Janet Wilson

The appellant, a paralegal, sought an extension of time to appeal an interlocutory costs order and an appeal panel decision of the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The appellant had been charged with exceeding his authority by representing clients on super summary offences.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the interlocutory costs order.

The court also declined to extend the time to appeal the appeal panel decision, concluding there was no merit to the proposed appeal and that the interests of justice required the appellant to raise his factual and constitutional arguments at a new disciplinary hearing.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a decision that allowed an appeal from a master's severance order.

The plaintiffs, two sisters, alleged historic sexual abuse by their uncle.

The master had severed their claims, but the motion judge reversed this, finding the claims fit within a 'series of occurrences' under Rule 5.02(1)(a) and that joinder was appropriate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and no issue of such importance to warrant granting leave.

The appellants, shareholders in two deadlocked corporations, sought a stay of a winding-up order pending appeal and leave to introduce fresh evidence.

The court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding it irrelevant because the appellants had not requested an adjournment or objected to proceeding without cross-examinations before the application judge.

The court also denied the stay, applying the RJR-MacDonald test, concluding there was no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm as funds would be held in trust, and the balance of convenience favoured the respondent who sought to end the corporate deadlock.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a medical negligence action on the basis that it was res judicata and statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced an essentially identical action arising from the same death, which had been dismissed as out of time and unsuccessfully appealed through the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada.

In the present action, the plaintiffs again alleged negligence, lack of informed consent, and fraudulent concealment.

The court held that the allegations had already been fully considered in the prior proceedings and raised no triable issue.

Allowing the claim to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and the limitation period under the Trustee Act applied.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which upheld a Hearing Panel's finding of professional misconduct and the penalty of revocation of his licence.

The misconduct involved overcharging a family law client, failing to explain irrevocable directions, and failing to keep the client informed.

On appeal, the appellant raised new issues regarding the burden of proof and the sufficiency of the Hearing Panel's reasons.

The Divisional Court allowed the new issues to be raised but dismissed them on the merits, finding that the Hearing Panel did not reverse the burden of proof and that its reasons were sufficient under the Newfoundland Nurses standard.

The court also upheld the global assessment of the lawyer's fees without expert evidence and confirmed the penalty of revocation.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following convictions for choking, sexual assault, and uttering threats.

The offender had a history of violent sexual offences against women.

The court declared the offender a dangerous offender.

The Crown sought an indeterminate sentence, while the defence argued for a determinate sentence followed by a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO).

After reviewing extensive psychiatric and psychological evidence regarding the offender's treatability, personality disorder, and risk of reoffending, the court concluded that a determinate sentence of 5.5 years (equivalent to 8 years and 7.5 months with pre-sentence custody credit) followed by a 10-year LTSO would adequately protect the public, as the offender's risk would significantly decrease by age 50 and could be managed with strict community supervision and treatment.

The accused brought a Charter application in a blended voir dire and trial seeking exclusion of a loaded firearm discovered during a warrantless vehicle search following a traffic stop.

The court found the police stop under the Highway Traffic Act was a racially motivated pretext rather than a legitimate highway safety stop, rendering the detention and subsequent arrests for careless driving and failure to identify unlawful.

The search of the vehicle was also unconstitutional because it was not truly incidental to arrest and amounted to a broad exploratory search unrelated to the alleged traffic offences.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held that the Charter breaches—racial profiling, unlawful arrest, and an unjustified search—were serious and deliberate, and that admitting the firearm would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The firearm and ammunition were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted as the Crown could not prove knowledge and control of the firearm.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions that dismissed his duty of fair representation complaint against his union without a full hearing.

The applicant alleged the union failed to give him adequate notice of a grievance that ultimately displaced him from his permanent custodian position.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board did not breach procedural fairness by deciding the matter on written submissions, and that its conclusion that the union did not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith was reasonable.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) Reconsideration Order.

The IPC had ordered the LCBO to cease collecting the personal information of wine club members when processing special orders, finding the practice contravened s. 38(2) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The LCBO argued the IPC's order forced it to violate liquor laws and that the IPC applied an unreasonably strict test for 'necessity' under FIPPA.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the IPC's decision was reasonable, the LCBO was exempt from the relevant liquor law prohibitions, and the IPC correctly applied the established legal test for necessity.

The applicants sought judicial review of a school board's decision to close an elementary school due to declining enrollment.

The applicants argued the decision was procedurally unfair and that the board trustees exhibited a closed mind, raising a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board substantially complied with its accommodation review policy, provided adequate disclosure, and afforded the community a meaningful opportunity to participate.

The court also held that the trustees' conduct, viewed objectively, did not meet the 'closed mind' test for bias in the context of a policy-driven decision by elected officials.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a director's delegate's decision upholding an arbitrator's finding that the insurer's refusal to designate the respondent as catastrophically impaired did not trigger the two-year limitation period under s. 281.1(1) of the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness, rejecting the insurer's argument for correctness.

The Court found the director's delegate reasonably concluded that a catastrophic impairment determination is not a benefit itself, and the insurer's denial letter did not constitute a clear and unequivocal refusal of a benefit.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant lawyers for negligent misrepresentation, alleging they relied on the lawyers' confirmation that a financing condition had been met.

During discovery, the plaintiffs refused to answer questions about the legal advice they received from their own counsel regarding the alleged confirmation.

The motion judge ordered the plaintiffs to answer the questions, finding they had waived solicitor-client privilege by placing their state of mind and reliance in issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that fairness and consistency required disclosure of the legal advice to allow the defendants to adequately defend against the reliance claim.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment, which had argued that the plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal fees was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court denied leave, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that the defendants' undertakings to protect the plaintiff's account likely estopped them from relying on a limitation period defence, and suggested the matter proceed to a summary trial.

The plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall at a Mike's No Frills store but mistakenly named Dickie's No Frills as the defendant in the statement of claim.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiff sought and was granted leave by a Master to amend the claim to name the correct store operators based on the doctrine of misnomer.

The appellants appealed the Master's decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's application of the 'litigating finger' test, as the intended defendants shared an insurer with the named defendant and their staff were aware of the incident, meaning they would have known they were the intended defendants.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario Discipline Committee Panel, which found him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a former patient.

The panel's decision was split 3-2, with the minority finding the sexual abuse allegations unproven.

The appellant argued the majority's credibility assessments and factual findings were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the majority's findings were reasonable, supported by the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing his motion to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of his motor vehicle accident action for delay.

The action was dismissed after the appellant's counsel inadvertently missed the deadline to set the matter down for trial.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master made palpable and overriding errors in assessing the Reid factors and failed to take a contextual approach.

The court noted the appellant's clear intention to proceed, the solicitor's inadvertence due to staff changes, and the lack of prejudice to the respondents.

The dismissal order was set aside and the action revived.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board confirming the revocation of its licence to operate a long-term care home.

The appellant argued that the revocation order was issued without notice, breaching procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the hearing before the Board was a hearing de novo, which cured any prior procedural defects regarding notice.

The court also noted that any prejudice suffered by the appellant stemmed from the appointment of an interim manager, an order the appellant chose not to appeal.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision dismissing her appeal for lack of standing.

After initiating a claim against Tarion for the cost of an unapproved fireplace installation, the appellant sold her home but entered into a collateral agreement with the purchasers to maintain her claim.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, confirming that under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, warranties run with the home and former owners lack standing.

The court further held that the collateral agreement could not assign the fireplace claim, as the purchasers had no such claim to assign, and assigning warranty claims violates s. 13(6) of the Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding her $3,000 for two incidents of violence but denying her other claims.

The appellant argued the Board erred in failing to compensate her for other incidents, awarding insufficient damages for pain and suffering, and failing to compensate for increased rent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the Board proceeding in the appellant's absence after she failed to attend the hearing.

The Court held that the Board's factual findings were reasonable based on the record before it, and noted that the appellant's attempt to introduce new evidence should be directed to the Board under its statutory power to vary decisions.

The appellants appealed a Master's order refusing to set aside a registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The Divisional Court found that the Master made factual errors regarding the calculation of delay and the alleged prejudice to the respondents concerning document preservation.

Furthermore, the Master failed to conduct a proper contextual analysis of the Reid factors, including the impact of recent amendments to Rule 48.14 extending the time for dismissal.

The appeal was allowed, and the dismissal order was set aside.