request for the adjournment was the "antithesis" of a defence request. The adjournment was granted, and the trial was rescheduled to June 6 and 7, 2019, the next available dates. As a result of the Crown prioritization of other matters, the applicant's trial was delayed for a period of 77 days (2 months and 16 days) beyond the originally scheduled trial dates. The entirety of the period between November 22, 2018 and June 5, 2019 counts towards the presumptive ceiling.
18On June 5, 2019, one day in advance of the second scheduled trial dates, the Crown again applied for an adjournment. The Crown advised that in preparing the response to the defence Charter application new disclosure came to light in respect of surveillance officers involved that were not included as part of the original witness list as well as "search warrant disclosure". The Crown advised that the additional surveillance officers were not available to proceed with the trial on the scheduled June dates.
19The new "search warrant disclosure" related to the substances alleged to have been found in the applicant's home upon execution of a search warrant on August 9, 2018, ten months earlier. The June 5, 2019 transcript and subsequent transcripts make clear that despite the fact that three ounces of cocaine were found in the applicant's home on August 9, 2018, as of June 5, 2019 no disclosure had been made relating to the search of the applicant's home and it was only while preparing for trial that the Crown with carriage of the trial realized that cocaine had been seized not only from the backpack incident to arrest but also from the applicant's bedroom. On June 5, 2019 the Crown sought the adjournment to provide the outstanding disclosure, to secure the attendance of the outstanding surveillance officers, and to expand the factual basis relied upon to prove the charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking to include the cocaine seized during the execution of the search warrant.
20The defence was ready to proceed to trial on June 6 and 7, 2019, made no complaint about the non-disclosure, and did not request an adjournment to obtain the disclosure. During submissions on June 5, 2019 the defence indicated that if the trial was adjourned, given the change in the nature of the case, the time estimate determined at the November 22, 2018 pre-trial was no longer valid and another judicial pre-trial would be required to determine a proper time estimate, to seek to narrow the issues, and to schedule a s. 11(b) application.
21The Crown application for the adjournment was granted and the second scheduled trial dates were vacated. The matter was adjourned from June 5, 2019 to July 8, 2019 for a further judicial pre-trial to be held.
22On July 8, 2019, 11 months after the offence date, the second judicial pre-trial was held. The matter was adjourned to July 18, 2019 to be spoken to before the pre-trial Judge because the Crown had not yet disclosed the search warrant related material including the information to obtain and the related investigative file.
23Finally, on July 18, 2019, 44 days after seeking the adjournment of the trial due to the non-disclosure, and 344 days (11 months and 10 days) after the execution of the warrant, the Crown provided the outstanding disclosure and the matter was adjourned to July 31, 2019 for a further judicial pre-trial to allow the defence to review the disclosure and to schedule new trial dates in relation to the allegations of possession of not only the 65.5 grams of cocaine seized from the backpack but also in relation to the 3 ounces of cocaine seized during the execution of the search warrant on August 9, 2018.
24On July 31, 2019 the Crown advised that it would not be prosecuting the "new" allegations relating to the cocaine seized during the execution of the August 9, 2018 search warrant and requested that the matter be set for a two-day trial as originally agreed with the only issue being the legality of the search and seizure of the 65.5 grams of cocaine from the backpack. Third trial dates were scheduled for January 13 and 14, 2020 and a s. 11(b) application was scheduled on December 6, 2019. Earlier dates for trial of January 8 and 9, 2020 were offered however the defence was not available on January 8, 2020. Considering the history of the proceedings and because it was a single day that the defence was not available, the Crown did not submit that the five days between January 9 and January 14, 2020 should be treated as defence delay. I agree with this concession.
25As a result of the Crown's failure to provide significant disclosure in a timely manner and the change in the Crown position regarding the evidence to be relied upon at trial, a decision subsequently abandoned, the applicant's trial was delayed from June 6 and 7, 2018 to January 13 and 14, 2020, a period of 222 days (7 months and 8 days). The entirety of this period counts toward the Jordan ceiling.
26As noted, the total period of delay from the date of the laying of the information on August 9, 2018 to the anticipated end of trial on January 14, 2020 is a period of 524 days (17 months and 6 days). From the "total delay", I have deducted the 44 day period of defence delay between October 9, 2018 and November 22, 2018. As a result, the "net delay" is 15 months and 24 days.
27In these circumstances, I am satisfied that although the period of "net delay" falls below the presumptive ceiling, the defence has established that this is one of the rare and clear cases where a stay is warranted. I am satisfied that the defence has established that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and that (2) the case took markedly longer that it reasonably should have.
28A consideration of the history of the matter makes clear that the applicant took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings:
The applicant was ready to proceed with his bail hearing on the first appearance and did so with the assistance of duty counsel.
By the second appearance the applicant had retained counsel and counsel sent an agent to appear in court and receive disclosure.
After receiving disclosure, counsel reviewed disclosure in a timely fashion and held a counsel pre-trial in advance of the third appearance.
On the third appearance counsel continued to move the case forward by scheduling a judicial pre-trial.
At the pre-trial counsel was prepared and agreed to focus the trial in a manner designed to expeditiously move the case forward. Counsel agreed that the sole issue at trial was the lawfulness of the applicant's arrest and the search incident to arrest. The applicant conceded that if the evidence was admitted following the determination of the Charter issues, that a conviction should follow. This focused approach significantly reduced the time required for trial and as a result trial dates were set within four months of the pre-trial. The defence agreed to trial dates within one week of the earliest available date.
The applicant elected to be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice, the first available forum for a trial, instead of electing to have a preliminary hearing and a trial.
When the Crown sought to adjourn the first trial dates due to their unavailability, the defence made clear that they were opposed to the matter being delayed and accepted the earliest available new dates for trial.
When the Crown sought to adjourn the second scheduled trial dates, the defence put the Crown and the Court on notice that s. 11(b) would be in issue if the trial was adjourned.
The defence made themselves available for the new third trial dates within five days of the earliest available date. When the third trial dates were scheduled the applicant requested that the s. 11(b) application be heard in advance of trial and filed the motion materials in compliance with the rules on October 15, 2019. The Crown response was not filed until the day of the hearing on December 6, 2019. Despite this, the defence made no complaint about the late response and the application proceeded as scheduled.
29A review of the totality of the defence conduct shows that the actions of the defence aimed at expediting the trial were of substance, not merely of form. The defence attempted to set the earliest possible hearing dates, was cooperative with and responsive to the Crown and the Court, put the Crown on timely notice when delay was becoming a problem, and conducted all applications, including the s. 11(b) application, reasonably and expeditiously.
30The delays were caused by the Crown and resulted in the case taking markedly longer than it reasonably should have given the narrow issues to be litigated. This was not a complex case. It was a simple case with a single legal issue to be determined.
31Local considerations suggest that this case took markedly longer than it should have. Even though Newmarket is a very busy jurisdiction, the case was originally set for trial within approximately 7.5 months of the offence date and only four months after the completion of the pre-trial. However, at the Crown request the trial dates were adjourned twice, leading to ten additional months of delay. As discussed in more detail below, the second delay was due to significant non-disclosure. In this jurisdiction, all parties are aware that the loss of a trial date can lead to lengthy delays. As such, the Crown must be especially diligent in ensuring disclosure is complete well in advance of trial. The delays caused by the Crown ultimately more than doubled the length of time the matter took to be tried.
32Most significantly, the Crown did not take reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings. In contrast to the applicant's sustained efforts to move the case forward, the prosecutorial errors lead to repeated and avoidable delays of the trial. It was indicative of the type of complacency decried by the Supreme Court of Canada in Jordan. Although the court and the defence were ready for the matter to be tried within 7 months and 13 days of the laying of the information, due to the decision of the Crown to prioritize other matters, the first trial date was adjourned two and a half months from March to June. Alone, this would have been a relatively minor delay. The Crown is not to be held to a standard of perfection. However, when this delay is added to the significant and avoidable delay caused by the serious non-disclosure and the Crown decision to alter the original trial strategy agreed upon at the pre-trial, the delay became unreasonable.
33The non-disclosure in this case was serious involving evidence of the gravamen of the offence, not peripheral or marginally relevant material. The delay associated with the non-disclosure in this case is especially concerning given that the bail hearing transcript of August 9, 2018 makes clear that at the bail hearing the Crown was aware of the execution of the search warrant and seizure of three ounces of cocaine at that time. The facts relating to the execution of the search warrant were read into the record at the bail hearing.
34The explanation for the non-disclosure was administrative error. The Crown explained that a separate police file was generated in relation to the execution of the search warrant so that the materials related to the search of the applicant's home were in a different electronic case file than the rest of the disclosure. I recognize that the trial Crown did not conduct the bail hearing and may not personally have been aware of the results of the search warrant until shortly before trial. However, the police could have been under no misunderstanding about the relevance of the fruits of the execution of the search warrant, 30 ounces of cocaine, and all of the related materials. The provision to the Crown of that material for disclosure should have been automatic and it is difficult to understand how non-disclosure of materials so central to the gravamen of the offence could go unnoticed for ten months. Despite the fact of the execution of the search warrant and the related seizure being before the court at the bail hearing, and a counsel and judicial pre-trial being held, the Crown did not avert to the missing disclosure until immediately before the second trial dates were scheduled to proceed. The highly relevant materials clearly could have and should have been disclosed shortly after the charges were laid. Moreover, once the error was discovered, there is no explanation for why it took another 44 days for the materials to be disclosed, conduct that further delayed the scheduling of a new trial date.
35The defence made no complaint about non-disclosure but cannot be faulted for choosing not to bring the outstanding disclosure to the Crown's attention especially given that both in the Crown screening form and at the pre-trial the Crown advised that the prosecution was seeking to establish possession for the purpose of trafficking on the basis of the 65.5 grams of cocaine seized from the backpack. Not surprisingly, the defence opted to "let sleeping dogs lie" and did not question this decision or prompt the Crown to revisit it by requesting the disclosure of the materials related to the execution of the search warrant. This was not a case where the defence waited until the last minute to request outstanding disclosure and then complained about its absence. Rather, it was the Crown that decided ten months after the warrant was executed that they may wish to rely upon the undisclosed information, despite earlier taking the position that the charge related only to the cocaine seized from the backpack.
36Delay was also caused as a result of the need to pre-try the matter a second time because the original trial estimates were no longer valid due to the change in the Crown approach to the case, a change of position that was ultimately abandoned. The Crown had an obvious obligation to disclose the materials related to the search of the applicant's home once the Crown realized they had not been disclosed. However, the disclosure should have been expedited and the Crown ought to have more carefully considered the appropriateness and impact of the decision to proceed on the more expansive allegations at such a late stage of the proceedings. The decision to proceed on the more expansive allegations effectively undid, at least temporarily, the effective case management achieved at the judicial pretrial and exacerbated the problem caused by the non-disclosure. In total, the case was adjourned an additional ten months from when it was originally scheduled for trial.
37Like Belle, this is a case that highlights the potentially dire consequences of a major disclosure failure by the Crown in a busy jurisdiction and the need for immediate steps to be taken to contain the damage. The decision to significantly alter the nature of the Crown case on the eve of the trial exacerbated rather than ameliorated the problems caused by the non-disclosure. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that the defence has established that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, and that this is one of the rare but clear cases where, despite the fact the "net delay" falls below the presumptive ceiling, a stay is warranted.
Released: January 12, 2020
Signed: Justice Marcella Henschel
APPENDIX "A"
| Date | Summary of Appearance/Event | Characterization of Delay | Delay to next event |
|---|---|---|---|
| August 8, 2018 | Offence date. | Does not count towards s. 11(b) ceiling. | n/a |
| August 9, 2018 | Information sworn and bail hearing completed. | Start of s. 11(b) clock. Counts towards ceiling. | 21 days |
| August 30, 2018 | Second appearance (first appearance out of custody). Counsel retained and initial disclosure provided. | Counts towards ceiling. | 35 days (1 month, 4 days) |
| October 4, 2018 | Third appearance. A counsel pre-trial was held after receipt of disclosure and on October 4 a judicial pre-trial is set for November 22, 2018. Earlier dates are offered including October 9, 31, and throughout the month of November. | 5 days counts towards ceiling. 44 days is defence delay because the Crown and court were available to conduct the pre-trial as of October 9 but the defence was not available due to involvement in an ongoing trial. | 49 days (1 month, 18 days) |
| November 22, 2018 | Fourth appearance. Judicial pre-trial held. Crown and defence narrow the issues to the lawfulness of the applicant's arrest and search incident to arrest. Crown to proceed on the possession for the purpose of trafficking count only in respect of 65.5 grams of cocaine. Two days set for trial on March 20 and 21, 2019. | Counts towards ceiling. | 28 days |
| December 20, 2018 | Fifth appearance. Crown application for adjournment because Crown is unavailable on the scheduled trial dates. New trial dates scheduled for June 6 and 7, 2019. | Counts towards ceiling. | 168 days (5 months, 18 days) |
| June 5, 2019 | Crown application for adjournment of June 6 and 7, 2019 trial dates due to non-disclosure of all materials related to execution of search warrant of August 9, 2018, unavailability of additional Crown witnesses identified in missing disclosure; and to accommodate potential change in Crown position regarding allegations to be relied upon. Matter adjourned to July 8, 2019 for judicial pre-trial. | Counts towards the ceiling. | 33 days (1 month, 3 days) |
| July 8, 2019 | Second judicial pre-trial held. Matter adjourned for further pre-trial because search warrant related disclosure still outstanding. | Counts towards ceiling. | 10 days |
| July 18, 2019 | Outstanding disclosure provided. Matter adjourned to July 31, 2018 for further judicial pre-trial to determine new trial estimates due to reliance upon additional allegations of seizure of cocaine during execution of search warrant. | Counts towards ceiling. | 13 days |
| July 31, 2019 | Third judicial pre-trial held. Crown decides to proceed as initially agreed and to abandon intent to rely upon seizure of cocaine obtained during execution of search warrant. Section 11(b) application scheduled for December 6, 2019. Trial dates scheduled for January 13 and 14, 2020. | Counts towards ceiling. | 168 days (5 months and 15 days) |
| December 6, 2019 | Matter stayed for violation of s. 11(b) |
Footnotes
2Jordan, at para. 105.
3Jordan, at para. 63.
4Jordan, at para. 64; R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, at para. 55; R. v. Mallozi, 2018 ONCA 312; R. v. Albinowski, 2018 ONCA 1084; R. v. Ameeruth, 2019 ONSC 4537, at paras. 24-30.
5Jordan, at paras. 84 and 85.
6Jordan, at para. 87 and 89; R. v. Belle, 2018 ONSC 7728, at paras. 6-26.
7Jordan, at para. 91.
8A chart at Appendix "A" sets out the chronology of the case, the periods of delay, and identifies any periods characterized as defence delay to be subtracted from the total period of delay.
9R. v. Ameeruth, 2019 ONSC 4537, at para. 28.
10Jordan, at para. 84.
11Jordan, at para. 84.
12Jordan, at para. 90.
13R. v. Belle, 2018 ONSC 7728, at para. 26.
14Belle, at para. 1. See also following additional examples of cases resulting in a stay where the net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling but where there were multiple trial dates and delays caused by non-disclosure by the Crown: R. v. Bole, [2019] O.J. No. 1465 (OCJ) (15.75 months); R. v. Chor, [2017] O.J. No. 1121 (OCJ) (16 months); R. v. DeSouza, [2016] O.J. No. 5091 (OCJ) (15 months); R. v. Gnanansubramaniam, [2017] O.J. No. 611 (OCJ) (17 months 6 days); R. v. Santhanam, [2016] O.J. No. 6691 (OCJ) (15.5 months).
