A. Ruffo

The offender, who was 18 years old at the time of the offences, was sentenced for attempted murder, conspiracy to commit forcible confinement, unauthorized possession of a loaded firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and trafficking in a controlled substance.

The court considered the offender's cognitive impairments, background of poverty, and harsh presentence custody conditions as mitigating factors against the serious aggravating factors of the offences, which included a home invasion and the use of a firearm.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 14 years, which was reduced to 8 years and 3 months after applying credit for presentence custody.

During a re-trial for second-degree murder, the accused brothers sought to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The principal shooter, John, argued he was provoked by the victim's threats.

The court found an air of reality to John's claim, despite evidence of prior threats and preparation.

However, the court ruled that provocation is not available in law to an aider, Mato, as it only applies to the person who committed the murder.

Furthermore, there was no air of reality to provocation for Mato based on the evidence.

In a pre-trial ruling for a second-degree murder case, the court determined the appropriate jury selection procedure following the enactment of Bill C-75, which abolished peremptory challenges.

The defence proposed combining the challenge for cause and stand-aside inquiries.

The court rejected a combined approach but permitted a limited expansion of the challenge for cause questions.

The court established a procedure where, after the challenge for cause, a specific question is asked to assess juror competence, allowing counsel to make submissions on whether the judge should exercise the enhanced stand-aside power under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown brought an application regarding the jury selection procedure for a second-degree murder trial during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown proposed that the Sheriff divide the jury panels into smaller groups in the absence of the accused, arguing the proposed 'B.C. Model' violated the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that dividing the panels in the absence of the accused would violate their right to be present at trial under section 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court adopted the B.C. Model, which allows for random selection and identification of jurors in open court with the accused present, while accommodating physical distancing requirements.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the 41-month and 19-day delay between his arrest and the jury's verdicts violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court calculated the total delay and deducted periods of defence delay, including time before the scheduling of the preliminary inquiry and time resulting from an abandoned Garofoli application.

The court also found that exceptional circumstances, specifically a lack of judicial resources due to illness and a family death, justified a further 7.5-month deduction.

The net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, and the application was dismissed.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of two counts of importing cocaine and one count of conspiracy to import firearms.

The accused orchestrated the importation of eight kilograms of cocaine using couriers and conspired to import 40 to 50 handguns from the United States into Canada.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the accused's leadership role, the quantity of drugs and firearms, and a calculated profit motive.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 16 years' imprisonment, reduced to 12 years and 10 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest bail.

The applicant, an airport worker charged with conspiracy to import cocaine, brought an application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained through wiretap authorizations and search warrants.

The applicant argued that the affidavits supporting the authorizations and warrants lacked reasonable and probable grounds and investigative necessity.

The court reviewed the authorizations and warrants, applying the Garofoli standard and amplifying the record where necessary.

The court found that the authorizations and warrants were validly issued and supported by sufficient grounds, including intercepted communications, surveillance, and informant information.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation under s.253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code involving the operation of a Davinci Scout e‑bike, and also appealed the sentence of six months’ imprisonment, probation, and a lengthy driving prohibition.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s credibility findings under the W.(D.) framework and argued that an e‑bike was not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of s.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that a device capable of propulsion by non‑muscular power qualifies as a motor vehicle for purposes of the offence, regardless of whether it could also be propelled by muscular power.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s application of the W.(D.) analysis or factual findings and determined the sentence was fit given the offender’s extensive impaired‑driving record.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.