Sean Hanley

The defendant, Ontario, brought a motion to defer filing its statement of defence in a proposed class proceeding concerning the alleged maltreatment of inmates at the Maplehurst Correctional Centre.

Ontario argued that exceptional circumstances existed, including the need to await an appellate decision in a related criminal matter and to investigate recent amendments to the statement of claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the circumstances were not exceptional and that requiring the statement of defence would advance the litigation, frame the issues for certification, and serve the public interest in timely justice.

The applicants brought a Charter challenge alleging that the Government of Ontario's cancellation of a joint task force violated their right to freedom of association under section 2(d).

The task force had been proposed during collective bargaining between the union and the college employer council to help resolve a strike, but no collective agreement was reached and the strike was ended by back-to-work legislation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the task force was not part of any collective agreement and its cancellation did not substantially interfere with the collective bargaining process.

The appellants, a public sector union and its officers, challenged the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation (Bill 178) that ended a five-week faculty strike at Ontario's 24 colleges of applied arts and technology in 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the legislation limited the appellants' s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association by ending a lawful strike, departing from the application judge's finding of no substantial interference.

However, the court held that the limitation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter, finding that Ontario had a pressing and substantial objective of resuming classroom instruction to protect students' academic year, that the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and that the substitution of neutral interest arbitration for strike activity rendered the effects proportionate.

The applicant, a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing their claim that changes to the Ontario Autism Program discriminated on the basis of age and disability.

The tribunal had declined to decide whether the definition of 'age' in section 10 of the Human Rights Code, which limits age discrimination claims to persons 18 or older, violated section 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court held that the tribunal was required to decide the Charter issue as it was properly pleaded and necessary to resolve the applicant's claim.

The tribunal's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for resolution of the constitutional question.

Ontario sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that changes to the Ontario Autism Program (OAP) discriminated against a child with autism on the basis of disability.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding it unreasonable.

The Court held that the Tribunal failed to provide a rational chain of analysis to support its conclusion that the child experienced adverse treatment based on her disability, as the OAP's funding caps were designed to address inequities and ensure all eligible children received some beneficial services.

The Court declined to remit the issue of disability discrimination back to the Tribunal, concluding that no rational analysis could lead to a finding of discrimination on these facts.

The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) and two individuals applied for a declaration that the Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017, which ended a five-week college strike, infringed their freedom of association rights under section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and sought damages.

The Crown in Right of Ontario and the College Employer Council argued the Act did not infringe the Charter or was justified under section 1.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Act did not substantially interfere with meaningful collective bargaining, as the parties were at an impasse.

Alternatively, the court held that even if there was an infringement, it was justified under section 1, given the pressing and substantial objective of resuming college instruction, the rational connection of the legislation, its minimal impairment (by substituting a neutral arbitration process), and its proportionality.

This appeal involved a constitutional challenge to Ontario's COVID-19 public health measures, specifically the proof of vaccination requirement enacted by Ont.

Reg 364/20.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the provincial government had ceased enforcement and subsequently revoked the Regulation.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding no practical effect for the declaratory relief sought and that the claim for nominal damages did not cure mootness.

Concerns about judicial economy and the utility of deciding fact-specific constitutional issues in the absence of a live controversy also weighed against exercising discretion.

The applicants, families of adults with severe autism, sought judicial review of the Ministry's decision to discontinue special, non-statutory funding for Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA) therapy and transition them to mainstream adult developmental services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the allocation of public funds is a political decision not subject to judicial review absent bad faith.

The court also dismissed the applicants' Charter claims, reaffirming that section 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to fund specific health or social services, and finding no breach of sections 7, 9, or 12 regarding one applicant's involuntary hospitalization under the Mental Health Act.

The applicants brought an application challenging the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 proof of vaccination requirement (Ont.

Reg. 364/20) under sections 2(a), 7, and 15 of the Charter.

The applicants argued that the regulation, which required patrons to provide proof of vaccination to enter certain businesses, violated their freedom of religion, right to life, liberty, and security of the person, and equality rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no Charter contraventions.

The court held that the regulation did not interfere with the applicants' religious beliefs, did not compel medical treatment or engage the right to security of the person, and did not discriminate based on religion or disability.

The defendant government brought a motion to transfer the plaintiff's action challenging mandatory COVID-19 vaccination laws from Ottawa to the Toronto Region.

The government sought to have the plaintiff's Charter claims heard alongside a similar application already scheduled in Toronto.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that transferring the action would result in a loss of discovery rights for the plaintiff, risk duplication of evidence, and create a risk of inconsistent verdicts between the Charter and Human Rights Code claims.

The court concluded there was no connection between the action and the Toronto Region to justify a transfer.

The respondent, representing a class of seriously mentally ill inmates and inmates held in prolonged administrative segregation, brought a class action against Ontario for Charter breaches and systemic negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that Ontario's use of administrative segregation violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, and awarded $30 million in aggregate Charter damages.

Ontario appealed, arguing that the Charter breaches were not established for all seriously mentally ill inmates, that Charter damages were inappropriate due to good governance concerns, and that the negligence claim was barred by statute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings that administrative segregation of seriously mentally ill inmates constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, that Ontario's clear disregard for inmates' rights justified Charter damages, and that the operational implementation of segregation policies grounded a valid systemic negligence claim.

The applicants sought to schedule an expedited application for judicial review of an emergency order made under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The order permitted specified persons to obtain personal health information about the COVID status of individuals.

The court declined to set an expedited schedule because the applicants had not yet served their expert evidence, there was no direct evidence of urgency, and the order was set to expire shortly.

A regular hearing date was set, with further case conferences scheduled to address potential mootness or timetabling.

The appellant was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers while walking to a counter-protest flag rally, having committed no offence and presenting no threat of violence.

The police relied on a purported common law power to arrest someone acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace by others.

Applying the ancillary powers doctrine, the Court held that no such common law power exists: the power is not reasonably necessary because statutory arrest powers already address situations where individuals resist or obstruct officers taking less intrusive measures, and effectiveness of a police action alone cannot justify an arrest if less intrusive means were available.

The Court restored the trial judge's award of damages for battery, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, and found no new trial was warranted on the issue of excessive force because the arrest itself was unlawful.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal of a trial judgment in a civil action involving allegations of excessive force during arrest.

The respondent sought to avoid paying the costs of the appeal on the basis that the matter constituted public interest litigation.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the nature of the proceeding did not fall within the recognized categories of public interest litigation.

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal in the amount of $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The respondent was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers on May 24, 2009, near Douglas Creek Estates in Caledonia while carrying a Canadian flag to participate in a flag-raising rally.

The trial judge found the arrest was unlawful and awarded damages for false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and breach of Charter rights.

On appeal, the majority (Nordheimer and Cronk JJ.A.) found the arrest was lawful as a preventive measure to avoid an imminent breach of the peace, but remitted the case for a new trial on the issue of excessive force.

Huscroft J.A. dissented, finding the arrest was unlawful and that the trial judge's findings should not be disturbed.

The appellant law firm and lawyers brought an application for an order protecting the confidentiality of solicitor-client privileged information of clients who had lodged complaints against them, and for a declaration that the Law Society Act's investigation powers violate sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed the application as premature because the proceedings before the Law Society Tribunal had not yet concluded.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the administrative process should run its course before a Charter challenge is brought to the courts.

Lawyers under investigation by their professional regulator sought constitutional declarations and procedural protections concerning potential disclosure of client confidential information during disciplinary proceedings.

They argued provisions of the governing statute violated ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter by failing to adequately protect solicitor‑client privilege and requested public interest standing to advance broader constitutional relief.

The court held the application was premature because the administrative process before the regulator’s tribunal had not yet been completed.

The tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the constitutional arguments and grant most requested remedies, with courts reviewing the matter only after the administrative process concluded.

The application was dismissed and public interest standing refused.

The defendant, Ontario, sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a class action and refusing to strike the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff's claim alleged that detaining individuals in jail while awaiting a psychiatric hospital bed under a Criminal Code assessment order violated Charter rights and breached fiduciary duties, relying on the decision in R. v. Hussein.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification decision because the motion judge accepted the plaintiff's legal interpretation of Hussein as a pleaded fact, and because individual issues regarding the separate purposes of detention and assessment could overwhelm common issues.

The Crown appealed an order of an Ontario Court of Justice judge who purported to exercise delegated habeas corpus powers to declare the accused's detention in jail unlawful.

The accused had been ordered to undergo a mental health assessment at a hospital but was held in jail due to a lack of beds.

A Superior Court judge had remitted the accused's habeas corpus application to the lower court under s. 775 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the lower court judge's order was not a judgment issued on the return of a writ of habeas corpus, as s. 775 does not permit the delegation of superior court habeas corpus powers to a lower court.

Consequently, there was no statutory jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 784(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants challenged the province's policy of seeking compensation for fire services fees from individuals involved in motor vehicle accidents, arguing it violated section 7 of the Charter by potentially deterring people from calling for essential services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that there was no evidence to support this assertion.

The Court also affirmed that section 7 does not protect purely economic interests and that the province's process of establishing liability through the courts accords with fundamental justice.