John Norris

The applicant was committed for extradition to Trinidad on charges of murder and accessory after the fact to murder, where he faced a mandatory death penalty.

He applied for bail pending his appeal of the committal order and pending the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.

The Court of Appeal granted bail pending the surrender decision, finding that the mandatory death penalty raised a non-frivolous issue for the Minister, the applicant established he would surrender despite the flight risk, and public interest favoured his release given the 14-month delay.

The application for bail pending appeal was adjourned until after the Minister's decision.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal from his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge did not err in finding the similar fact evidence inadmissible.

The appellant was charged with first degree murder and denied bail under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under s. 11(e) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the portion of s. 515(10)(c) permitting detention 'on any other just cause being shown' is unconstitutionally vague and violates s. 11(e).

However, the Court severed this phrase and upheld the remainder of the provision, which allows bail to be denied where necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for various drug-related offences.

The Crown's case relied entirely on intercepted communications and derived evidence.

The appellants argued the wiretap authorizations violated s. 8 of the Charter due to lack of reasonable and probable grounds and failure to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the authorizations were properly issued and the evidence supported the convictions.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, varying one appellant's intermittent sentence to time served due to post-sentencing progress, and adjusting the other's intermittent sentence schedule to accommodate employment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, possession, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal found four trial errors, including improper cross-examination by the Crown regarding the failure to call a co-accused, a flawed jury charge on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule (the Carter test), a violation of section 650(1) of the Criminal Code by allowing the accused to leave the courtroom during cross-examination, and a failure to instruct the jury on good character evidence.

The cumulative effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial, leading the court to set aside the convictions and order a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after a 12-year-old complainant identified him in a photo line-up 28 months after being attacked in her tent at night.

The Crown's case rested entirely on this identification.

The trial judge had excluded similar fact evidence of a prior sexual assault committed by the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as the identification evidence was too weak and the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's initial description.

The majority held that the trial judge did not err in excluding the similar fact evidence, as her assessment of its prejudicial effect versus probative value was entitled to deference.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and other offences and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

The Crown successfully applied for an order under s. 487.052 of the Criminal Code authorizing the taking of a bodily sample for the national DNA data bank.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the standard of 'the best interests of the administration of justice' in s. 487.052 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad unless interpreted to require reasonable and probable grounds to believe the offender will commit a future offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the search warrant standard of reasonable and probable grounds is not required for DNA data bank orders, as the context, purposes, and privacy expectations differ significantly.

The court found the trial judge did not err in balancing the appellant's privacy interests against his criminal record and the circumstances of the offence.

The appellant was initially found not criminally responsible (NCR) for property offences and possession of an imitation weapon based on psychiatric evidence.

At a subsequent Review Board hearing, it was revealed and undisputed that the appellant had feigned his mental disorder and did not actually suffer from one.

The proceedings before the Review Board were admitted as fresh evidence on appeal.

On the joint position of the parties, the Court of Appeal quashed the NCR finding and ordered a new trial on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder in the hatchet killing of the victim.

He argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on consciousness of guilt, the admissibility of tattoo evidence, the Crown's theory of an attack on an unknown victim, and the charge on reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a 'no probative value' instruction for post-offence conduct was not required because the conduct was relevant to identifying the murderer.

The court also held that the pre-Lifchus jury charge on reasonable doubt substantially complied with the required standard.

The appellant applied for a stay of an order requiring the taking of a DNA sample pending his appeal of that order.

The Court of Appeal held that it has jurisdiction to stay such an order despite section 487.056(1) of the Criminal Code.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the majority granted the stay, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the appellant's privacy interests, and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant as he was already in custody.

A dissenting judge would have refused the stay due to the appellant's failure to perfect the appeal on time.

The police obtained ex parte search warrants to seize video footage and photographs from various media organizations following a violent demonstration at Queen's Park.

The media organizations challenged the validity of the warrants, arguing they should have been given notice and an opportunity to make submissions before the warrants were issued, and that the police failed to disclose an alternative source of video footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the issuing justice had the discretion to proceed ex parte and did not commit jurisdictional error.

The court also found that the failure to disclose a secondary security camera system was not fatal to the warrants' validity.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault and a sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The court held that the trial judge made two errors in assessing the complainant's evidence: using jointly reconstructed evidence about age to bolster credibility, and failing to test credibility and reliability against the improbability of the alleged incident occurring in a public park in broad daylight.

Taken together, those errors rendered the verdict unsafe.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for counselling murder arising from an alleged arrangement with a co-accused witness to kill a prospective witness in unrelated property offences.

He argued the verdict was inconsistent with acquittals on conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, that the jury charge on counselling was flawed, that a prior guilty plea to possession of property obtained by crime was wrongly admitted, and that the Crown’s closing unfairly overstated the target witness’s importance.

The Court of Appeal held the verdicts were not violently at odds because the offences were separately defined and involved materially different elements, the charge as a whole could not have misled the jury, the prior guilty plea was admissible, and the closing address disclosed no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order staying historic sexual offence charges on the basis that the respondent could not make full answer and defence because key potential defence witnesses were dead or unavailable after several decades.

The court reviewed the trial judge's application of the abuse of process and fundamental justice framework under ss. 7, 11(d), and 24(1) of the Charter.

It held that the trial judge properly assessed the affidavit evidence concerning missing Children's Aid Society and foster home personnel and committed no error in law.

The appeal was dismissed and the stay remained in place.

The appellants picketed a police station carrying placards alleging a police officer allowed or participated in the sexual abuse of children.

They were convicted of defamatory libel under s. 300 of the Criminal Code.

They appealed, arguing the defamatory libel provisions infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provisions infringe s. 2(b), they are justified under s. 1, subject to the severance of a portion of s. 299(c).

The Court found the protection of reputation to be a pressing and substantial objective, and that the provisions were rationally connected and minimally impairing, given the requirement of subjective knowledge of falsity and intent to defame.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions upheld.

The respondent, charged with indecent assault, sought the production of the complainant's counselling records held by third-party institutions.

The trial judge ordered the records produced.

The third parties appealed the interlocutory order.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act.

On the substantive issue, the Court applied the framework established in the companion case of R. v. O'Connor, balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy and equality rights.

The Court found that the trial judge erred in ordering production without first determining likely relevance and balancing the competing Charter rights.

The appeal was allowed and the order for production was quashed.