Kerry Lee McVey

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit within two hours of operating a motor vehicle contrary to the Criminal Code, and operating a motor vehicle while licensed as a young driver with a blood alcohol concentration over zero contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in law and misapprehended material evidence regarding: (1) his reasonable expectation of privacy in the ambulance; (2) when the officer detected an odor of alcohol; and (3) when the officer's grounds to issue a breath demand crystallized.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellate court found no material misapprehension of evidence, no legal error, and that the trial judge's findings were reasonably available on the record.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and assault offences against three adopted children.

During a two-week judge-alone trial, midway through the cross-examination of the second complainant, defence counsel sought an adjournment to bring a section 278.92 application regarding text messages between the complainant and the defendant.

The court denied the adjournment request, finding that the probative value of the text messages was minimal and did not justify the significant disruption to the proceedings.

The court emphasized that section 278.92 applications should be brought pre-trial and that midtrial applications pose substantial risks to the administration of justice, particularly regarding the wellbeing of vulnerable complainants and the waste of scarce court resources.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The appellant, a 64-year-old woman involved in ongoing employment litigation, attempted to cycle to British Columbia in winter without adequate preparation or training.

She was apprehended under the Mental Health Act and subsequently found incapable of consenting to treatment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the CCB's decision on grounds of bias, procedural fairness, and misapprehension of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the CCB's determination of incapacity was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's impaired judgment and inability to appreciate the consequences of her decisions in the context of her mental illness.

The plaintiffs, including a national not-for-profit HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C treatment information organization and its employees and board members, brought a defamation action against the defendant for an online libel campaign.

The defendant created profiles on his website labeling the plaintiffs as "groomers" and pedophiles, posted defamatory content on social media platforms, and left threatening voicemail messages at the plaintiffs' workplace.

The defendant's conduct was motivated by hatred stemming from the plaintiffs' association with the 2SLGBTQIA+ community.

The defendant failed to respond to the action and was noted in default.

The court granted default judgment, finding the statements were clearly defamatory, and awarded substantial general and aggravated damages.

A permanent injunction was issued requiring removal of all defamatory publications and prohibiting further defamatory statements.

The court granted an application under the Hague Convention for the return of a child wrongfully removed from Michigan to Ontario by her mother.

The judge found that Michigan was the child’s habitual residence immediately prior to removal, rejecting the argument that the child’s ties to her primary caregiver in Ontario were determinative.

The court also found that the mother had not established a grave risk of harm or intolerable situation if the child were returned, and ordered the child’s return to Michigan with undertakings to protect the mother and child’s interests pending further proceedings in Michigan.

The court sentenced B.B. for sexual offences against two child complainants, J.B. and F.T.G., including sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to a child.

The decision details aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact on the victims and their families, and the application of sentencing principles such as denunciation, deterrence, and the totality principle.

The court imposed a total sentence of nine and a half years, with extended parole ineligibility, and made several ancillary orders for public protection.

The accused, O.W., was charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder in connection with a fatal shooting.

The Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial, relying on evidence of means, opportunity, motive, and post-offence celebratory conduct.

The central issue was the identity of the second shooter.

The court found significant gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence, particularly regarding motive and animus, and concluded that the Crown had not proven O.W.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

O.W. was acquitted on both counts.

The court considered the admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence in a judge-alone trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence that the accused, O.W., threatened the deceased with a firearm on Instagram Live hours before the homicide, and a video showing O.W. associating with J.A. (the co-accused) who brandished a handgun.

The court found both pieces of evidence highly probative to issues of motive, animus, intent, and identification, and held that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, especially given the reduced risk of prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The application to admit the evidence was granted.

The court considered a Crown application to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased to a friend, Rebecca Guindon, identifying O.W. as the perpetrator of a prior shooting, in a trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the statements lacked sufficient procedural and substantive reliability to be admitted for their truth under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court also rejected their admissibility under the "state of mind" exception, finding the statements incapable of supporting the inferences the Crown sought regarding motive or animosity between the deceased and O.W.

The court considered whether a video-recorded statement by the complainant S.R., describing alleged sexual offences by A.G., was admissible under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued the statement was not taken within a reasonable time of the alleged offences, as required by the section.

The court found that the delay in disclosure was adequately explained by the complainant’s circumstances and trauma, and that her memory was not so impaired as to undermine reliability.

The court also held that section 715.1 is not limited to child witnesses at the time of testimony, but applies if the complainant was under 18 at the time of the alleged offence.

The application to admit the statement was granted.

The court considered whether A.O.'s post-arrest statement to police was voluntary, given his mental health history and evidence of psychosis.

After reviewing the circumstances of the arrest, A.O.'s mental state, and the content of the police interview, the court found that A.O. had the capacity to understand what he was saying and that his statement could be used against him.

The application to admit the statement was granted.

The court denied the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ defamation claim under Rule 21, finding the claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action and was not frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court also declined to remove the plaintiffs’ counsel for conflict of interest, refused to prohibit the defendant from bringing further motions without leave, and declined to order that a single judge be seized of all pretrial matters.

A litigation timetable was imposed by consent, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The Ottawa Police Services Board brought an application to have Deirdre Moore declared a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court reviewed Ms. Moore’s extensive litigation history, including multiple meritless and repetitive claims, improper purposes, and abusive conduct both inside and outside the courtroom.

The court found that Ms. Moore’s conduct met the hallmarks of vexatious litigation and granted the application, prohibiting her from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave of the court, except for ongoing divorce proceedings.

The court also fixed costs against Ms. Moore.

The court granted the application of the Sunset Lakes Owners Association (SLOA) for a mandatory injunction requiring the respondents, Todd and Erika Gingras, to remove a fence and shed that encroached on SLOA-owned property and an easement.

The decision addresses whether the respondents had approval to build, whether the structures constituted actionable encroachments, and whether the restrictive covenants were enforceable.

The court found that the respondents did not have approval, the structures substantially interfered with SLOA’s easement rights, and the restrictive covenants were valid and enforceable.

Costs were awarded to SLOA.

This ruling addresses the Crown’s application for the complainant to testify via CCTV in a sexual assault and assault by choking prosecution.

The court grants the application, finding that the complainant’s concerns about testifying in the presence of the accused and before a jury are reasonably held and that testifying via CCTV will facilitate a full and candid account of her evidence.

The decision reviews the legislative amendments to section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, clarifies that necessity is no longer the standard, and emphasizes the importance of balancing the interests of the complainant and the accused’s right to a fair trial.

Randall Hillier, charged with multiple offences related to the "Freedom Convoy," sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay was approximately 34 months and 28 days.

The court deducted 65 days for defence-caused delay (counsel's refusal to attend a pretrial conference) and 40 days for exceptional circumstances (Supreme Court's Haevischer decision requiring re-hearing of a motion).

The net delay of 31 months and 13 days still exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling, leading the court to grant the application and stay the charges.

The plaintiff, a property developer, moved for default judgment against the defendant for failing to close on an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The defendant defaulted on deposit payments and did not respond to communications or defend the action.

The plaintiff terminated the agreement, remarketed the property, and resold it at a lower price due to a market downturn.

The court granted default judgment to the plaintiff for damages representing the shortfall from the resale, plus legal and real estate fees, after finding the defendant breached the agreement and the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to mitigate losses.

Costs were also awarded to the plaintiff.

The Crown brought an application under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit two video-recorded statements of a 13-year-old complainant (F.T-G.) in a sexual assault case.

The respondent opposed, arguing the statements were not taken within a reasonable time, did not adequately describe the alleged acts, and their admission would interfere with the proper administration of justice due to issues like leading questions, external influence, and the complainant's expressed animus.

The court found that the statements met the statutory preconditions, were taken within a reasonable time given the nature of child abuse disclosures, and sufficiently described the acts complained of.

The court dismissed the respondent's arguments regarding the administration of justice, emphasizing that concerns about memory frailties, leading questions, or external discussions generally go to the ultimate reliability of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The court ruled that the statements would be admitted at trial, provided the complainant adopts them, with the caveat that any presumptively inadmissible similar fact evidence must be vetted.

The applicants, maternal grandparents, sought an interim contact order for their three grandchildren under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The respondents, the biological parents, had terminated all contact in October 2021, alleging the grandparents repeatedly tried to undermine their relationship with the children and caused psychological distress.

The court denied the grandparents' motion for interim relief, finding that the parents' decision to terminate contact was not arbitrary but was a reasoned, incremental response motivated by the children's emotional needs, given the grandparents' consistent disregard for boundaries and attempts to interfere with parental authority.

The court emphasized the high deference owed to parental decision-making unless parents are found to be acting arbitrarily.

S.D. pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm on her 12-year-old daughter and assault on her four-year-old son.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's decision to grant a conditional discharge with three years probation, arguing that the judge prioritized rehabilitation over denunciation and deterrence, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence, while exceptionally lenient, was not demonstrably unfit given the unique and extensive mitigating circumstances, including the offender's mental health crisis and significant stressors.