John Norris

The appellant, sought by the United States on terrorism charges related to the LTTE, appealed his committal for extradition and applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the committal on corresponding Canadian terrorism offences.

The Court also dismissed the judicial review application, holding that the Minister's independent Cotroni assessment and surrender decision were reasonable and did not deny the appellant procedural fairness.

The appellants appealed their convictions and 15-year sentences for attempted murder.

They argued the verdicts were unreasonable due to unreliable eyewitness identification and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The appellant Nguyen also argued the trial judge erred in applying party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the identification evidence was supported by other evidence and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeals, holding that the 15-year sentences were within the appropriate range given the horrific nature of the shooting that rendered the victim quadriplegic, and that the trial judge did not err in denying enhanced pre-trial custody credit to an offender who committed the offence while serving a conditional sentence.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender to the United States to face fraud charges.

The applicant argued that his significant health problems would not be adequately treated in the Florida prison system and that the Minister should have obtained formal assurances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister did not act unreasonably in relying on information from United States authorities and in declining to request specific assurances as a precondition to surrender.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The appellants, a newspaper and its journalists, received an allegedly forged document from a confidential source implicating the Prime Minister in a conflict of interest.

The police obtained a search warrant and assistance order to seize the document and its envelope to identify the source through forensic testing.

The appellants challenged the warrant, claiming a constitutional or common law journalist-source privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 2(b) of the Charter does not provide a blanket constitutional immunity for journalists, a case-by-case privilege may be established using the Wigmore criteria.

On the facts, the public interest in investigating the serious crime of forgery outweighed the public interest in protecting the confidential source.

The search warrant and assistance order were upheld as reasonable under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing he should have been designated a long-term offender.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding his post-sentence treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly interpreted s. 753.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code as requiring a reasonable possibility that the risk posed by the offender will be controlled within the duration of the long-term sentence.

Given the appellant's pedophilia, cognitive limitations, and need for life-long pharmacological treatment, the trial judge did not err in concluding this criterion was not met.

The fresh evidence was not admitted as it would not have affected the result.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to traffic marijuana and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence of inconsistent witness statements, argued the Minister failed to consider prosecuting him in Canada under the Extradition Treaty, and challenged the Minister's refusal to seek return assurances or delay surrender pending Ontario civil forfeiture proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and judicial review, finding the fresh evidence would not have altered the committal and the Minister's discretionary decisions were reasonable.

The applicant, who was ordered committed for surrender to France for a terrorism-related offence, applied for bail pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that his release was not in the public interest given Canada's international obligations.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding that the applicant was not a flight risk, his detention was not necessary in the public interest since he would not be surrendered before the leave application was decided, and his application raised a viable question of law that was not frivolous.

The Republic of France sought the extradition of the appellant, a Canadian citizen, following his in absentia convictions for forging a travel document and membership in a terrorist organization.

The appellant appealed his committal for surrender on forgery-related offences and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, finding ample evidence to support the committal and concluding that the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable and did not violate the appellant's Charter mobility rights.

The applicant sought to set aside an order of abandonment and reinstate his appeal against committal for extradition.

The applicant had come into possession of new materials that allegedly undermined the sufficiency of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding it in the interests of justice to reopen the appeal, conditional upon the appeal being perfected by a specified date.

The appellant, a dual Canadian-American citizen, was convicted in Canada of drug offences.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition for a related drug transaction in Detroit.

The Minister of Justice ordered his surrender, concluding that extradition would not unjustifiably infringe his mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Minister's decision to surrender a fugitive, including the assessment of Charter rights, is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.

The Court found that the Minister provided adequate reasons and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not already been punished in Canada for the U.S. offence, and that the U.S. had a greater interest in prosecuting the conduct that occurred on its territory.

The Crown appealed a decision quashing a search warrant and assistance order that required the National Post to produce a forged document and envelope received from a confidential source.

The reviewing judge had found the warrant violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and the items were protected by journalist-confidential source privilege.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error in proceeding ex parte, and holding that the fourth Wigmore criterion was not met because the law enforcement interest in investigating a serious crime (forgery) outweighed the benefit of protecting the confidential source.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The Crown moved for directions to transfer the application to the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court of Justice has concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application under s. 679(7.1) of the Criminal Code, as a Superior Court judge is an ex officio justice of the peace under the Justices of the Peace Act.

The application was transferred to the Superior Court because the Crown intended to call viva voce evidence, which is more readily accommodated in that court.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that the Authority to Proceed met statutory requirements and a prima facie case was established.

The Court also dismissed the judicial review application, concluding that the Minister reasonably considered the appellant's concerns regarding potential sexual assault in Texas prisons, delay, and his personal circumstances in Canada.

The appellant, an African-American man who fled to Canada in 1969 after being charged with the attempted murder of a Chicago police officer, appealed his committal for extradition and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

He argued that the extradition judge failed to properly assess the reliability of inconsistent witness statements and that his surrender would be unjust and oppressive due to systemic racism in the Chicago justice system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding that the evidence met the threshold for reliability and sufficiency, and that the Minister reasonably concluded the appellant would not face persecution or be denied a fair trial if returned to the United States.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

During jury selection, the trial judge departed from the statutorily mandated procedure under s. 640(2) of the Criminal Code by having the first two jurors act as triers for the challenge for cause for the entire panel, rather than rotating them.

The Court of Appeal held that this was a fundamental jurisdictional error that resulted in an improperly constituted court.

The error could not be cured by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his two step-daughters and designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on bad character evidence, reasonable doubt, and prior inconsistent statements.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing he was entitled to the benefit of the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions, while pre-dating Lifchus and not perfect, did not result in an unfair trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the long-term offender provisions, the court applied the curative proviso because the expert evidence overwhelmingly established that his risk could not be controlled in the community.

The applicant applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order her surrender to the United States under s. 57 of the Extradition Act.

She argued that the Minister failed to balance the effect of surrender against the regulatory nature of the offences, erred in treating the US prosecutor's position as irrelevant, misapplied the test for security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the offences serious, the Minister's treatment of the prosecutor's position proper, the s. 7 analysis reasonable, and the reasons adequate.

The appellant appealed from a committal order.

The appellant subsequently abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellants, foreign nationals and a permanent resident, were detained under security certificates issued pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

They challenged the constitutionality of the IRPA's certificate scheme, which allows for detention and deportation based on secret evidence not disclosed to the named person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedure for determining the reasonableness of a certificate infringes section 7 of the Charter because it denies the named person the right to know the case to meet, and is not saved by section 1.

The Court also found that the lack of prompt review for the detention of foreign nationals infringes sections 9 and 10(c) of the Charter.

The Court struck down the offending provisions but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to amend the law.