James Stribopoulos

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from a shooting at a residential home in Brampton on February 9, 2012.

Between 8 and 10 shots were fired into the Dos Santos family home using a restricted firearm belonging to the accused.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the accused's connection to a person with apparent motive (Z.A., who had been arrested after threatening the family) and his exclusive control over the firearm used.

The accused testified in his defence, denying involvement and suggesting his younger brother Danish may have been responsible.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as internally inconsistent and found him guilty of most charges, finding that the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the accused committed the shooting.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and breach of probation.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on eyewitness testimony that the accused was positioned on top of an unconscious woman in a park, DNA evidence showing the complainant's DNA on the accused's penis, and statements allegedly made by the accused.

The accused testified that his contact with the complainant was innocent and that her DNA came to be on his penis through a prank involving a tissue.

The court found the accused guilty, determining that the eyewitness evidence, the accused's incriminating statements, and the DNA evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had intercourse with the unconscious complainant.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the seizure of her breath samples on Charter grounds and argued that the samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the Crown discharged its burden of establishing reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including the failed roadside screening device test.

The court also found that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant brought a Charter application challenging the admissibility of statements made during police interrogation.

The defendant claimed that the police violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his lawyer of choice before questioning him.

The Crown argued there was no breach or, alternatively, that any breach should not result in exclusion of evidence.

The court found that the police failed to afford a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice by placing only a single phone call and waiting less than half an hour on a Saturday night.

The court further found that any purported waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the defendant was not provided with the required Prosper warning.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial commenced on January 13, 2014, and continued on April 16, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay exceeded two years, only slightly more than nine months resulted from institutional or Crown delay, which fell within the Morin guidelines for the jurisdiction.

The court found that the defence was responsible for a fair amount of early delay, and while the accused suffered some prejudice in the form of stress and anxiety, this was insufficient to warrant a stay of proceedings.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing approximately 959 grams of cocaine into Canada, contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The sentencing court was required to balance the extremely serious nature of cocaine importation with the unique circumstances of the Aboriginal offender, including his traumatic childhood marked by parental alcoholism and violence, his lifelong struggle with substance abuse, and his limited connection to his Aboriginal heritage.

The court applied the principles established in Gladue and Ipeelee, recognizing that while the offence was serious, the offender's level of culpability was sufficiently diminished by his Aboriginal background and circumstances to justify a sentence below the ordinary range of three to five years imprisonment.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

At trial, the defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of her right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found two distinct breaches of the defendant's right to counsel: a four-minute delay in informing her of her rights, and a more serious violation of her right to counsel of choice when police failed to disclose that a contact was attempting to arrange for a lawyer and instead rushed her to speak with duty counsel.

The court excluded evidence of the refusal to provide a breath sample under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the serious nature of the violations and their impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on the merits.

The court also dismissed the impaired driving charge, finding the admissible evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings based on a violation of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from charge to scheduled trial was approximately 22.5 months.

The court found that the combined institutional delay and delay caused by Crown actions totaled 12.5 months, exceeding the Brampton guideline of 8-9 months by 3.5 months.

The court also found actual prejudice to the accused, including stress, anxiety, and significant financial hardship to his family resulting from the need to pay counsel twice due to the case not being reached on the first scheduled trial date.

The court granted the application and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The court found that approximately 13 months elapsed from the swearing of the information to the trial date, with 11 months constituting institutional delay exceeding the local guideline of 8-9 months.

The defendant demonstrated actual prejudice through educational disruption caused by additional legal fees necessitated by the delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that on July 6, 2012, the defendant refused to comply with a lawful demand by a peace officer to provide a breath sample for analysis by an approved screening device.

The defendant was found guilty after the court determined that the officer had reasonable grounds to make the demand, the device was approved, the defendant failed to comply with the demand, and the failure was intentional.