Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-540586
DATE: 20191008
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
BARRY WEISLEDER
Plaintiff
– and –
THE ONTARIO SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS’ FEDERATION
Defendant
Counsel:
Alexander N. Zivkov, for the Plaintiff
Joanna Birenbaum and Kristen Allen, for the Defendant
HEARD: September 16, 2019
REASONS FOR DECISION
J.E. FERGUSON J.
[1] The Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation (“OSSTF”) brings this motion for summary judgment on the sole basis that the defence of qualified privilege clearly disposes of the necessity of a trial. OSSTF submits that there are two legal issues on this motion:
(i) were the words published on an occasion of qualified privilege?
(ii) has Barry Weisleder (“Weisleder”) discharged his burden of proving that the privilege was lost because of actual or express malice?
[2] Weisleder submits that defamation cases are a category of cases that should not be determined on a summary judgment motion (except where the issue is non‑compliance with notice requirements or limitation periods). This is not correct and defamation cases are the proper subject matter of summary judgment motions. Further, Weisleder submits that the defence of qualified privilege cannot be determined in this case on a summary judgment motion.
[3] Summary judgment motions are granted where there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (i) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact; (ii) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (iii) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.[^1]
[4] In this case summary judgment is appropriate for the following reasons:
(i) I am able to make the necessary findings of fact;
(ii) I am able to apply the law to the facts; and
(iii) I find that this is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.
[5] Boiled down to its essential elements, Weisleder’s assertion is that when he signed the collective agreement on behalf of the membership in 2001, as the president of the Occasional Teachers' Bargaining Unit District 12 (“the OTBU D12”), he was forced to do so by the OSSTF. Weisleder submits that the OTBU D12 created a pamphlet containing passages that are defamatory towards him, and then the OTBU D12 circulated said pamphlet at the OTBU D12 Annual General Meeting (“AGM”).
[6] I do not agree with Weisleder. This defamation claim is frivolous and without merit.
THE BACKGROUND
[7] (i) from 1998 to 2002, Weisleder was the president of the OTBU D12. In 2002, he was removed from office by the OSSTF judicial council (“judicial council”) due to serious misconduct. In 2003, the OTBU D12 was put into trusteeship mainly due to Weisleder’s ongoing misconduct, disregard for the judicial council order, and ongoing interference with the OTBU D12. In June of 2018, Weisleder was terminated from his employment at the Toronto District School Board (“TDSC”) and is no longer a member of the OSSTF;
(ii) since his removal from office, Weisleder has brought fourteen unsuccessful complaints to the judicial council alleging misconduct against members of the OTBU D12 executive; eight unsuccessful applications to the Ontario Labour Relations Board; an unsuccessful application for an injunction to restore him to his position as president; and an application for a peace bond against an OTBU D12 executive member (which was withdrawn by the Crown); and a small claims court action against the OSSTF, which has recently been dismissed;
(iii) on May 27, 2015, the OTBU D12 held its AGM which included a celebration of its 10th anniversary of having come out of trusteeship. At the time, it was the only bargaining unit that had been subjected to a trusteeship by the provincial office;
(iv) the AGM was a closed event, open only to OTBU D12 members who were required to check in at a registration table and validate their membership. The AGM is an occasion at which the OTBU D12 executive provides information to the membership about the steps and activities it has taken in the previous year (pursuant to its statutory duties);
(v) a pamphlet was provided to all attendees at the AGM, entitled “OTBU D12 10th Anniversary AGM”. The second page of the pamphlet set out the history of the bargaining unit, the events that led to the trusteeship, and the positive steps taken by the executive in the ten years since the trusteeship. Approximately 125 pamphlets were distributed with approximately 50-60 being picked up at the end of the meeting and returned to the OTBU D12 office;
(vi) the allegations in this claim relate to two paragraphs on the second page of the pamphlet (paragraphs 2 and 5) which make reference to Weisleder’s tenure as president immediately prior to the trusteeship. They also relate to a one‑page document, the collective agreement signature page excerpt (“the excerpt”);
(vii) Weisleder’s term as president was characterized by extreme conflict between Weisleder and other members of the executive. Weisleder acknowledged in March of 2002 that there was a war going on within the executive;
(viii) in March of 2002 a complaint against Weisleder was made to the judicial council. By a decision dated October 8, 2002, the judicial council found Weisleder guilty of a number of violations of the OSSTF bylaws and constitution and the judicial council subsequently removed him from office.
(ix) in discussing penalty, the judicial council stated that:
[Weisleder’s] behaviour has contributed to an atmosphere of disrespect for colleagues and distrust of OSSTF beyond his unit. His behaviour has created rifts within the bargaining unit, diminishing its effectiveness by diverting energy and resources away from its obligations to its members. This is an extraordinary circumstance that requires an extraordinary remedy and a significant period of time for healing and restoration of normal union procedures. The panel felt that Weisleder’s domination of the unit is so extensive that he needed to be removed for the necessary changes to be made;
(x) an appeal to the OSSTF provincial appeal panel (“appeal panel”) resulted in an increase in Weisleder’s suspension from office until August 31, 2005;
(xi) summaries of the judicial council and appeal panel decisions were published in the OSSTF Update, a publication which is sent to all 60,000 OSSTF members and widely circulated by bargaining units;
(xii) Weisleder did not file an application for judicial review of the decision of the judicial council or the appeal panel and instead he commenced an action in Superior Court seeking injunctive relief against the OSSTF, which was denied. That case was ultimately settled;
(xiii) as a result of the significant disruption caused by Weisleder’s actions both before and after the October 2002 judicial council decision, the OSSTF in accordance with its constitution and bylaws, assumed control of the OTBU D12 through trusteeship;
(xiv) on June 27, 2013, Weisleder was found guilty of breaching various bylaws with respect to his conduct during an OTBU D12 general meeting. The judicial council found that his disruptive behaviour (including shouting) prevented the business of the meeting from continuing and interfered with the rights of other members. The evidence of Anne Burke (“Burke”) and Linda Bartram (“Bartram”), two members of the OTBU D12 executive, is that this was not an exceptional occasion; this is how Weisleder conducted himself at all OTBU D12 meetings, and it was such a serious problem that members were disengaging from union participation. The judicial council barred Weisleder from holding OSSTF office for a further ten years. In addition, they banned him from attending OSSTF meetings for a ten-year period, commencing July 1, 2013;
(xv) despite being banned from attending meetings and being served with trespass notices, Weisleder continued to attend OTBU D12 meetings and events, interrupting speakers, causing a scene, which required the executive to ask him to leave and/or to call the police or security;
(xvi) following the imposition of the trusteeship, Weisleder, on behalf of the OTBU 12, made two applications to the Ontario Labour Relations Board to have the trusteeship set aside. The applications were dismissed as not disclosing a prima facie case;
(xvii) in the approximate 12-year period following Weisleder’s removal from office to the date of the May 2015 AGM, Weisleder proactively disseminated information to the OSSTF and OTBU D12 members, in the form of articles posted on the internet, articles circulated through an email list-serve, and through pamphlets distributed at OSSTF and OTBU D12 meetings. Weisleder admitted at his examination for discovery that he tried to distribute his leaflets every single time the OTBU D12 held a meeting and “as much as [he] can” at other OSSTF meetings;
(xviii) the content of Weisleder’s leaflets includes information on his view of events since 1998, including his removal from office; the imposition of the trusteeship; and his criticisms of the OSSTF, including his repeated assertions that the OSSTF gave up the cap (a job security provision in the collective agreement which refers to a limit placed on the number of teachers on a dispatch list who may be contacted for daily or multi-day supply teaching jobs). Weisleder also admitted on cross-examination, in the context of his dissemination of his history of the OTBU D12, that “when you’re talking about the history of an organization, you do have to assume that you have first-time readers who don’t know the background…”;
(xix) some of Weisleder’s statements about the integrity and honesty of the OTBU D12 and the OSSTF leadership were set out in a pamphlet distributed to OTBU D12 members in March of 2015, just prior to the May 2015 AGM;
(xx) a consistent theme in Weisleder’s pamphlets is references to the cap: asking members “what would you do if your union… worst of all, gave away collective agreement job security provisions and refuse to take action to restore fair access to work, especially at a time when members are starved for regular employment”. At his examination for discovery, Weisleder admitted that he has repeatedly called the current members of the OTBU D12 executive the “gang that gave away the job security cap”;
(xxi) Jamie Whitaker (“Whitaker”), another member of the OTBU D12 executive, and Bartram, in their evidence, confirmed that they felt unfairly criticized and under attack. They were concerned that Weisleder’s leaflets were being distributed to members at OSSTF meetings and in schools and that members might believe their contents. They felt that it was appropriate for them to respond and were concerned that Weisleder’s pamphlets might leave the impression that they were responsible for giving up the cap.
The defence of qualified privilege
[8] The defence of qualified privilege is described in Brown on Defamation, as follows:
There are certain occasions on which a person is entitled to publish untrue statements about another, where he or she will not be liable even though the publication is defamatory. One such occasion is called a conditional or qualified privilege. No action can be maintained against a defendant unless it is shown that he or she published the statement with actual or express malice. An occasion is privileged if a statement is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, or for the purpose of pursuing or protecting some private interest, provided it is made to a person who has some corresponding interest in receiving it. The duty may be either legal, social or moral. The test is whether persons of ordinary intelligence and moral principle, or the great majority of right-minded persons, would have considered it a duty to communicate the information to those to whom it was published.[^2]
[9] Qualified privilege attaches to the occasion upon which the communication is made, and not to the communication itself. A privileged occasion is an occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it.[^3]
[10] Qualified privilege applies to communications made by a member or executive member of a trade union to other members of that union concerning the union's affairs and the activities or actions of executive members.[^4]
[11] The legal effect of the defence of qualified privilege is to rebut the inference that the published defamatory words were spoken with malice. Where the occasion is shown to be privileged, the bona fides of the defendant is presumed and the defendant is free to publish, with impunity, remarks which may be defamatory and untrue about the plaintiff.[^5] The privilege is not absolute, however, and may be defeated if the dominant motive for publishing is actual or express malice. Qualified privilege may also be defeated if the limits of the duty or interest have been exceeded. If the information communicated was not reasonably appropriate to the legitimate purposes of the occasion, the qualified privilege will be defeated.[^6]
[12] The defence of qualified privilege reflects a balancing of competing interests: the interest the maker of the statement seeks to serve and the interest in reputation that the defamed party seeks to protect.[^7]
Onus of Proving Qualified Privilege
[13] Because qualified privilege is an affirmative defence, the onus is on the defendant to establish the interest that is being protected by the impugned communication and to prove that the protection of this interest is sufficiently important to justify full immunity for the damage caused to the reputation of the defamed party. The mere fact that the defamatory words relate to matters of public interest, or that the defendant believed that an interest or duty existed, is not sufficient to create an occasion of qualified privilege.[^8]
[14] Once qualified privilege is established, the inference of malice that the law draws from defamatory words disappears. The onus is then on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant published the defamatory words with express malice. The burden of proving malice is not easily discharged.[^9]
Proving malice
[15] Evidence of malice is only probative if it goes to the defendant’s subjective state of mind at the time the statement was published.[^10]
[16] Malice may be established by showing that the defendant either knew that he was not telling the truth or was reckless in that regard.[^11] However the process by which that belief was arrived at may be imperfect.[^12] The law requires no more than the defendant having an honest and positive belief that the conclusions they have reached are true.
[17] “Recklessness” to the truth has a particular and narrow meaning in defamation law:
If ‘reckless’ here means that the maker of the statement has jumped to conclusions which are irrational, reached without adequate enquiry or based on insufficient evidence, this is not enough to constitute malice if he nevertheless does believe in the truth of the statement itself. The only kind of recklessness which destroys privilege is indifference to its truth or falsity.”[^13]
[18] The person making the defamatory statement on the privileged occasion is able to rely on information provided to that person by others and need not necessarily investigate the content of the statement. A defendant is not required to research the truth of the allegations.[^14]
[19] The law of defamation recognizes that people’s motives may be mixed (and thus requires the dominant purpose to be malice):
Judges and juries should… be very slow to draw the inference that a defendant was so far actuated by improper motives as to deprive him of the protection of the privilege unless they are satisfied that he did not believe that he said or wrote was true or that he was indifferent to its truth or falsity. The motives with which human beings act are mixed. They find it difficult to hate the sin but love the sinner.[^15]
[20] The law recognizes that there is a difference between mere dislike is not sufficient to establish malice:
Qualified privilege would be illusory, and the public interest that it is meant to serve defeated, if the protection which it affords were lost merely because a person, although acting in compliance with a duty or in protection of a legitimate interest, dislike the person whom he defamed or was indignant at what he believed to be that person’s conduct and welcomed the opportunity of exposing it. It is only where his desire to comply with the relevant duty or to protect the relevant interest plays no significant part in his motives for publishing what he believes to be true that ‘express malice’ can properly be found.[^16]
[21] The law of qualified privilege extends to protecting a person making defamatory statements when they are responding to attacks on that person’s character, provided they are bona fides and are “fairly relevant” or “germane and reasonably appropriate to the occasion”.[^17] Using qualified privilege as a defence is much like using the right of self-defence in criminal law:
[T]here is a “privilege to hit back when one’s reputation is attacked”. A person has a right, within limits, to defend himself or herself against false accusations. This privilege has been likened to a man’s right of self-defence in criminal law. Where a defendant is attacked by another, he or she is privileged to meet the attack with an appropriate rejoinder, and where the attack is a public one, the public has a corresponding interest in the reply. There is available to him or her the common law privilege of self-defence. A defendant is not obliged to keep one hand behind his or her back and retaliate with respect to only some of the blows. Nor is he or she obliged to follow the rules of Queensberry. A person…is entitled to respond by way of vindication. …He or she may deny or explain the defamatory matter, correct any misstatements, reflect adversely on the assailant, label a personal attack as a “lie” and the attacker as a “liar”, “attack in proper language the accuracy of the conclusions”, “impugn the truth of the charges”, question the purity of the accuser’s motives, and, in an appropriate case, even defame the assailant in the process.[^18]
[22] In the context of attacks on a defendant’s reputation, express malice will only be found where the defendant’s desire to protect his or her reputation or interest plays no significant role in the motive for publishing what he or she believes to be true. In other words, malice is not established where there is evidence that the dominant motive of the defendant was to defend their reputation in response to the plaintiff’s publications.[^19]
[23] Excessive or inflammatory language will not defeat the defence of qualified privilege. In Ward, the British Columbia Court of Appeal explains as follows:
The law does not require either blandness or accuracy as a condition of successfully invoking qualified privilege. The law was stated thus by Lord Atkinson in Adam v. Ward, supra, at p. 173:
These authorities, in my view, clearly establish that a person making a communication on a privileged occasion is not restricted to the use of such language merely as is reasonably necessary to protect the interest or discharge the duty which is the foundation of his privilege; but that, on the contrary, he will be protected, even though his language should be violent or excessively strong, if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he might have honestly and on reasonable grounds believed that what he wrote or said was true and necessary for the purpose of his vindication, though in fact it was not so.[^20]
Alleged Defamatory Passages
[24] As stated earlier, Weisleder makes a defamation claim based on two passages in a pamphlet circulated at the OTBU D12's 2015 Annual General meeting. Below, I set out the said passages, Weisleder's position, and my findings.
Alleged Defamation #1 – “Barry Weisleder was elected as its first president. By 2001 conflicts arose within the OTBU Executive. Some of the contentious issues between the members of the OTBU Executive included the financial compensation of the president, and more importantly, lack of service to members.”
[25] Weisleder does not dispute that there was conflict between himself and his executives in 2001, and he confirms that the conflict was political and involved a dispute over the cap.
[26] There is evidence of conflict between the OTBU executive during Weisleder's tenure as president. The Elementary Teacher's Federation of Ontario president, Elaine Salisbury (“Salisbury”), in a public letter written in 2002, expressed concerns about Weisleder's leadership and his "inflammatory, derogatory, and false statements about the union local and leadership." The judicial council found Weisleder guilty of several charges surrounding his conduct while he was president, including charges of using unprofessional and malicious language, making demeaning statements, intimidating several female union members, manipulating and altering minutes of the executive meetings, and a failure to perform a number of duties required of the president.
[27] The OTBU D12 executive members who were involved in the creation of the AGM pamphlet could have reasonably saw that the conflict was not all about politics and the cap, but the conflict was also/mainly about the judicial council complaints and findings about Weisleder's conduct during his presidency and the events that led to the trusteeship.
Alleged Defamation #2: “…the local president had signed a very regressive OTBU Collective Agreement. Major concessions were made in the 2000 Collective Agreement when the Cap on the dispatch list, paid professional development and other benefits were given away or squandered”
[28] The OTBU D12 executive members understood that Weisleder’s directed criticisms at them regarding the cap being given up and their lack of efforts to restore it. At examination for discovery, Weisleder admitted that the collective agreement was regressive because of it asked for the cap to be given up; that his signature appears on the memo of settlement with the TDSB; that he signed it as president of the OTBU D12; and that he does not dispute that the cap was given up.
[29] Weisleder’s position is that there also must be a reference to his statement that he was forced to sign the memo against his will.
[30] I agree that in any event, it would be a reasonable and honest belief on the part of the OTBU D12 executive members that when Weisleder signed as president, he did so willingly and because he believed it to be the best deal under the circumstances.
[31] I also have the evidence of Domenic Bellissimo ("Bellissimo"), the chief negotiator for the OSSTF during the round of bargaining with OTBU D12 when Weisleder was president (Bellissimo was not cross‑examined). I find that Weisleder could have refused to sign the collective agreement but did not.
[32] Although not necessary to find on this motion, alleged defamation #1 and #2 appear to be true.
Alleged Defamation #3 – The excerpt of the collective agreement signature page with the written capital letters on the top “who really gave up the cap”, with an arrow pointing to Weisleder's signature
[33] The uncontradicted evidence of at least two OTBU D12 executive members, Bartram and Whitaker, was that the 4-6 copies of the annotated signature page excerpt were only made so as to have them available if the cap issue was raised at the AGM. Weisleder had been distributing pamphlets outside the building where the meeting was taking place. The issue of the cap was not raised at the meeting and the excerpt was never mentioned. The excerpt had been placed in a location where it was not readily available.
[34] Although not necessary to find on this motion, I also accept that, in view of Weisleder’s criticisms around the loss of the cap, it was reasonable for the OTBU D12 to draw to the members’ attention, if necessary, that the collective agreement had been signed by Weisleder.
Analysis
[35] The occasion on which the impugned words were published (the two paragraphs and the excerpt) was on an occasion of qualified privilege.
[36] The evidentiary record clearly establishes that the dominant motive of the impugned paragraphs in the AGM pamphlet was to provide a history of the bargaining unit to the membership and of the events leading to and following a low point in the bargaining unit’s history. To highlight the difficult work that the new executive undertook to rebuild relationships and re-establish the bargaining unit, a discussion of this history was necessary. It was also an opportunity to provide some context, especially for newer members, for the disruptions that Weisleder caused at OTBU D12 events and meetings. I agree that it was impossible to celebrate the 10 years of emerging from the trusteeship without mentioning Weisleder.
[37] I also agree that, given the consistent attacks on the OTBU D12 executive by Weisleder, the OTBU D12 executive had an interest and a duty to respond to Weisleder’s allegations, and that the OTBU D12 members had a corresponding right or interest to receive the executive’s response and information about Weisleder’s leadership. The pamphlet summarized the union history and politics and was drawn from public documents, including the judicial council decision. If Weisleder wanted members to be aware that the cap was given up by the OSSTF (which he did), information showing that Weisleder’s signature appears on that collective agreement was relevant to the issue and of interest to the membership in forming their own views on who gave up the cap.
[38] Even assuming that the impugned paragraphs and excerpt are defamatory (which I strongly doubt), they are protected by the right of the OTBU D12 to defend itself against and respond to Weisleder’s criticisms.
[39] The issue of whether the privilege was lost because the words were disproportionate to the occasion simply does not arise in this motion. The impugned words are balanced, bland, and reasonable, particularly in light of the context of the inflammatory and vindictive words used by Weisleder.
[40] The uncontradicted evidence is that the AGM pamphlet was distributed only to union members who attended the 2015 AGM, that the excerpt was not distributed, and that the only 4-6 copies made of the excerpt were collected from the meeting and returned to the OTBU D12 office. The only evidence on distribution of the excerpt was that produced by Weisleder in his affidavit of documents.
[41] Although there is no evidence of any communication of the impugned documents outside of OSSTF members, incidental communication is not sufficient to defeat the privilege; nor can the court rely on Weisleder’s speculation as to distribution.[^21]
[42] The pamphlet was written by Whitaker, who had no meaningful personal history with Weisleder and who had only recently joined the OTBU D12. Whitaker heard about the trusteeship and the cap, and he even heard about these issues from Weisleder’s own flyers. As a history teacher, Whitaker wanted to learn more and believed that other members would want to learn more. The pamphlet was drafted with a view of providing “just the facts”. Bartram’s evidence is that she believed that the pamphlet was fair and accurate, and that fear of reprisal and harassing litigation by Weisleder should not prevent the executive from sharing with OTBU D12 members the history of the trusteeship and the fact that Weisleder signed the 2001 collective agreement.
[43] Burke authored emails about Weisleder and described the extremely unpleasant interactions that she had had with him, during which she felt physically threatened. Burke did not like Weisleder or his behaviour. In any event, dislike is not evidence of malice, the latter of which defeats the defence of qualified privilege. There is no evidence to refute that the dominant motive of the impugned publications was a need or desire to set out the history of the OTBU D12; to celebrate a brighter period in the 10 years out of trusteeship; and to respond to Weisleder’s political criticisms.
[44] The defendant’s summary judgment motion is granted. As I do not believe that the parties will be able to agree on costs, the defendant can provide its brief submissions within 20 days and Weisleder with his brief response within 15 days thereafter. The submissions can be sent to my assistant at: lorie.waltenbury@ontario.ca.
J.E. FERGUSON J.
Released: October 8, 2019
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-540586
DATE: 20191008
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BARRY WEISLEDER
Plaintiff
– and –
THE ONTARIO SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS’ FEDERATION
Defendant
REASONS FOR DECISION
J.E. Ferguson J.
Released: October 8, 2019
[^1]: Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7; [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, at para. 49 [^2]: Raymond E. Brown, Brown on Defamation: Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, United States, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Carswell 1999), (loose‑leaf updated 2014, release 3) Vol. 4. [^3]: Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at para. 143 [Hill]. [^4]: See e.g.: Neuschaefer v. Leskiw, 2008 ABQB 18, at paras. 52-55; Masunda v. Johnson, 1999 B.C.J. No. 2570 1744, at paras. 23,30, affirmed, 2001 BCCA 530; Rodrigues v. Toop, 2011 ONSC 794, at para. 35; Teamsters Local Union No. 987 v. O’Halloran, 2003 ABQB 1065, at paras. 39-40, rev’d on other grounds, 2005 ABCA 263; Doyle v. I.A.M., Local 1681, [1991] A.J. No. 13 (Alta Q.B.), at para. 12, affirmed 1992 ABCA 177, [1992] A.J. No. 637 (C.A.); Hunter & Boyd & NAFCO v. Godin & Mallette & UCCO, 2012 ONSC 4774, at paras. 29-32 [Hunter]. [^5]: Hill, at para. 144; Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 78 [Botiuk]. [^6]: Botiuk, ibid, at para. 80. [^7]: RTC Engineering v. Ontario, (2002) O.R. (3d) 726, at paras. 15-16. [^8]: 567893 B.C. Ltd. v. Aasen, 2007 BCSC 663, at para. 35; rev'd on other grounds, 2008 BCCA 303. [^9]: Robinson v. Furlong, 2015 BCSC 1690, at para. 29 [Robinson]. [^10]: Jerome v. Anderson, [1964] S.C.R. 291, at p. 299. [^11]: Botiuk, supra note 5, at para. 79; Horrocks v. Lowe, [1975] A.C. 135 (H.L.), at p. 150 [Horrocks]. [^12]: Botiuk, supra note 5, at paras. 95-98; see also the longer quote from Horrocks v. Lowe relied on by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Korach v. Moore, (1991) 1 O.R. (3d) 275, at p. 5, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1991] S.C.C.A. No. 30. [^13]: Horrocks, supra. note 11, at p. 150. [^14]: Neuschaefer v. Leskiw, 2008 ABQB 18 at paras. 75 and 78; see also MacArthur v. Meuser, [1997] O.J. No. 1377 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.), at paras. 35-37, 44. [^15]: Horrocks v. Lowe, supra note 11, at pg. 151. [^16]: Ibid; Robinson, supra note 9, at para. 32. [^17]: Richardson v. Vancouver (City), 2006 BCCA 36, at para. 36; Buck v Morris, 2015 ONSC 5632, at paras. 146, 148; Robinson, supra note 9, at para. 23; Ward v. Clark, 2001 BCCA 724, at para. 54 [Ward]. [^18]: Brown on Defamation, supra note 2, at 13-236.56-13.236.61. [^19]: Robinson, supra note 9, at para. 30. [^20]: Ward, supra note 18, at para. 56. [^21]: Brown on Defamation, supra note 2, at p. 260-61; Mann v. International Assn. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 2012 BCSC 181, at para. 93; Hunter, supra note 6, at para. 40.