John R. R. Jennings

The City of Toronto appealed a decision ordering its Chief Building Official to issue building permits for sun rooms using sandwich panels and to evaluate the applicant's load test data.

The City argued that section 9(1) of the Building Code Act granted the official discretion to refuse to evaluate test results if the testing method was not specified in the Building Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 9(1) does not grant discretion to defeat applications relying on design methods authorized in the Building Code, such as load testing.

The court also upheld the motions judge's factual finding that the submitted data was adequate and dismissed the appeal on costs.

The defendant bank moved to quash the plaintiffs' appeal from a Master's order requiring the plaintiffs to pay $100,000 into court as security for costs.

The plaintiffs had appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing the order was effectively final because they were impecunious.

The court held that orders for security for costs are interlocutory, not final, and therefore the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the revocation of his registration as a real estate salesperson.

The Tribunal found that the appellant failed to disclose his status as a registered salesperson and his interest as a beneficial purchaser in multiple transactions.

Furthermore, he acted for vendors in transactions where he was the undisclosed beneficial purchaser, violating the standards of honesty and integrity required under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's conclusion was reasonable and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $3,000 to the respondent.

The Town of Oakville sought leave to appeal two decisions of the Ontario Municipal Board regarding heritage buildings.

The first decision rescinded an earlier order cross-appointing a Conservation Review Board member to the panel.

The court granted leave to appeal this decision, finding reason to doubt its correctness given the statutory provisions of the Ontario Heritage Act.

The second decision directed the Town to permit the relocation of two heritage buildings.

The court denied leave to appeal this decision, finding the Board committed no error of law in its assessment of conservation principles.

The appellant sought leave to appeal two orders in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal an order staying the appellant's child support application pending compliance with a financial disclosure order.

However, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal of a case conference judge's order that struck the affidavit of the parties' teenage child.

The Court found the case conference judge erred by striking the affidavit on his own initiative without hearing submissions, contrary to the Family Law Rules, and without providing adequate reasons for exercising parens patriae jurisdiction.

The affidavit was restored to the record.

The Grand River Conservation Authority appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal finding that the Tenant Protection Act applied to seasonal cottage lot leases.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's interpretation that the s. 3(a) exemption for seasonal accommodation only applies to commercial establishments like hotels or campgrounds, not to these cottage lots.

However, the Court remitted the matter back to the Tribunal to determine whether a prior mediated settlement between the parties, which purported to exclude the Act's application, was valid under s. 181(2) of the Act.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motions to strike, stay, or quash notices of application brought by three corporate taxpayers.

The responding parties raised preliminary objections that the order was final, not interlocutory, and that the motion for leave was out of time.

The Divisional Court held that the order was interlocutory because it dealt with procedure rather than substantive rights, and that the motion was timely because time ran from the date the order was settled.

On the merits, the court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision that a Rule 14 application was an appropriate procedure for determining taxpayers' rights based on statutory interpretation.

The applications for leave to appeal were dismissed.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of decisions by a FSCO arbitrator and Director's delegate finding that the respondent insured suffered a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(e)(i) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued the arbitrator unreasonably interpreted 'reasonable period of time' for a Glasgow Coma Scale score.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review is patent unreasonableness and the tribunal's decisions were supported by evidence and within its specialized jurisdiction.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order declining to disqualify the defendants' solicitors.

The solicitors had received documents hacked from the plaintiff's computers by a third party.

The motions judge found that the solicitors disclosed the documents the day after receipt and did not realize they were obtained in breach of privacy until months later.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the balancing test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin and that there was no conflicting case law.

The defendant in a civil action for damages arising from a double homicide appealed a Master's decision finding insufficient evidence that he was a person under a disability.

The defendant's former counsel had withheld psychiatric reports from the Master due to concerns about solicitor-client privilege.

On appeal, the court admitted the psychiatric reports as fresh evidence, holding that the traditional due diligence criterion for fresh evidence should yield where compelling psychiatric evidence exists and the interests of justice require its admission to protect a vulnerable person.

The appeal was allowed and the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as litigation guardian.

The successful responding party on a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court sought partial indemnity costs of $12,400.

The court found the requested fees disproportionate for a simple leave application in a family law dispute, noting that the attendance of two senior counsel was unnecessary.

Costs were fixed at $4,000 for fees and $568 for disbursements, plus GST.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award requiring a grievor, a registered nurse returning from a medical leave for physical surgery, to provide answers to questions regarding her mental health.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's decision was unreasonable, as there was no basis to require a psychological assessment given that the grievor's absence was for physical, not mental, reasons.

The application for judicial review was granted and the arbitrator's award was set aside.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that found she suffered no compensable damages from a motor vehicle accident because her injuries did not meet the Insurance Act threshold.

In supplementary reasons, the Divisional Court addressed the appellant's claim for past and future loss of income, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that her inability to work was not caused by the accident.

The appeal remained dismissed, and costs of the appeal were fixed at $5,000 payable to the respondents.

The appellant husband appealed an order varying his child support obligations.

A previous consent order had set support below the Child Support Guidelines table amount.

The motions judge found a material change in circumstances, as the husband was no longer obligated to support the two eldest children, and increased the support for the remaining three children to the Guidelines amount.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence, as there were no special provisions justifying a departure from the Guidelines.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that defamatory words were spoken without qualified privilege.

The trial judge had found that while the appellant's communication to the police was privileged, his communication to a co-worker was not, as there was no reciprocal interest in the communication.

The Divisional Court found no error in the trial judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent employee was constructively dismissed and awarding her damages.

The respondent, a director, had refused to accept a corporate restructuring that required her to report to a newly appointed assistant vice-president rather than the senior vice-president.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in construing the altered reporting obligation as a transfer of responsibility.

Applying an objective test, the court found that the structural change did not constitute a fundamental breach of the employment contract, and therefore, there was no constructive dismissal.