Herman J. Wilton-Siegel

The applicant, a lawyer, sought judicial review of Legal Aid Ontario's decision refusing to enter his name on its duty counsel and certificate panels.

The applicant bypassed the statutory internal review and hearing processes, arguing that Legal Aid Ontario was biased and in a conflict of interest due to his ongoing wrongful dismissal lawsuit against them.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that allegations of bias do not constitute exceptional circumstances justifying judicial intervention before administrative remedies are exhausted.

The applicant sought a contempt order against the respondent for failing to comply with an Ontario Labour Relations Board order to produce documents.

The respondent did not appear.

The Divisional Court adjourned the application, holding that because contempt is a quasi-criminal proceeding, the notice of application must be served personally on the respondent pursuant to Rule 60.11(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicants, including several religious physicians and organizations, challenged two policies of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario that require physicians who object to providing certain medical services (such as abortion or medical assistance in dying) on religious or conscientious grounds to provide an 'effective referral' to a non-objecting provider.

The applicants argued these policies infringed their rights to freedom of religion and equality under the Charter.

The Divisional Court held that while the effective referral requirements did infringe the physicians' freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, the infringement was justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to ensure equitable access to healthcare for patients.

The court dismissed the applications.

The plaintiff, Brand Name Marketing Inc., brought an action against Rogers Communications Inc. for breach of a non-disclosure agreement and breach of confidence.

The plaintiff alleged that it provided confidential marketing concepts to Rogers regarding a 'Pink Phone program' and a 'Call for the Cure program', which involved affinity marketing with a breast cancer charity.

The plaintiff claimed that Rogers misused this information to launch its own 'Pink Razr campaign' and sought over $14 million in damages.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff could not enforce the NDA as it was not a party to it at the relevant time.

Furthermore, the court held that while certain financial projections were confidential, the general concept of a charitable donation tied to a product sale was public knowledge.

Ultimately, the court concluded that Rogers did not use the plaintiff's confidential information in designing or implementing the Pink Razr campaign, which was fundamentally different from the plaintiff's proposals.

Canada Post Corporation applied for judicial review of an arbitration award that reinstated a temporary employee dismissed for failing to demonstrate reasonable availability.

The arbitrator found the dismissal unjustified, introducing a requirement for corporate prejudice.

The Divisional Court held that while the arbitrator failed to follow established arbitral jurisprudence and impermissibly amended the collective agreement by requiring corporate prejudice, his ultimate conclusion that the dismissal was unreasonable remained defensible on the facts.

The application for judicial review was dismissed, with one judge dissenting.

The appellant appealed a Master's order that dismissed its action for delay under Rule 11.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Master had found that the appellant intentionally delayed obtaining an order to continue following a corporate reorganization to insulate its assets from the respondent's counterclaim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Master misapprehended the evidence and erred in applying the test for dismissal.

The Court held that a dismissal under Rule 11.03 requires a showing of prejudice related to the failure to obtain the order to continue, which the respondent failed to demonstrate.

The dismissal of the action was set aside, though the Master's refusal to vary the flawed 2015 order to continue was upheld, with leave for the appellant to requisition a fresh order.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motions for summary judgment regarding claims of nuisance, trespass, and negligence arising from the application of biosolids on their farm.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to apply the proper summary judgment principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The plaintiffs had failed to provide expert evidence or sufficient factual evidence to establish the elements of their claims, and the motion judge improperly speculated on what evidence might be available at trial.

The action against the appellants was dismissed.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy for rent arrears.

The tenant argued the landlord was estopped from charging market rent due to a letter suggesting she pay a lower rent-geared-to-income amount while they attempted to convert her unit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the estoppel issue was not raised before the Board, the letter was not a clear and unequivocal promise, and the Board reasonably interpreted its home statute regarding jurisdiction over rent subsidies and service of notices.

The Judgment Creditors brought a motion within a receivership proceeding seeking a declaration that they held valid, independent unsecured debt claims against two insolvent corporations, 230 and MM, arising from a consent order and minutes of settlement.

The Receiver and a preferred shareholder opposed, arguing the claims were equity claims.

The court applied the Van Laun principle to look behind the consent order and found that the obligations to purchase the shares and pay accrued dividends contravened the solvency and cross-holding provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

Consequently, the claims were unenforceable as debt, except for the costs component, which was remitted to the Receiver for a reasonableness review.

Following the dismissal of a motion to set aside assignments made by the bankruptcy trustee, the court determined costs.

The bankrupt's request for costs was dismissed as his participation was unnecessary.

The Trustee was awarded costs of $18,500 on a substantial indemnity basis because the moving parties lacked standing as 'aggrieved' persons under the BIA and had impugned the Trustee's integrity.

Following a successful appeal by the estate trustee, the court ordered the respondent to pay costs of $9,500.

The respondent subsequently sought clarification on whether the costs were payable to the appellant directly or to the estate, arguing they should be paid from or to the estate.

The Divisional Court rejected the respondent's submissions, applying the modern approach to costs in estate litigation.

The court confirmed that the costs are payable directly to the successful appellant, as the findings appealed from were made against him in his personal capacity and he was denied procedural fairness.

The appellant physician appealed an eight-month suspension imposed by the Discipline Committee for professional misconduct.

The appellant had borrowed substantial sums of money from two patients to fund a failed investment and subsequently made a consumer proposal, resulting in significant financial losses for the patients.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee reasonably considered specific and general deterrence, the appellant's lack of remorse, and the vulnerability of the patients due to shared ethnicity and language.

The moving party, the cousin of the respondent husband in a family law equalization proceeding, sought leave to appeal an order adding him as a third party.

The wife alleged that the husband transferred significant funds to the moving party to shelter them from equalization.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as adding the moving party was necessary to determine the extent to which he held family assets.

The applicants sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a property containing a chapel, asserting its uniqueness for their business.

The respondents did not contest the agreement's enforceability but challenged the availability of specific performance.

The court found the applicants' evidence insufficient to establish the property's uniqueness, as required by *Semelhago v. Paramadevan*, lacking details on the property, the nature of the business, or a search for similar properties.

The motion for specific performance was dismissed, and the parties were directed to address damages.

The applicants, two cancer researchers, sought judicial review of two decisions by the respondent hospital network regarding findings of research misconduct.

The first decision upheld a reconsidered sanction suspending their research activities after an earlier court decision remitted the matter.

The second decision permanently closed their laboratory following a second investigation committee's finding of material non-compliance with accepted standards due to image manipulation and falsification in published papers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the decisions and sanctions reasonable, the reasons adequate, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant buyer appealed a Small Claims Court judgment dismissing his claim for the return of a $10,000 deposit and awarding the deposit to the respondent sellers as damages for anticipatory breach.

The buyer had repudiated the agreement of purchase and sale after a pre-closing visit, alleging undisclosed prior water damage to the basement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusion that the buyer failed to prove the existence of prior water damage or misrepresentation by the sellers.

The appellant, an estate trustee, appealed an order requiring him to pay damages for breach of fiduciary duty and repay pre-taken compensation following an application to pass accounts.

The Divisional Court found it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the Estates Act.

The Court held that the application judge failed to afford the unrepresented appellant procedural fairness, given the complexity of the issues, the lack of proper notice of the claims, the failure to consider statutory defences, and the informal manner in which evidence was introduced.

The appeal was allowed and the matter referred for trial.

The landlord appealed two Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) orders that awarded the tenant damages and ordered the return of a dog.

The landlord had not attended the initial hearing because the tenant provided an incorrect mailing address.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the LTB denied the landlord procedural fairness by failing to inquire into service and by improperly dismissing her request for review.

Furthermore, the court held that the LTB erred in law by exceeding its statutory jurisdiction under the Residential Tenancies Act when it made orders regarding the return of the tenant's dog and awarded damages far exceeding the amount claimed.

The appellant sued a public transit commission after falling on a bus when another passenger flipped up an accessible seat.

At trial, the judge granted the transit commission's motion for non-suit, finding no evidence of the standard of care.

On appeal, the appellant argued the driver had special knowledge and should have warned her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in finding the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence by omission.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint against the City of Toronto as an abuse of process, and against her union and its counsel for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant had previously settled her grievance and human rights complaint with the City but later filed a new complaint, alleging she signed the settlement under duress from her union.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator's decision was reasonable and correct, as the settlement was binding and the allegations of duress did not invalidate it.