John Fennel

The Crown applied for an assessment under s.752.1 of the Criminal Code to determine if the accused, who pleaded guilty to possessing and accessing child pornography, should be declared a dangerous or long-term offender.

The central issue was whether these offences qualified as "serious personal injury offences" under s.752, a prerequisite for such an assessment.

The court, distinguishing from previous cases like Patterson based on the quantity and nature of the child pornography, the accused's repeat offender status, and compelling victim impact evidence, found that the offences did meet the definition of serious personal injury offences.

Consequently, the court ordered the assessment.

The applicant, who was found guilty of child pornography offences, applied for a stay of sentencing under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay between the verdict and the sentencing hearing.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that the presumptive ceiling of five months for sentencing delay was exceeded.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that the delay was reasonable due to the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a suspension of regular court operations and a significant backlog.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, brought an application arguing that the abolition of peremptory challenges under Bill C-75 should not apply retrospectively to his case.

The court held that the repeal of section 634 of the Criminal Code is purely procedural and does not affect the applicant's substantive rights.

Consequently, the new jury selection regime applies retrospectively to the applicant's trial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of criminal harassment.

The trial judge had found that while the respondent's conduct caused the complainants subjective fear, that fear was not objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

The Crown argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal test by importing a proportionality requirement and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the objective standard from R. v. Sim and that his factual findings regarding the nature of the respondent's emails and the complainants' reactions were supported by the evidence.

The applicants, William Cummins and Matthew Moreira, charged with first-degree murder and robbery alongside Patrick Smith, sought severance from Mr. Smith for their joint trial.

The motion was based on the potential impact of Mr. Smith's statement to undercover officers, which they argued was exculpatory for them and necessary for their full answer and defence.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the legal presumption in favour of joint trials for co-accused acting in concert, the risk of inconsistent verdicts, and the truth-seeking function of a single trial.

The court found that antagonistic defences were likely to arise, and that carefully crafted jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice.

The accused, Simon Gares, was charged with assault causing bodily harm and breach of probation after violently attacking a 5-year-old child.

The trial proceeded by judge alone after a mistrial.

The central issue was whether Gares was not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists provided divergent opinions on Gares' mental state and capacity to know his actions were morally wrong.

The court found Gares guilty, concluding that he failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was NCR, as his post-offence conduct suggested an awareness of wrongdoing and there was evidence of malingering.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of morphine and possession of morphine for the purpose of trafficking, as well as an eight-month sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a key defence witness and failed to properly apply Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the trial judge properly rejected the defence evidence and adequately considered the appellant's Aboriginal background and personal circumstances in imposing a fit sentence.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following an altercation in a correctional facility where he punched the complainant 25 to 30 times in the head.

The sole defence at trial was self-defence.

The trial judge found that the Crown had disproved self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the appellant had launched a pre-emptive attack to maintain his status as the "heavy" rather than in genuine self-defence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the prison context and the "inmate's code." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the prison setting must be considered as a contextual factor, it does not override the Criminal Code's legal definition of self-defence.