John Norris

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to find that the initial police stop was arbitrary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact supported the conclusion that the initial detention was not arbitrary, and there was no basis to interfere with those findings.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering her to the United States on charges of interference with custody, arising from her removal of her children to Canada in violation of an Alabama custody order.

The applicant argued the Minister erred in finding the double criminality requirement was met and in failing to refuse surrender under section 7 of the Charter, citing the Canadian defence of necessity under section 285 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the Minister correctly focused on the underlying conduct rather than available defences for double criminality, and reasonably concluded that Alabama law contained analogous defences to section 285.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and the related forfeiture order.

He argued that the police violated his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter during a traffic stop and subsequent vehicle search.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the s. 9 analysis and, although correcting the trial judge's reasoning on s. 8, upheld the search as a valid search for identification evidence incident to arrest.

The court also found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove knowledge of the drugs and upheld the forfeiture order.

The applicant, sought by the United States for the attempted murder of a police officer in 1969, applied for judicial interim release pending his extradition appeal and the Minister's surrender decision.

The applicant had previously breached bail twice in the US and lived in Canada under a false identity for 30 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that despite a comprehensive supervision plan, the applicant posed a significant flight risk that was not adequately mitigated.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting the deceased during a confrontation.

The appellant claimed the gun discharged accidentally while he was using it to ward off the deceased in self-defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the relationship between self-defence and accident.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge made errors that would have affected a manslaughter verdict, the jury's conviction for murder meant they must have found the appellant had the requisite intent to kill, rejecting the accidental discharge defence.

Applying the curative proviso, the court concluded the errors did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him to the United States to face charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.

The applicant argued that the American jurisdictional claim was unfounded, that his surrender violated his section 6(1) Charter right to remain in Canada, and that he was denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister correctly applied the substantial connection test to determine that Canada would have jurisdiction in similar circumstances, reasonably weighed the factors favouring prosecution in the United States, and afforded the applicant adequate procedural fairness.

The appellant previously appealed his committal for extradition and applied for judicial review of the surrender decision.

The appeal was dismissed, but the judicial review was adjourned pending reconsideration of the surrender decision.

The Minister of Justice subsequently vacated the surrender order and discharged the appellant.

The parties agreed the matter was moot, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found no rational basis to differentiate between the evidence of the alleged sexual assaults on September 1 and September 8, 2001.

Given the acquittals for the September 1 charges, the guilty verdicts for the September 8 charges were deemed unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty verdicts were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his 15-month custodial sentence.

He had been denied bail on a second set of charges and refused a lifting of bail on his first charge.

The second set of charges was later withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have considered the six months served on the withdrawn charges as relevant information under section 726.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court agreed with the 15-month sentence but granted 12 months of credit (at a 2:1 ratio) for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and exposing genital organs for a sexual purpose involving a seven-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the evidence reasonable despite the complainant's recantation to a friend.

However, applying the Kienapple principle, the Court stayed the convictions for sexual touching and exposure, as they arose from the same factual and legal nexus as the sexual assault.

The global sentence of three years was upheld and applied solely to the sexual assault conviction.

The United States sought the respondent's extradition to New York and later to Ohio on drug charges.

The Minister ordered the respondent's surrender to New York but delayed conveying him to consider the Ohio request, citing the rule of specialty.

The respondent applied for a discharge under s. 69 of the Extradition Act because he was not conveyed within 45 days of the surrender order.

The application judge granted the discharge, finding the Minister failed to show sufficient cause for the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Minister's appeal, holding that the delay was unjustified and that s. 69 mandates discharge when sufficient cause is not shown.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to distribute MDMA, and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the committal order, finding the Authority to Proceed sufficiently particularized the conspiracy.

On the judicial review, the Court rejected arguments regarding jurisdiction, disclosure, and adequacy of reasons.

However, based on fresh evidence that the main prosecution witness had been returned to Canada and was on parole, the Court adjourned the judicial review application to allow the appellant to request the Minister to amend the surrender order.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder based on circumstantial evidence, including traces of his blood and a footwear impression found at the scene.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that his statement to police and running shoes should have been excluded under the Charter, that expert footwear evidence was inadmissible, that the jury instructions were flawed, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was not detained when he gave his statement, the expert evidence was properly admitted, the jury instructions were fair, and the verdict was one a reasonable jury could reach.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal by a jury.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in excluding the respondent's statement based on his right to silence, in permitting the defence to lead evidence of a statement to police regarding post-offence conduct, and in failing to give a stronger jury charge concerning the victim's hospital statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the trial judge erred in excluding the statement, the Crown failed to show the verdict would not necessarily have been the same, as the statement had little probative value and the case ultimately depended on identification evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, including a period of parole ineligibility, for conspiring to import 100 kilograms of drugs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and free of errors in principle.

The court noted the appellant was a career criminal and the mastermind of the offences, justifying the lengthy consecutive sentence and disparity with co-accused.

The period of parole ineligibility was deemed appropriate given the appellant's history of violating probation, parole, and interim release.

The United States of America appealed the dismissal of an application to extradite the respondent for prosecution on charges of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

The extradition judge had discharged the respondent because there was no evidence that the alleged conduct occurred within the United States.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the extradition judge misinterpreted section 29(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court held that the extradition judge's role is limited to determining whether there is evidence of conduct that would amount to the Canadian offence described in the authority to proceed, regardless of where the conduct occurred.

The order of discharge was set aside and an order for committal was substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge gave inadequate instructions on in-dock identification and the W.D. framework regarding defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the instructions sufficient given the context of the trial and the evidence presented.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed fit given the seriousness of the crime and the appellant's record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering a death threat against a Crown Attorney and causing a disturbance, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the witnesses consistently described a threat to kill, the trial judge correctly inferred the requisite mens rea, and the appellant's yelling in court constituted a disturbance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit despite being at the high end of the range.

The Crown appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that permitted an accused, found not criminally responsible and deemed a significant threat to public safety, to be transferred to Jamaica pursuant to a deportation order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the disposition unreasonable as it effectively abdicated the Board's jurisdiction over a dangerous offender without adequate safeguards in the receiving country.

The Court held that the existence of a deportation order does not grant the Board authority under the Criminal Code to permanently transfer an accused out of the country.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences including criminal harassment and breach of probation.

He argued that the trial judge erred by limiting the duration of his trial and in her findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the majority of the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge accommodated the self-represented appellant and made reasonable inferences from the evidence.

However, the court quashed the conviction for breach of probation, noting that under s. 732.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, probation does not commence until a person is released from prison, and the appellant was incarcerated when the calls were made.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the global sentence of 28 months.