Defamation

The decision addresses a motion to amend the Statement of Claim in a civil action brought by Gurupdesh Pandher against the University of Windsor and several individuals.

The court considers whether the plaintiff may add Human Rights Code claims from prior HRTO applications, the addition of new defendants, the sufficiency of defamation pleadings, the scope of misfeasance in public office, the introduction of new human rights grounds, the effect of the collective agreement and labour arbitration, the use of documents subject to the deemed or implied undertaking rule, and the pleading of matters subject to settlement privilege.

The court grants some amendments, strikes others, and provides detailed directions for further pleadings.

The decision addresses an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act in a defamation action brought by Prasanth Tella against A.B., his former partner.

The allegedly defamatory statements were made primarily to the Ottawa Police Service’s Professional Standards Section and to a few other individuals.

The court finds that most of the statements at issue relate to a matter of public interest, but some do not.

The court concludes that the statements made to the Professional Standards Section are protected by absolute privilege and that the plaintiff has not met the burden to show there are no valid defences.

The action is dismissed, with leave to bring a new action regarding certain statements if desired.

The court also grants an anonymity order and a publication ban regarding the defendant’s identity.

The defendant, Wolf Schroeder, requested dismissal of the plaintiff’s action under rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the claim was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court declined to dismiss, finding the claim was not clearly abusive or frivolous on its face and that rule 2.1 is reserved for only the clearest cases.

The court emphasized that the proper response to a potentially improper claim is through regular pleadings or summary judgment motions, not the exceptional rule 2.1 process.

This decision concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the defendants, Trinitee Okoye and Olivia Singaye, seeking to stay or dismiss a defamation action by the plaintiffs, Reynolds Okoh, Axel Mensah, and 2357392 Ontario Inc. o/a The Palace Ottawa.

The court found that the impugned social media posts did not constitute expression on a matter of public interest within the meaning of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Even if the threshold were met, the court held that the action had substantial merit and the defences of justification and fair comment were unlikely to succeed.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant, Samantha Robinson (carrying on business as Postering Ottawa), brought an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action brought by Diffusart International and Marc Agostini.

The court found that while Robinson’s expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs’ claim had substantial merit and Robinson did not have valid defences.

The court concluded that the harm to the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting Robinson’s expression, and dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion without costs.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of HSBC Bank of Canada and HSBC Securities Canada Inc., dismissing Kenneth James's claims for conversion, intentional interference with economic relations, defamation, and punitive damages.

The court found that HSBC acted within its contractual and legal rights in freezing and managing the plaintiff’s accounts following criminal charges and a restraining order, and that all funds (except those in Hong Kong, over which HSBC Canada had no control) were returned to the plaintiff after his acquittal.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court dismissed the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that Facebook posts made by the defendant accusing the plaintiffs of corruption and bribery were not protected as fair comment.

The posts, which followed a controversial development approval in Niagara-on-the-Lake, were found to be based on falsehoods and reckless disregard for the truth, with the defendant admitting he had “no proof” for his accusations.

The court held that the harm to the plaintiffs’ reputation and business interests outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression, and that the posts were motivated by an ulterior motive to thwart the plaintiffs’ development project.

This endorsement addresses the awarding of full indemnity costs to the Defendants following the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that several indicia of anti-SLAPP litigation were present, including a history of litigation against critics, a punitive purpose, and minimal damages.

The Plaintiffs did not provide costs submissions or arguments against the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs.

The court found the quantum of costs sought to be reasonable and noted that the Plaintiffs’ conduct increased litigation costs.

The Defendants were awarded $64,359.30 in costs, payable within 30 days.

The court dismissed a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) by three siblings (Normand Quesnel, Rachelle Paquette, and Marc Quesnel) to dismiss a defamation action brought by their brother, Gilles Quesnel.

The moving parties argued the action was a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation).

The court found that while some of the impugned statements related to matters of public interest (communications to authorities and professionals), others (communications to friends and family) did not.

The court held that the action had substantial merit, that the moving parties had no valid defence, and that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

This costs endorsement follows an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion brought by the defendant, a former employee, who had made damaging and unsubstantiated allegations against the plaintiff, his former employer.

The court found the defendant's campaign of correspondence to be extortionate and awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in costs, exercising discretion under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court considered a motion to strike all claims against Patricia France, the former President of St. Clair College, in an action by Waseem Habash for breach of contract, defamation, injurious falsehood, and related torts.

The court partially granted the motion, striking only the claim for intentional interference with contractual and/or economic relations, but granted leave to amend the claim for inducing breach of contract.

The court found that the pleadings for defamation and injurious falsehood were sufficient to proceed, as was the claim for inducing breach of contract (subject to amendment), and that there was an arguable basis for personal liability against Ms. France.

The court granted summary judgment in two related libel actions brought by Felicia Crichton, John-Marcel Forget, Rainbow Alliance Dryden, and Caitlin Hartlen against Brian Webster.

The plaintiffs alleged that Webster's social media posts falsely labelled them as "groomers" and pedophiles, causing reputational harm and distress.

The court found the posts were defamatory, identified the plaintiffs, and were published to third parties.

Webster's defences, including fair comment, were rejected.

The court awarded each plaintiff $75,000 in general damages and $20,000 in aggravated damages, finding Webster's conduct was malicious and constituted hate speech.

This decision addresses motions for partial summary judgment brought by the Crown and Thunder Bay police defendants in a civil action by Keith and Marisa Hobbs.

The court considers whether the plaintiffs' claims are statute-barred by limitation periods, and whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the presence of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and prosecution.

The court grants partial summary judgment dismissing the false arrest and certain Charter claims as time-barred, but allows claims for negligent investigation, negligence, discrimination, intentional infliction of mental distress, and defamation to proceed to trial.

The court dismissed an anti-SLAPP motion brought by Zhou Chen, a former employee of Diverse Transportation, who had sent disparaging messages to Diverse’s customers linking payment demands to allegations of misconduct.

The court found that Chen’s communications were not genuinely in the public interest but were instead a façade for a private employment dispute and debt collection.

The decision clarifies the threshold for public interest under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and affirms that anti-SLAPP protections do not extend to private disputes disguised as matters of public concern.

The plaintiff, Carrie Wei, moved for summary judgment against the defendants (except Zhi Qiang Wang) for $700,000 plus 30% interest, and for dismissal of the counterclaim.

The court found that the loan agreement was clear, that the defendants failed to provide any credible defence or evidence, and that the corporate veil should be pierced due to fraudulent conduct.

The counterclaim for defamation was dismissed for lack of evidence.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff, including costs.

The court dismissed motions by the defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim on the basis of absolute privilege.

The case concerns whether statements made in an affidavit in another proceeding, about a non-party, are protected by absolute privilege.

The court held that absolute privilege is subject to exceptions and applies only to statements made “with reference to the inquiry.” Without the full context of the affidavit and related documents, the court could not determine that the claim was bound to fail.

The court also addressed the application of absolute privilege to counsel and found no basis to treat counsel differently in this context.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The court addressed two motions: one to remove counsel for the Estate and Mr. Mylabathula due to a conflict of interest and the likelihood of becoming a witness, and another to strike the counterclaim brought by the Estate and Mr. Mylabathula against RBC and its counsel, Mr. Bowden.

The court ordered the removal of counsel, Mr. Callahan, finding he would inevitably be a witness regarding Mr. Mylabathula's knowledge of costs orders.

The counterclaim by the Estate was struck without leave to amend due to limitations and the inability of an estate to pursue defamation claims.

Mr. Mylabathula's counterclaim against Mr. Bowden was struck without leave due to absolute privilege and abuse of process.

Mr. Mylabathula's counterclaim against RBC was struck with limited leave to amend, requiring proper pleading of tort elements and a connection for discrimination claims.

The Court of Appeal heard two appeals concerning defamation actions dismissed under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation).

The motion judge had dismissed the actions, finding no valid defence in one case and a potentially valid defence in the other, and in both cases, the public interest in protecting expression outweighed the harm to the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, upholding the dismissal of the defamation actions.

However, it allowed the cross-appeals on costs, finding that the motion judge erred in not awarding full indemnity costs to the successful defendants, as the actions bore the hallmarks of SLAPP lawsuits.

The appellant, Ahmed Bouragba, sought to transfer an appeal from a Master's order from the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the appeal lay to the Court of Appeal under s. 6(1)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act as an order made under s. 137.1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the transfer motion, holding that an order made under s. 137.1 must be made by a "judge" of the Superior Court of Justice, and a Master is not a judge.

Therefore, the appeal did not lie to the Court of Appeal, and the proper forum was the Divisional Court.

The case involved a claim by Scotia Capital Inc. against Aphria Inc. for an "Independence Fee" under an engagement letter for financial advisory services in defending a hostile takeover bid, and a counterclaim by Aphria for defamation related to Scotia's discontinuation of analyst coverage.

The court found that Scotia successfully defended Aphria against the takeover bid, entitling it to the Independence Fee.

The court dismissed Aphria's defense arguments of lack of causality and repudiation.

The court also dismissed Aphria's counterclaim for defamation, finding no evidence that the discontinuation of coverage lowered Aphria's reputation or caused economic loss.