Jane E. Ferguson

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle accident action, the jury awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in general damages but no other damages.

Because the statutory deductible under the Insurance Act exceeded the award, the resulting judgment was effectively zero dollars.

The defendant had previously offered to settle for $5,000, which in practical effect was also equivalent to zero after the deductible.

Both parties sought partial indemnity costs and argued the Rule 49 consequences of the offers to settle.

The court held that both the offer and the trial result were artificially characterized as monetary outcomes when in reality each amounted to zero recovery.

Exercising its discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered that neither party recover costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s action concerning the sale of a residential property.

The plaintiff alleged damages including recovery of funds from a line of credit secured against the property, the difference between the sale price and fair market value, and loss of rental income.

The court held that by signing Minutes of Settlement the plaintiff had agreed to the sale price and payment of encumbrances and was therefore estopped from challenging the transaction.

The court further found that the action was commenced outside the applicable limitation period.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the entire claim.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence discovered on his laptop during a police investigation initially framed as theft of telecommunications.

Police had detained the accused while he was using a laptop in a parked vehicle and seized the computer without lawful authority, later obtaining search warrants.

The court found multiple breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, including unlawful seizure of the laptop, delayed access to counsel, failure to re‑advise rights when the investigative focus shifted to child pornography, and execution of a search warrant months outside the authorized time period.

The court also found the warrant application contained irrelevant criminal history and that the investigation into telecommunications theft was used as a pretext to search for sexual offences.

Applying the s.24(2) analysis, the court held that the state conduct was serious and the privacy intrusion significant, warranting exclusion of the computer evidence.

The accused was charged with possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000, possession of cocaine and cannabis for the purpose of trafficking, possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of a recognizance.

Police executed a search warrant at a residence co-owned by the accused and discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, cash, and packaging materials.

The principal issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs found in the residence.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised control over the drugs or knew of their presence, particularly given evidence that other individuals resided in or frequented the home and one individual occupied the bedroom where drugs were found.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The plaintiff brought a motion to stay pending summary judgment motions brought by the defendants, arguing that the motions were premature and that discovery was necessary to develop a full evidentiary record capable of satisfying the “full appreciation” test.

The defendants opposed the stay and argued that the issues—primarily a limitation period defence under the Limitations Act, 2002—were appropriate for determination on summary judgment.

The court reviewed the post‑2010 summary judgment framework articulated by the Court of Appeal and considered whether the evidentiary record required the procedural advantages of a trial.

The court found that the dispute was largely document‑driven, involved limited witnesses, and centred on whether the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the loss of her beneficial interest in property by at least April 2009.

The court held that the matter was suitable for summary judgment and dismissed the motion to stay.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against guarantors of a corporate loan following default under a small business term loan agreement.

The responding guarantors argued they believed each was liable only for one-quarter of the guaranteed amount and claimed they had not received independent legal advice before signing the guarantees.

The court held that absent fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, or a valid non est factum defence, the bank had no obligation to ensure the guarantors obtained independent legal advice.

The court further found that the relationship between the bank and the guarantors was purely commercial and did not give rise to any duty of care.

Because the guarantees contained entire agreement clauses and the alleged misunderstanding did not render the documents fundamentally different from what was signed, the defences failed and summary judgment was granted.

The plaintiff sued a developer for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale after the developer refused to complete the sale of a subdivision lot, alleging late delivery of the deposit.

The court held that a binding agreement existed and that the developer could not rely on the time-of-essence clause because the parties subsequently extended the closing date through correspondence between counsel.

The developer also counterclaimed seeking removal of a house constructed by the plaintiff on a different lot, alleging breaches of restrictive covenants requiring approval of building plans.

The court found the covenants enforceable in real property law but declined injunctive relief because the developer had acquiesced and delayed while construction proceeded.

The plaintiff was awarded consequential damages for the aborted transaction but not loss-of-bargain damages.

The plaintiff brought a post‑trial motion seeking to set aside a civil jury verdict arising from a rear‑end motor vehicle collision, arguing there was no evidence to support the jury’s apportionment of liability and damages.

The jury had found both parties negligent, assigning 90% fault to the plaintiff and 10% to the defendant, and awarded damages subject to that apportionment.

The court reviewed the limited circumstances in which a trial judge may refuse to accept a jury verdict, namely where the verdict is devoid of evidentiary support or legally incapable of supporting judgment.

The court held that the plaintiff’s Highway Traffic Act conviction and the evidence presented at trial constituted some evidence capable of supporting the jury’s findings.

The motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial or substitute judgment was dismissed.