Ronald G. Slaght

The successful appellant, Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries, sought costs of the appeal and the underlying application from the respondents.

The respondents argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the respondents were public interest litigants but held this did not excuse them from all costs consequences.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the respondents' public interest status, the Court ordered the corporate respondent to pay $350,000 in total costs and the individual respondent to pay $10,000.

The appellant cemetery group appealed a decision declaring that its directors were invalidly appointed under 1849 legislation, that its funeral home and visitation centre businesses exceeded its statutory objects, and that it was a charitable purpose trust subject to the Charities Accounting Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that an 1871 Act fundamentally changed the cemetery's governance to a corporate model, displacing the pioneer public election process.

The Court also held that the ancillary funeral operations were within the cemetery's objects and that the cemetery was a statutory trust, not a charitable purpose trust.

The respondents' cross-appeal seeking an investigation by the Public Guardian and Trustee was dismissed.

The appellant, Dr. Colin Ward, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for negligence in performing a laparoscopic colectomy on the respondent, Karen Armstrong, in February 2010.

The trial judge found that Dr. Ward breached the standard of care by bringing a LigaSure device within one to two millimetres of the respondent's left ureter, causing a thermal injury that resulted in stricturing of the ureter and eventual removal of the kidney.

The majority of the Court of Appeal (Paciocco and Juriansz JJ.A.) allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by defining the standard of care as a goal or result (avoiding injury) rather than as the means a prudent surgeon would employ.

The majority held that since the trial judge found Dr. Ward took the steps a prudent surgeon would take, he should have been exonerated.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, finding the trial judge's findings on standard of care were fully supported by the evidence and that staying at least two millimetres away from the ureter was a necessary step, not merely a goal.

The appellant brought two motions: one to set aside a costs order made by a single judge on an abandoned motion for leave to appeal, and another for leave to appeal a reconsideration decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions.

The court found no error in the costs order, noting the appellant could have simply requested reasons under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act instead of bringing a motion.

The court also denied leave to appeal the tribunal's decision, agreeing that the appellant lacked standing under s. 34(19) of the Planning Act because he did not make oral or written submissions at the statutory public meeting.

The appellant, 2138746 Ontario Inc., appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent, Friday Harbour Village Inc., acquired legal and beneficial ownership of the Marina Strip by adverse possession, did not abandon its titled right of way over the Marina Strip, had a prescriptive easement over the Marina Strip, and did not commit actionable trespass.

The respondent cross-appealed a finding that its right of way over the Western Strip was abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings on adverse possession and related matters.

The appellant physician appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct and revoking his certificate of registration.

The Committee found that the appellant had deliberately overbilled patients for laser eye surgery and directed staff to alter medical records to conceal the overbilling.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Committee misapprehended the evidence, reversed the burden of proof, and imposed an unreasonable penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Committee's credibility findings and weighing of the evidence were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The penalty of revocation was also upheld as reasonable given the premeditated nature of the fraud and the need for public protection.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's finding that the purchaser (241 Ontario) had actual notice of a defect in the power of sale process.

The trial judge had conflated actual knowledge with constructive knowledge, finding that receipt of information suggesting the need for inquiry constituted actual notice.

The appellate court clarified that actual notice requires actual knowledge of the defect itself, not merely knowledge of facts that might prompt inquiry.

The court held that 241 Ontario was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and could rely on the protections of the Land Titles Act.

The court also found that sections 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act do not limit the right to rely on registration under the Land Titles Act, and that these provisions provide complementary methods of protecting bona fide purchasers.

The post-sale mortgagees' interests were upheld, and Ginkgo's mortgage was found to be valid.

McDonald's appealed a Superior Court decision that terminated a commercial ground lease due to McDonald's failure to comply with the renewal provision.

The application judge found that because the parties had not agreed on a rental rate at least nine months before the lease expiry, McDonald's was obliged to either refer the matter to arbitration or revoke its renewal notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in concluding that North Elgin had properly revoked its waiver of strict compliance with the renewal provision.

The court held that the revocation lacked sufficient clarity and did not provide McDonald's with reasonable notice or an opportunity to cure the defect.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing an application.

The Court of Appeal reversed the application decision.

As a result, the costs order awarded to the respondent in the amount of $45,000 was set aside, and costs in the application were awarded to the appellant on a partial indemnity basis in the same amount, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellant was awarded costs of the motions before the motion judge in the amount of $85,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant purchased a cottage property through an online auction conducted by the respondent auction company.

After the high bid was accepted and a purchase and sale contract executed, the sellers refused to close.

The appellant subsequently negotiated a second purchase and sale contract directly with the sellers and the sale closed.

The auction company claimed entitlement to the buyer's premium from the appellant's escrow deposit, arguing the two contracts were effectively one continuous agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the buyer's premium was not payable when the sale failed to close due to the seller's default, and that the subsequent direct purchase did not trigger the obligation to pay the premium under the auction contract.

The appellant loaned $500,000 to a company with the understanding that it would receive registered shares in a related company as consideration.

Years later, the respondent guaranteed repayment of the loan.

The respondent sought summary judgment to declare the guarantee unenforceable, arguing that a trust agreement had discharged the loan by providing the appellant with a beneficial interest in shares.

The motion judge agreed, but the Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the motion judge's conclusion contradicted his own factual findings and misconstrued the purpose of the trust agreement.

The court held that the trust agreement was intended to provide security, not to discharge the loan, and that the guarantee and general security agreement were enforceable under the Business Corporations Act.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her negligence claim based on lack of informed consent following a laparoscopically assisted vaginal hysterectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which the appellant's left ureter was transected.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding of negligence in post-operative care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on informed consent, finding the trial judge properly applied the modified objective test and reasonably concluded that a reasonable person in the appellant's circumstances would have proceeded with surgery despite the risks.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent breached the standard of care in post-operative management was not supported by the expert evidence, as the experts acknowledged that declining to order a CT scan on July 7, 2008 was a reasonable decision within the standard of care.

The City of Toronto brought a motion to quash an appeal by Brookfield from an arbitration award determining the fair market rental for a commercial property.

The court held that under the arbitration agreement and the Arbitration Act, 1991, the parties' appeal rights were limited to questions of law with leave.

The court found that Brookfield's grounds of appeal, which related to valuation theories, lease rates, and contractual interpretation, raised questions of fact or mixed fact and law, not questions of law.

Consequently, the motion to quash the appeal was granted.

Following the dismissal of two related civil actions, the successful defendants sought a costs order requiring the plaintiffs’ counsel personally to pay a portion of the trial costs associated with calling 22 witnesses.

The defendants argued that the evidence of those witnesses was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule and that counsel’s decision to call them wasted approximately ten days of trial time.

The court considered Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to award costs against a solicitor.

The judge held that such orders should be made only in rare circumstances and typically require conduct approaching recklessness, abuse of process, or bad faith.

The court concluded that counsel’s decision to lead the evidence was not reckless or abusive and declined to order costs against counsel personally.

Following a major apartment building fire, the owner and property manager were found liable as one defendant.

The appellant insured both the owner and property manager, while the respondent insured only the property manager.

After the respondent paid the full excess claim to the tort plaintiffs, it sought to recover half the amount from the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision that the respondent was entitled to recover 50% from the appellant under the principles of equitable contribution and unjust enrichment, as the appellant retained an obligation to indemnify the owner.

The representative plaintiff in a certified securities class action sought court approval of a settlement, class counsel fees, and a modest honorarium under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The proposed settlement required the defendants’ insurers to pay $2.25 million for distribution to class members alleging misrepresentations affecting publicly traded shares.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class after considering the likelihood of success, litigation risks, and the absence of objections.

However, the court declined to approve the proposed cy près recipient because of connections between class counsel and the proposed organization, concluding that such links created an inappropriate indirect benefit to counsel.

The settlement and counsel fees were approved subject to the parties proposing a different cy près recipient.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding on behalf of York University students whose classes were disrupted by a 2008 strike, alleging breach of contract, breach of the Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment.

The motions judge dismissed the certification motion, finding the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action because the claims improperly interfered with the university's academic discretion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's conclusion that the claims were barred by academic discretion and that the pleadings were insufficient to establish a contractual or statutory cause of action.

Tobacco producers commenced a proposed class action alleging that federal and provincial governments failed to enforce tobacco taxation and excise legislation, allowing contraband tobacco markets to flourish and causing economic losses to lawful producers.

The plaintiffs advanced claims in misfeasance in public office and negligence, asserting that public officials deliberately failed to enforce statutory regimes to placate certain communities.

The defendants moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the amended statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the pleading failed to allege the essential elements of misfeasance in public office, including deliberate unlawful conduct and bad faith by specific officials.

It further concluded that the statutory schemes governing tobacco regulation did not create a private law duty of care owed to tobacco producers and that recognizing such a duty would improperly subject government policy decisions to tort liability.

The amended statement of claim was struck and the action dismissed.

In long‑running commercial litigation concerning an alleged oral agreement granting the plaintiffs a 50% interest in a casino development project, the parties brought pre‑trial motions addressing potential conflicts of interest involving defence counsel and issue estoppel relating to alleged spoliation of evidence.

The plaintiffs clarified that their spoliation allegations were directed only at the defendants and not at defence counsel, and that they would not seek to call defence counsel as witnesses.

The court treated these statements as binding admissions and issued declarations preventing the plaintiffs from alleging misconduct, spoliation, or false statements by defence counsel at trial.

Remaining issues, including whether issue estoppel barred certain spoliation arguments, were left for determination by the trial judge.