Katherine E. Swinton

The Greater Toronto Airports Authority sought judicial review of an arbitration award that found it had unjustly dismissed a long-term employee and awarded significant damages, including past and future economic loss, $50,000 for mental distress, and $50,000 in punitive damages.

The Divisional Court upheld the arbitrator's decision to award economic loss and mental distress damages in lieu of reinstatement, finding it reasonable given the employer's bad faith in the manner of dismissal.

However, the Court set aside the quantum of mental distress damages because it improperly included unsupported damages for physical pain and suffering.

The Court also set aside the punitive damages award due to a denial of natural justice and the arbitrator's failure to identify an independent actionable wrong or address proportionality.

The issues of quantum for mental distress and punitive damages were remitted to the arbitrator.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that found they had discriminated against an employee on the basis of ancestry, ethnic origin, creed, and sex.

The Divisional Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, finding it to be patently unreasonable and procedurally unfair.

The adjudicator erred by refusing to accommodate a key witness for the employer, drawing an adverse inference from that witness's absence, and making findings of discrimination regarding a microwave policy and dress code that were unsupported by factual findings or logical legal reasoning.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The appellant physician appealed the revocation of his medical license and a costs order of $95,812 imposed by the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons for sexual misconduct involving three young boys.

The appellant, joined by intervenors, also challenged the constitutionality of the College investigator's summons power under s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code, arguing it violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the summons power was constitutional in the regulatory context, the Committee had jurisdiction to hear the Charter challenge, and the delay in proceedings did not amount to an abuse of process.

The Court upheld the Committee's factual findings, penalty, and costs order as reasonable.

The respondent purchased a travel package but cancelled it due to her husband's illness.

After failing to obtain a refund from the travel wholesaler and her cancellation insurance, she applied to the Travel Industry Compensation Fund.

The Board denied her claim, but the Licence Appeal Tribunal allowed her appeal.

The Travel Industry Council of Ontario appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding that under s. 57(3) 3 of O. Reg. 26/05, a customer is not entitled to reimbursement if the travel services were available but not received because of the customer's own act of cancellation.

The Tribunal's decision was set aside and the Board's decision denying the claim was restored.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to vary an order refusing leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board.

The Board had dismissed an appeal regarding minor variances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the motions judge applied the correct test and did not decline jurisdiction.

The court awarded costs to the respondent but declined to order substantial indemnity costs despite the moving party's unfounded allegations of false evidence.

The applicants sought relief under the Arbitration Act and judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to challenge an arbitrator's award.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, as such applications must be brought before the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court also held that judicial review is a public law remedy unavailable to challenge a private consensual arbitrator's award.

The application for judicial review was quashed, and the remaining relief was referred to the Superior Court.

The applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a partially successful application for judicial review regarding the municipal reimbursement of legal expenses for city councillors.

The Divisional Court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs of $15,000 payable by the city, noting the lack of complexity and partial success.

The court declined to award costs against the individual councillors, and ordered the applicant to pay $5,000 in costs to one councillor who successfully opposed the relief sought against him personally.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board dismissing her claim for compensation for mental shock suffered after her home was destroyed by arson.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by treating the appellant as a secondary victim and applying the wrong criteria to deny her claim.

The Court held that the appellant was a primary victim and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a differently constituted Board.

The applicant police officer sought a stay of his disciplinary proceedings pending an application for judicial review.

The judicial review application alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against the adjudicator, who had previously presided over other hearings involving the applicant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be determined, the applicant failed to establish sufficient irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in proceeding with the hearings without further delay.

The appellant appealed a costs order of $345,733.53 awarded against it following a partially abandoned summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge erred in principle by failing to step back and assess whether the costs claimed were fair and reasonable, effectively rubber-stamping the respondent's costs outlines.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding the hours claimed excessive and duplicative, and reduced the costs award for the summary judgment motion to $145,000.

The appellant, who was severely assaulted in his home, appealed the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board's decision denying him compensation.

The Board had found that the appellant's involvement in drug dealing inherently risked violence and thus barred his claim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board erred in law by failing to properly apply the proportionality principle under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The Board was required to weigh the severity of the injuries against the contributory conduct and consider a reduced award rather than an automatic complete denial.

The City of Toronto appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision finding that Home Depot's application to develop a major retail store in an Employment Area did not constitute a 'conversion' under the Growth Plan.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for the Board's interpretation of planning documents is reasonableness.

The Court found the Board's conclusion—that major retail use was already contemplated in the Official Plan and thus not a conversion—was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Superior Court judge's decision made under the Building Code Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that certiorari is not available to challenge a decision of a Superior Court judge absent exceptional circumstances, which were not present.

The Court also declined to transfer the proceeding to the Court of Appeal under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, noting that an application for judicial review is distinct from an appeal and the time to appeal had expired.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing that the Board breached procedural fairness by proceeding with the hearing in her absence and allowing a witness to be present while the tenant testified.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the landlord had notice, did not request an adjournment, and explicitly asked the Board to consider her unsworn written materials in her absence.

The Court held that the Board made no error in proceeding and that allowing the witness to be present was a matter of discretion.

The applicant, a former Justice of the Peace, applied for judicial review of a Commissioner's report and an Order in Council removing him from office for judicial misconduct.

The misconduct involved inappropriate in-court treatment of an unrepresented litigant and out-of-court attempts to improperly influence an investigation into his conduct.

The Divisional Court found the Commissioner's recommendation for removal was reasonable given the severity of the misconduct and the need to restore public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed, and fresh evidence of the applicant's improved health and character did not alter the outcome.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the police and his former wife's lawyer for negligent investigation and conspiracy to bring false criminal charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to draw an adverse inference for the failure to call the former wife as a witness.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the appellant due to his persistence in making serious, unfounded allegations against a lawyer.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal regarding the calculation of his long-term average earnings.

The applicant, a drywall installer, argued his benefits should be based on his gross earnings.

The Tribunal concluded that, for fairness, his average earnings should be calculated based on the net income he declared for tax purposes, accounting for his business expenses.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The Board had rescinded the Society's decision to refuse an adoption application by the respondent foster parents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's mandate under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act allows it to make substantive determinations regarding the best interests of the child, rather than being limited to procedural fairness.

The Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Board's decision to place the children for adoption with the respondents was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario finding that it had permitted drunkenness on its premises contrary to s. 45(1) of Regulation 719 under the Liquor Licence Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by concluding the appellant permitted drunkenness without any evidence of how long the patron had been in an intoxicated state, which was necessary to determine if the appellant failed to remove the patron within a reasonable period of time.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Securities Commission decision ordering the disclosure of his compelled evidence to co-respondents in a regulatory proceeding.

The applicant argued the evidence was privileged based on an undertaking from Commission staff and that the Charter applied due to the risk of quasi-criminal proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commission's interpretation of the undertaking was reasonable and that the Charter did not apply to the administrative proceeding.