Laurie Lee Aitchison

The applicant son worked on his father's farm for 27 years for minimal wages, relying on his father's promise of a house and a parcel of land.

After the father's death, the farm was placed in a marital trust, and the son was evicted by his mother.

The son sought equitable relief and dependants' support.

The court found that the son established proprietary estoppel and awarded him a one-third interest in the farm.

The court also held that the estate trustees were required to sell the farm, as the mother had failed to pay the maintenance expenses required by the will to maintain her right to occupy the property.

The defendant Sovereign General Insurance Company brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike out the plaintiffs' claim and Bank of Montreal's cross-claim, arguing no reasonable cause of action.

Sovereign contended that the claim for recovery of an unpaid judgment against a mortgage broker's errors and omissions policy was not covered by s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act due to pure economic loss, and was outside the policy's scope or excluded.

The court accepted that s. 132 did not apply to pure economic loss but found it was not "plain and obvious" that the claim lacked a reasonable cause of action under the policy itself, particularly regarding whether the underlying agreement constituted "professional services" of a mortgage broker.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

The Estate Trustees moved for court approval of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Minutes of Settlement (MOS), and to enforce the MOU against a beneficiary.

The court found that the beneficiary's consent to the MOU was conditional on obtaining independent legal advice, which was subsequently withdrawn.

The MOS, negotiated without all parties, contained terms significantly different from the MOU.

The court ruled that the MOU was void due to the withdrawal of conditional consent, and the MOS could not be approved as it was not agreed to by all parties and contained inconsistent terms.

The motion was dismissed, and the parties were directed to update estate information for further proceedings.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for delay, the defendants sought costs of the action and motions on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants also sought an order that the plaintiff's non-party principal be jointly and severally liable for the costs, as the plaintiff corporation was impecunious.

The court awarded costs against the plaintiff corporation but declined to order non-party costs against the principal, finding no evidence of fraud, gross misconduct, or abuse of process that would justify such an exceptional remedy.

The applicant sought a declaration that his insurer had a duty to defend him in a civil action arising from an altercation that resulted in an assault conviction and alleged personal injuries to the plaintiff.

The insurer denied coverage relying on policy exclusions for intentional or criminal acts.

The court applied duty‑to‑defend principles and held that where pleadings include a potentially independent negligence claim, an insurer must defend if there is a possibility that the claim could fall within coverage.

Because the underlying statement of claim pleaded both assault and negligence and it remained possible that liability could be established on a non‑intentional basis, the exclusion provisions could not yet be conclusively applied.

The insurer was therefore required to defend the action, except with respect to punitive or exemplary damages which were expressly excluded.

The appellant dentist appealed a permanent injunction enforcing a non-solicitation covenant in a management agreement with the respondent dental centre operator.

The appellant had copied patient lists before leaving the centre to start a new practice nearby.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent had a valid proprietary interest in the goodwill of its business model, the non-solicitation covenant was reasonable and did not offend the regulatory scheme for dentists, and any alleged fee-splitting arrangement was a matter for the regulator and did not invalidate the contract.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment to enforce an Illinois default judgment.

The appellant argued there was no real and substantial connection between Illinois and the claim or the appellant, and that enforcing the judgment was contrary to public policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the connection between Illinois and the appellant was not strong, there was a real and substantial connection between Illinois and the plaintiff's claim, which is sufficient to enforce the foreign judgment.

The court also found no public policy reason to refuse enforcement.