Arthur Robert Camporese

Following the allowance of the appeal, the Court of Appeal requested submissions on costs for the motion, which had not been addressed at the hearing.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the appellant $4,000 all-inclusive, in accordance with the parties' agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge against provisions of the Insurance Act, alleging the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) lacked adjudicative independence.

They obtained a motion judge's order under Rule 30.10 requiring the LAT to produce hundreds of internal records.

The LAT appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in her application of Rule 30.10.

The records were not relevant to a material issue because adjudicative independence in a specific case does not impact the constitutional validity of the tribunal's jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, nor does it engage s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court also clarified that deliberative secrecy applies to administrative tribunals to the same extent as courts.

The applicant appealed and sought judicial review of Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions dismissing her claims for income replacement benefits and medical expenses, and ordering the destruction of internal tribunal documents she submitted as evidence of institutional bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and application, finding no error of law in the Tribunal's determination that the insurer's examination notices complied with the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's orders striking the applicant's reply evidence and directing the destruction and non-dissemination of internal documents, concluding that the Tribunal reasonably exercised its jurisdiction to control its process and properly applied the doctrines of solicitor-client privilege and deliberative secrecy.

The plaintiffs sued multiple defendants, including an insurer and its subcontractors, for various torts arising from the handling of a statutory accident benefits claim.

The defendants brought Rule 21 motions to strike the claims for lack of jurisdiction and disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court refused to strike the action for lack of jurisdiction because of an outstanding constitutional challenge to the Insurance Act.

However, the court struck all tort claims against the moving defendants, except for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding it was plain and obvious they could not succeed.

The court also struck the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule as an abuse of process.

This decision addresses the costs of a dismissed motion brought by the plaintiff, United Mennonite Home for the Aged, to amend its pleadings to name Dan Gordon in his personal capacity.

The defendant, Dan Gordon, was entirely successful in opposing the motion and sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant, reducing the claimed amount by $1,000 due to the defendant's conduct unnecessarily lengthening the proceeding.

The court affirmed that success is a presumptive factor in costs awards and that a charitable organization's limited ability to pay is irrelevant when they initiated the motion.

The appellant/applicant sought to appeal and judicially review interlocutory decisions of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) regarding the striking out and destruction of certain evidence.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, as there is no right of appeal from an interlocutory LAT decision.

The court also dismissed the application for judicial review regarding the evidentiary rulings due to prematurity, but permitted the judicial review to proceed regarding the orders requiring the destruction of documents.

The appellant, Bon-Star Inc., appealed an order declaring its mortgage a closed mortgage with no prepayment privileges and requiring compensation for lost interest upon prepayment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the declarations to clarify that prepayment privileges were absent in favour of the mortgagor and that compensation for lost interest was required for the specific transaction where the "Due on Sale" clause was not invoked.

The court found the application judge erred in making a broad declaration regarding prepayment without compensation, as specific mortgage terms like the "Due on Sale" clause could alter prepayment conditions.

The court also upheld the application judge's discretionary decisions regarding adjournments and counsel appointment.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of "involved in the incident" under section 268(2) of the Insurance Act, which dictates liability for statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision that an arbitrator erred in law by introducing a causation requirement into the test for "involvement" in a priority dispute between an insured snowmobile's insurer (Gore Mutual) and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court held that temporal, spatial, and participatory factors were sufficient to establish involvement, without requiring a direct causal link to the injuries.

The appellant Minister appealed an arbitrator's decision holding the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund liable to pay statutory accident benefits to a passenger injured in a snowmobile accident.

The passenger was riding on an uninsured snowmobile that crashed into a tree, followed 0.6 seconds later by an insured snowmobile crashing into the same tree.

The arbitrator found the insured snowmobile was not 'involved in the incident' because it did not cause or contribute to the injuries.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator erred in law by engrafting a causation requirement onto the plain meaning of 'involved in the incident' under s. 268(2)(1)(iii) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant insurer appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal reconsideration decision that upheld a finding that the respondent was catastrophically impaired and entitled to non-earner benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to identify any extricable error of law in the adjudicator's assessment of the medical evidence and whole person impairment ratings.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction to hear the reconsideration request as a single member of the original two-member panel, noting that the Tribunal's rules permit such a procedure.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its request to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01.

Due to an administrative error, the motions judge did not receive or consider the appellant's responding submissions before releasing her decision.

When notified of the error, the motions judge declined to reconsider the matter and directed the parties to pursue their remedies under the Rules.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge should have set aside her decision and either reconsidered it or directed it to another judge, rather than requiring an appeal.

The decision was set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The moving party, an insurance company, brought a motion for leave to appeal the unreported decisions of the motion judge dated January 4, 2021, and January 21, 2021.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The parties were directed to contact the court to schedule a case conference.

The appellant, a passenger in a vehicle driven by an unlicensed driver without the owner's permission, sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident.

He sued the driver, vehicle owner, and the owner's liability insurer, claiming entitlement to uninsured motorist coverage under section 265(1) of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment, finding that section 1.8.2 of the standard Ontario Automobile Policy excluded uninsured motorist coverage where the vehicle was operated without the owner's consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, applying the precedent established in Shipman v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. The appellant was limited to Statutory Accident Benefits and could pursue other claims through the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The plaintiff, William Conners, was injured as a passenger in a car accident.

He initiated two actions: one against the driver, owner, and their insurer, Gore Mutual, and another against Unica Insurance, an insurer of a past employer.

Both Gore Mutual and Unica brought motions for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the actions against them.

Gore Mutual argued lack of coverage due to the driver operating the vehicle without the owner's consent.

Unica contended no coverage as Conners was no longer an employee for whom a vehicle was furnished.

The court dismissed both actions, finding that Conners was not an "insured person" under either policy based on the Insurance Act and relevant policy exclusions.

CUMIS General Insurance Company appealed a trial judgment finding that an unlicensed driver operated the respondent's vehicle without consent, either express or implied.

CUMIS argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and failed to establish the tort of negligent entrustment.

The appellate court rejected all of CUMIS's arguments, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual conclusions.

The court also held that even if negligent entrustment exists in Ontario, it could not be established given the finding of no implied consent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

In the first phase of a bifurcated trial, the court addressed whether a 16-year-old G1 driver, Nihad Ismail, had his father Sherif's express or implied consent to operate his vehicle, and whether Sherif Ismail negligently entrusted the vehicle to Nihad.

Nihad was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving his father's car without permission.

The court found no evidence of express or implied consent, noting Nihad's subjective belief that he lacked permission and the absence of prior unauthorized use known to the father.

The court also dismissed the claim of negligent entrustment, finding that the element of "entrustment" was not established as there was no direct giving of the chattel from owner to operator.

Consequently, Sherif Ismail was not held vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action, the defendant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff provided no submissions despite being invited to do so.

After reviewing the docketed time, hourly rates for counsel and law clerk, and the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including delays in the prosecution of the action by the plaintiff, the court found the claimed costs reasonable.

The court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendant for fees and disbursements.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her motor vehicle accident claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment because the appellant failed to plead facts relevant to discoverability in her statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a limitations defence must be pleaded in a statement of defence, and discoverability should be addressed in a reply, not anticipated in the statement of claim.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the claim was discovered and granted the appellant leave to deliver a reply.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the action was dismissed after statutory deductions eliminated the plaintiffs’ damages awards.

The defendant sought costs, arguing the trial result was more favourable than her pre‑trial settlement offer.

The plaintiffs opposed costs or sought reductions, relying on a minor damages award to one plaintiff, alleged failures to admit facts, hardship, and challenges to the defendant’s bill of costs.

The court held that the defendant, as the successful party, was entitled to partial indemnity costs throughout and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments for offset or substantial reduction.

Certain disbursements were disallowed or reduced, and the total costs were fixed at $100,000 inclusive.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a personal injury action as abandoned under Rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action arose from a motor vehicle accident but had been dismissed after no statement of defence was delivered and service issues arose due to a misnomer in the defendant’s name.

Applying the contextual approach endorsed in appellate authority, the court considered factors including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the delay was not inordinate, the error was inadvertent, the motion was brought reasonably promptly, and the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice.

The registrar’s dismissal order was set aside, the statement of claim was amended to correct the defendant’s name, and the time for service was extended.