Kirk Michael Marius Baert

A class action appeal concerning copyright ownership in plans of survey registered or deposited in Ontario's electronic land registry system (ELRS).

The appellant land surveyors claimed that Teranet Inc., which operated the ELRS, infringed their copyright by digitizing, storing, and copying their survey plans.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that copyright in registered or deposited plans belonged to the Province of Ontario under section 12 of the Copyright Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, holding that the provincial land registration scheme gave the Crown complete control over registered plans, and that the Crown's publication of those plans through the ELRS occurred under the Crown's direction or control, thereby vesting copyright in the Crown.

The Ecuadorian plaintiffs sought to enforce a judgment of approximately 9.5 billion dollars from an Ecuadorian court against Chevron Corporation and its subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited, in Ontario.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's affirmation of Ontario's jurisdiction to hear the enforcement action, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron and Chevron Canada, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of separate corporate personality.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Chevron and Chevron Canada brought a motion for security for costs.

The court held that security for costs was warranted because the plaintiffs were ordinarily resident outside Ontario, had not demonstrated impecuniosity, and had not established a good chance of success on appeal.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a new approach to security for costs should apply to foreign judgment enforcement actions, finding that comity does not require foreign litigants to be treated more favorably than domestic litigants.

Following the certification of a class action regarding emission levels in BlueTEC diesel vehicles, the plaintiff sought costs of $569,882 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued for no costs due to divided success.

The court found that while the plaintiff was largely successful, significant time was wasted on misguided aggregate damages submissions.

Applying the Grid rates and reducing the fees and disbursements to account for the unsuccessful arguments, the court fixed costs at $225,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action alleging price-fixing in the FX Market brought a motion for consent certification for settlement purposes against two groups of defendants: The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Canada), and Société Générale S.A., Société Générale (Canada), and Société Générale.

The court reviewed the settlement agreements and the five-part test for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, noting that criteria may be less rigorously applied in a settlement context.

The court was satisfied that all certification criteria were met and granted the order for consent certification for settlement purposes.

The plaintiff sought certification of a class action against Mercedes-Benz entities, alleging that BlueTEC diesel vehicles contained "defeat devices" that turned off emission controls below 10 degrees Celsius, leading to excessive nitrogen oxide emissions.

The action primarily claimed economic loss due to negligent misrepresentation, alongside statutory claims under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act and Competition Act, and common law claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of warranties, and waiver of tort.

The court granted certification for 14 of the 17 proposed common issues, revising three and declining to certify three (negligence, breach of express/implied warranties, and aggregate damages).

The decision clarified the "some basis in fact" test for common issues, emphasizing a one-step approach focused on class-wide commonality, and reiterated that aggregate damages are for the quantum of loss, not proof of liability, requiring liability to be established first.

The respondent Crown brought a motion to quash an appeal from a Superior Court order requiring the appellant to produce Youth Records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The motion judge had ordered the appellant to produce specified Youth Records or face a stay of his proposed class action proceeding.

The appellant challenged the order as final rather than interlocutory, arguing the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory in nature—a production order with a sanction for non-compliance—and therefore any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the Crown.

This class action involved two motions: approval of three settlements totaling $39.2 million in an FX market price-fixing conspiracy case, and approval of Class Counsel's fees and disbursements.

The court approved the settlements, finding them fair and reasonable given the litigation risks and the stage of the proceedings.

However, the court partially denied Class Counsel's request for $9.8 million in fees, approving only an additional $2 million, citing that the achieved recovery (5 cents on the dollar against a potential $1 billion loss) was respectable but not "very good" and that the claimed litigation risks were somewhat exaggerated given prior regulatory findings and U.S. settlements.

The court emphasized the need for diligence in approving contingency fees in settlements to ensure they are provident for class members, not just counsel.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision that refused to strike out several paragraphs of the defendant's statement of defence.

The underlying action involved the recognition and enforcement of a $9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment.

The defendant pleaded defences of fraud, public policy, and lack of natural justice, alleging the foreign judgment was ghostwritten and obtained through bribery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the pleaded defences were recognized in law and not plainly and obviously bound to fail.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal an order to the Divisional Court, while simultaneously filing an appeal with the Court of Appeal due to uncertainty over whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The defendants requested that the motion for leave to appeal be adjourned sine die pending the Court of Appeal's determination.

The court granted the defendants' request, holding that where simultaneous proceedings are launched in two different courts over the same issue, the proceeding in the lower court should be held in abeyance to conserve judicial resources.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to prevent the plaintiffs from using extra-jurisdictional procedures to acquire documents from non-parties, the defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $75,365.38.

The plaintiffs argued for reduced costs of $15,000, citing the novelty and public interest of the issue under section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, finding the issue was not legally novel in a way that justified denying costs and noting the plaintiffs' conduct was improper.

The court awarded the defendants their costs as claimed.

The plaintiffs moved to add Chevron Canada Capital Company (CCCC) as a party defendant to their action seeking to enforce an Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment was not legally tenable and disclosed no cause of action against CCCC, as the court had previously ruled that Chevron Canada's corporate veil could not be pierced.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for jurisdiction over CCCC, a Nova Scotia company with no assets or operations in Ontario, and noted that Rule 17.02(o) regarding necessary parties had been repealed.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a US$9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against Chevron Canada, arguing it was a separate legal entity not liable for the judgment.

The plaintiffs argued Chevron Canada's assets were exigible under the Execution Act or that the corporate veil should be pierced.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against Chevron Canada, finding the Execution Act does not override corporate separateness and there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil absent allegations of wrongdoing by the subsidiary.

The plaintiffs also moved to strike Chevron's statement of defence.

The court struck defences relating to retroactive legislation and international law, but permitted defences alleging the Ecuadorian judgment was procured by fraud, bribery, and a denial of natural justice to proceed to trial.

In a proposed class action regarding youth detention centres, the plaintiff sued the Crown for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter violations, explicitly limiting the claim to the Crown's several liability.

The Crown issued third party claims against the NGOs that operated some of the centres.

The plaintiff and the NGOs moved to strike the third party claims.

The court granted the motions, applying the principle that where a plaintiff limits their claim to the defendant's proportionate degree of fault, a third party claim for contribution and indemnity is legally untenable.

In a proposed class action regarding the use of secure isolation in youth detention centres, the Crown brought a motion seeking production of the representative plaintiff's Youth Records.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to order production under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court held that while it could not directly order production of the records, it had jurisdiction under the Class Proceedings Act to order the plaintiff to apply to the Youth Justice Court for access to the records.

The court ordered the plaintiff to make the application, failing which the proposed class action would be stayed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to disqualify the respondents' counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The conflict allegation arose after an associate lawyer, who previously worked at the law firm representing the moving parties, joined the law firm representing the respondents.

The court applied the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no conflicting decision to satisfy Rule 62.02(4)(a) and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order or any matter of general importance to satisfy Rule 62.02(4)(b).

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action alleging that the defendant financial institutions conspired to fix prices in the foreign exchange (FX) market.

The plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with three groups of defendants (Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and Citi) totaling $39.25 million.

The plaintiffs moved for an order certifying the action as a class proceeding for settlement purposes against these settling defendants and approving the notice plan.

The court found that the criteria for certification under section 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were satisfied and granted the order.

The plaintiffs, former federal inmates with mental health disorders, brought a proposed class action against Canada alleging systemic abuses in federal penitentiaries, including the overuse of solitary confinement and failure to provide adequate mental healthcare.

They alleged breaches of sections 7, 9, and 12 of the Charter.

On consent, the court found that all criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met and certified the action as a class proceeding.

The plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that numerous financial institutions conspired to manipulate the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs reached early settlements with three groups of defendants (UBS, BNP, and Bank of America) totaling $15,950,000.

The plaintiffs sought court approval of the settlements and Class Counsel's fee request.

The court approved the settlements, finding them fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, particularly given the litigation risks and the value of the settling defendants' cooperation.

The court also approved Class Counsel's fee request of $3,987,500 plus disbursements.

The Uber defendants in a proposed class action moved to disqualify Sutts Strosberg LLP as class counsel, alleging a conflict of interest.

The defendants claimed the firm failed to install adequate internal screens when hiring a lawyer who had previously acted for Uber in related litigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the lawyer did not acquire relevant confidential information and that Sutts Strosberg had implemented reasonable measures to prevent disclosure, including pre-existing internal safeguards and a prompt full screen upon receiving notice of the alleged conflict.

The court emphasized that removal of counsel is a remedy of last resort and that minor technical errors do not warrant disqualification.

The plaintiff, Christopher Staines, brought a motion for consent certification for settlement purposes in a proposed class action alleging that numerous defendants conspired to fix prices in the FX Market.

Settlements were reached with UBS, BNP Paribas, and Bank of America.

The court reviewed the five-part test under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and, applying a less rigorous standard for settlement contexts, found all criteria satisfied.

The motion for certification for settlement purposes was granted.