Joanne E. Mulcahy

The appellant police officer appealed a Hearing Officer's decision convicting her of misconduct for allegedly using unnecessary force by kicking a handcuffed suspect.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission reviewed the evidence and found that the Hearing Officer failed to make a definitive finding on whether the appellant actually kicked the suspect as alleged in the Statement of Particulars.

Concluding that the evidence did not meet the required standard of clear and convincing proof, the Commission revoked the Hearing Officer's decision and dismissed the charge.

The Chief of Police appealed a youth court judge's decision denying the disclosure of a young person's youth records.

The records were sought by both the prosecuting police service and the subject officer for use in a police disciplinary proceeding, where the young person was a key witness.

The appeal court found that the principle of diminished moral culpability under the Youth Criminal Justice Act does not shield a young person's records from disclosure when they are a witness and their credibility is at issue.

The court set aside the youth court judge's decision and ordered the records produced, subject to publication bans and redactions to protect the young person's identity.

This is a preliminary inquiry into charges of criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death against two Ontario Provincial Police officers.

The officers were engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a stolen vehicle driven by a prohibited driver that resulted in a collision with an innocent third party, causing her death.

The Crown alleged the officers failed to terminate the pursuit when the risk to public safety outweighed the benefit of apprehension, and that their driving was objectively dangerous.

The defence argued the officers' conduct was within their training and policy, and that neither supervising sergeant terminated the pursuit.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both officers to trial on both counts.

The appellant police officer brought a motion to strike portions of a factum delivered by the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), acting as a statutory intervener in her disciplinary appeal.

The appellant argued the OIPRD overstepped its permissible boundaries by making submissions not based on the record and inviting policy considerations.

The Commission held it had jurisdiction to strike portions of a factum under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act to control its own process.

The Commission struck one paragraph that requested an order beyond the OIPRD's mandate, but dismissed the remainder of the motion, finding the other impugned paragraphs were not so obviously irrelevant or inappropriately prejudicial as to justify being struck.

The police service applied for an order under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to disclose a young person's police records for use in a police disciplinary hearing against an officer.

The subject officer also sought access to the records.

The court held that both the police service and the officer must apply for access under sections 119(1)(s) and 123 of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither applicant established a valid interest in the records, as the records had no nexus to the alleged misconduct and were not relevant to the young person's credibility or character.

Furthermore, granting access would undermine the privacy protections and principles of diminished moral culpability under the Act.

Five police officers appealed their convictions for attempting to obstruct justice and perjury arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent efforts to conceal it.

The officers argued various trial errors, including Charter violations regarding the use of their preliminary inquiry testimony, improper jury instructions, and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

The Crown cross-appealed the 45-day conditional sentences.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the sentences demonstrably unfit for police officers committing perjury and obstruction of justice, and substituted 3-year custodial sentences, but stayed their operation due to the passage of time.

The Appellant, a police officer found guilty of misconduct, brought a motion seeking permission to deliver a Factum in excess of the 30-page limit set by the Commission's Practice Direction (proposing a 134-page Factum) and requesting up to three days for oral argument.

The Commission reviewed the factors for granting relief from factum length limits and found that the appeal did not raise exceptionally complex issues justifying a 134-page factum.

However, considering counsel's submissions, the Commission exercised its discretion to allow a 50-page Factum and scheduled the appeal for one day, granting the Appellant up to three hours for oral argument.

The Appellant, a police officer, appealed a finding of misconduct and a penalty of dismissal arising from a 2004 traffic stop and drug seizure.

The Hearing Officer had found the Appellant guilty of neglect of duty based largely on hearsay utterances from a disgraced former officer and circumstantial evidence.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission allowed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Officer committed numerous errors of law, including admitting highly unreliable and prejudicial hearsay evidence, shifting the burden of proof onto the Appellant, making irreconcilable findings of fact, and improperly using his own police experience to fill gaps in the evidentiary record.

The finding of misconduct was quashed, rendering the penalty moot.

A police constable was charged with assault with a weapon arising from his use of a police asp during the arrest of a protester at the G-20 demonstrations in Toronto on June 26, 2010.

The Crown alleged that the force used exceeded what was necessary.

The defendant testified that he used the asp to assist fellow officers in securing the arrestee's limbs.

The court found that the defendant's use of force was not proportionate, necessary, or reasonable, and that his explanation for the blows was an after-the-fact justification rather than the actual reason for them.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant Ontario Provincial Police appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Police Commission that substituted a penalty of demotion for the immediate dismissal of the respondent police officer.

The officer had previously pled guilty to criminal charges and discreditable conduct for stealing gasoline and office supplies.

The Divisional Court found that the Commission reasonably concluded the Hearing Officer erred by disregarding positive character evidence, focusing on irrelevant medical issues, and failing to properly consider rehabilitation.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the penalty of demotion.

Five police officers were convicted of attempting to obstruct justice, and three of them were also convicted of perjury, arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent false memo book entries and testimony to conceal the timing of the search.

The Crown sought penitentiary sentences of three to four years, while the defence sought non-custodial sentences.

The court considered the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence, but also weighed significant mitigating factors, including the catastrophic impact of the prolonged 14-year investigation and proceedings on the officers' lives, careers, and health.

The court concluded that a penitentiary term was not warranted and imposed a 45-day conditional sentence (house arrest) for each offender.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

Media organizations sought permission to use electronic devices to transmit information from inside the courtroom and to make audio recordings during a criminal jury trial.

The court considered s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and an applicable practice direction permitting unobtrusive audio recording by journalists solely to supplement handwritten notes.

The court authorized such audio recordings and permitted journalists to transmit information from inside the courtroom, provided proceedings were not disrupted.

The court also established a procedure governing media access to large volumes of documentary exhibits, requiring undertakings preventing publication until a judicial determination confirmed sufficient evidence to place the document before the jury.

A publication restriction was ordered for specified personal identifying information contained in documentary materials.

The appellant police officer appealed a penalty of immediate dismissal imposed after he pled guilty to discreditable conduct for stealing gas and supplies from the detachment.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission allowed the appeal, finding the Hearing Officer made significant errors by failing to consider substantial mitigating character evidence and the appellant's successful rehabilitation for PTSD and alcoholism.

The penalty was varied to a demotion to fourth-class constable with strict conditions for ongoing psychological monitoring.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sex discrimination and harassment by the personal respondent, a police officer.

The personal respondent, who was also facing disciplinary charges under the Police Services Act arising from the same events, requested a further extension of time to file a complete Response until after his disciplinary hearing concluded, citing prejudice.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding it amounted to an effective deferral of the application, which had already been denied.

The Tribunal rescinded the previous order requiring a fuller Response and directed the matter to mediation.

The appellant police officer appealed a penalty of demotion to third-class constable for six months, which was imposed after she pled guilty to discreditable conduct stemming from an off-duty criminal conviction for causing a disturbance.

At the disciplinary hearing, the parties had presented a joint submission for a lesser penalty of demotion to second-class constable.

The Hearing Officer rejected the joint submission without providing notice or reasons.

On appeal, the Commission found that the Hearing Officer violated principles of fairness by failing to give notice or an opportunity to make submissions before departing from the joint submission.

The appeal was allowed on consent, the original penalty was revoked, and the jointly proposed penalty was substituted.

In an interim decision, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario addressed three preliminary matters in a complaint alleging sexual orientation discrimination by police officers.

The Tribunal ordered the hearing bifurcated into liability and remedy phases.

It dismissed the Toronto Police Services Board's request to dismiss the complaint, finding the Board could be held vicariously liable for the actions of individual officers under s. 46.3(1) of the Human Rights Code.

Finally, the Tribunal ordered the production of an officer's personnel file and relevant policy documents, declining to apply an extraordinary O'Connor-type procedure for the disclosure of the personnel records.

The applicant police officers sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision ordering the production of their personnel files in relation to a human rights complaint.

After the police service confirmed no responsive records existed, the respondents argued the application was moot.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding no live controversy remained.

The Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, noting that recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence regarding police disciplinary records should be applied in a genuine adversarial context.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of misconduct for insubordination after conducting CPIC searches on his wife's vehicle at her request.

The Toronto Police Service cross-appealed the Commission's decision to reduce the officer's penalty from a seven-day to a three-day forfeiture.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, finding that the Commission reasonably concluded the CPIC searches were not exclusively for police business and that the Hearing Officer implicitly rejected the officer's defence of honest belief.

The Court also upheld the Commission's interpretation of the Police Services Act, confirming that prior informal discipline must be expunged after two years and cannot be considered in sentencing unless a new finding of misconduct is proven within that period.