Karen M. Weiler

The appellant, a unionized employee, sued his former employer and union executive for allegedly misrepresenting the terms of an early retirement agreement.

The employer and union successfully moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the dispute arose from the interpretation and application of the collective agreement and the union's duty of fair representation.

Under the Weber principle and the Labour Relations Act, such disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator or the labour relations board, not the courts.

The appellant brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce its security in convertible subordinated debentures against the respondent Brookfield, a wholly owned subsidiary of the issuer BCED.

The motion was dismissed, and the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the trust indenture, finding that the term 'Company' in Article VII, section 7.01 referred only to BCED and its successors, not its wholly owned subsidiaries.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal involving stock broker liability.

The court applied the test for intervention and found that the proposed intervention would not make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal, as the issues in the main appeal were essentially fact-driven and the intervention was not supported by any of the parties.

The motion for intervenor status was dismissed with costs.

The mother appealed a trial decision awarding joint custody of the parties' young child and ordering the parents to attend counseling, with an unnamed counselor to resolve disputes.

The father cross-appealed the net family property equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in awarding joint custody given the parents' complete inability to communicate and lack of historical cooperation.

The court also held the trial judge exceeded her jurisdiction by ordering counseling and delegating decision-making to a counselor.

Sole custody was awarded to the mother, and a new trial was ordered for access.

The father's cross-appeal regarding property was dismissed.

The mother appealed a trial judgment ordering joint custody of the parties' three children and requiring her to pay child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the joint custody order, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the parents could communicate effectively regarding the children.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding support, finding the trial judge erred by failing to impute income to the father despite evidence he worked part-time while receiving a disability pension.

The Court also set aside the future support orders due to the uncertainty of multiple contingencies, ordering instead that each parent bear the expense of supporting the children while in their care.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police stopped his vehicle and searched him.

The police suspected the appellant was involved in drug trafficking after observing his interactions with a suspected prostitute.

During the stop, an officer touched the appellant's groin area, leading to the discovery of cocaine and cash.

The Court of Appeal found that while the initial stop was justified, the search violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights as it was not conducted for officer safety.

The Court concluded that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence under s. 24(2), as the breach was serious and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant landlord appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay damages to the respondent tenant based on promissory estoppel.

The trial judge found the tenant undertook renovations based on the landlord's representation that the premises could be used for film and photography, but the landlord later interfered with this business.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding but reduced the damages award from $55,120 to $34,120, finding the trial judge failed to adequately consider evidence of a slow market when calculating lost revenue.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay $400,000 in lump sum spousal support to his former common-law partner.

During their nine-year relationship, the respondent supported the appellant financially and emotionally through severe depression and substance abuse, suffering economic detriment while enabling him to achieve significant financial success.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made unassailable findings of fact regarding the respondent's compensatory entitlement and need.

The court also upheld the lump sum format, distinguishing previous case law because the award would not cause the appellant hardship and the economic advantages and disadvantages could be accurately identified.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his wrongful dismissal claim against Goodyear Canada Inc. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by focusing on the Employment Standards Act rather than the common law test for co-employer status.

Because Goodyear had effective control of the employer's business and employees during a 20-month option agreement period, it was a co-employer at common law.

The appeal was allowed, and Goodyear was ordered to pay the appellant 12 weeks' wages in lieu of notice, less a two-week credit for statutory payments.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent trustee in bankruptcy on a guarantee signed by the appellants for the respondent's fees.

The motions judge had also directed a reference to the Registrar in Bankruptcy to determine the reasonable quantum of those fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the lack of independent legal advice was not a free-standing defence and there was no evidence the appellants misunderstood the guarantee.

The Court also upheld the motions judge's discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure to direct a reference to the Registrar in Bankruptcy.

The appellants appealed a judgment in favour of the respondent on a claim and the dismissal of their counterclaim.

They argued the matter should have proceeded under the ordinary rules rather than the simplified rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the ordinary rules applied, the outcome would have been the same as the appellants raised no defence to the claim and the counterclaim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellants sued the respondent for defamation, interference with economic relations, and intentional infliction of nervous shock, covering incidents before and after a June 2000 settlement agreement.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing several claims, finding that a mutual release in the settlement agreement barred the pre-settlement defamation claims, even if the respondent had repudiated the agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that repudiation does not discharge matured rights like a mutual release.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of the post-settlement claims and the costs order.

The appellant appealed an order varying his child and spousal support obligations, arguing the reduction should have been greater and retroactive to the date of the application.

He also challenged the determination of his income, the removal of a clause reducing spousal support based on the respondent's income, and the exclusion of orthodontic expenses from a settlement of arrears.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most grounds of appeal, finding no error in the application judge's income determination, removal of the support reduction clause, or effective date of the variation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the settlement of 'all arrearages' included the $10,360 in orthodontic expenses.

The Crown appealed a decision granting the respondents lawful ownership of an island by way of adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's weighing of affidavit evidence or his conclusion that the respondents met the three-pronged test for possessory title.

The Court upheld the finding that the land was not vacant or wasteland, rendering section 16 of the Limitations Act inapplicable.

The accused chiropractor was charged with sexually assaulting a patient.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings due to a 16-month delay, finding a breach of the accused's s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the stay, finding the trial judge erred in assessing prejudice and institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the 12-month institutional delay was not unreasonable given the seriousness of the charge and the accused's failure to take steps to expedite the trial.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that denied her compound interest and refused to enforce NSF, late payment, and collection letter charges on three promissory notes.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the interest calculation method was ambiguous and that the additional charges, combined with a 25% interest rate, constituted an unconscionable penalty.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual touching, and indecent assault involving multiple complainants.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, reversed the burden of proof, and erred in admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for all counts except count 14, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and the burden of proof was not reversed.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence for count 14 due to a lack of persuasive similarity, and entered an acquittal on that count.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Swinton.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to comment on the standard of review and agreeing with the reasons of the motion judge which adequately dealt with the grounds of appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding entitlement to a deposit for a condominium unit.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motions judge that the appellant's interpretation of the agreement, which would make the purchaser of an individual unit liable for the purchase price of the entire building or damages flowing from breaches between the developer and Skyline, made no commercial sense.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $15,000 to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction for threatening bodily harm.

At trial, the complainant's statement to police was admitted as past recollection recorded because she could not remember the incident or making the statement.

On appeal, the Crown conceded the statement did not meet the Wigmore criteria for past recollection recorded, but argued it was admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the statement met the necessity and reliability criteria, supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness including proximity in time and lack of motive to lie.

The appeal was dismissed.