Drew Black

This costs endorsement follows the plaintiffs' success in defeating an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss their libel action.

The court considered whether to award costs to the successful plaintiffs, referencing the discretion provided by section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Finding that the defendant's impugned words were designed to cause serious detriment to the plaintiffs and undermine their business, the court exercised its discretion to award costs.

The court settled on a compromise amount, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs $89,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The court dismissed the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that Facebook posts made by the defendant accusing the plaintiffs of corruption and bribery were not protected as fair comment.

The posts, which followed a controversial development approval in Niagara-on-the-Lake, were found to be based on falsehoods and reckless disregard for the truth, with the defendant admitting he had “no proof” for his accusations.

The court held that the harm to the plaintiffs’ reputation and business interests outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression, and that the posts were motivated by an ulterior motive to thwart the plaintiffs’ development project.

The self-represented plaintiff, Jennifer Scarangella, brought a motion seeking an order to act in a representative capacity on behalf of the estate of her late partner without a lawyer in a medical negligence action.

The defendants opposed, arguing that Rule 15.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires an estate to be represented by a lawyer and that Rule 2.03 should not be applied to dispense with this requirement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that it was not an appropriate case to dispense with the requirement for legal representation, particularly because the issue was raised promptly by the defence and the plaintiff was seeking monetary damages for both herself and the estate, engaging the core rationale of Rule 15.01(1).

The plaintiff, Tri-South Developments Inc., sued the defendant, 583167 Ontario Inc., for breach of contract, waiver/estoppel, and unjust enrichment related to a failed condominium development project.

The core dispute revolved around a "Severance Condition" in their Contribution Agreement (CA), which required Tri-South to obtain land severance by a specific date.

Tri-South failed to meet this condition, leading to the automatic termination of the CA.

Tri-South alleged the defendant breached its duty of good faith by not disclosing its intent to rely on the severance date and by misleading them regarding design approvals.

The court dismissed all of Tri-South's claims, finding no breach of good faith, no waiver or estoppel by the defendant, and no unjust enrichment, as the plaintiff had control over the condition and failed to meet its obligations.

The applicant, an equal shareholder and medical director of fertility clinics, sought interim relief in a corporate oppression claim against her estranged husband, the sole director of most corporate entities.

She alleged mismanagement, diversion of funds, and exclusion from decision-making.

The court applied the "serious issue" test for interim injunctions, finding a serious issue and irreparable harm to the business and her professional duties if the status quo continued.

The balance of convenience favored the applicant.

The court ordered the applicant to be appointed as a co-director of all respondent corporations with the individual respondent, and restrained the individual respondent from interfering in patient care or medical processes, aiming to prevent deadlock and preserve the business while acknowledging the underlying matrimonial dispute.

The plaintiffs, owners of a downtown Toronto office tower, sued the defendants, operators of the building's parking garage, for unpaid fixed monthly fees from April 2020 to April 2021.

The defendants ceased full payments due to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on revenue, arguing a binding oral agreement to reduce fees, the application of a force majeure clause, and contract frustration.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding no valid amendment to the contract due to a "no oral modification" clause and lack of consideration, no detrimental reliance for promissory estoppel, and that neither the force majeure clause nor the doctrine of frustration applied as the contract merely became unprofitable, not impossible to perform.