Helen M. Pierce

The applicant sought a finding of contempt against the respondent for breaching an interim order regarding access to premises and handling of assets during a tenancy dispute.

The court found the respondent in contempt for intentionally refusing access to one of the applicant's employees, Mr. Fennell, which was contrary to the order for supervised access.

Other allegations, including unreasonable behaviour, preventing removal of an 8-foot brake, and relocating assets within the premises, were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court imposed a fine of $5,000 and awarded substantial indemnity costs of $8,000 to the applicant.

Punitive damages were deemed inappropriate at this interim stage.

The applicant, City of Thunder Bay, sought an order for certiorari to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision to set aside four certificates of offence issued to the respondents for Highway Traffic Act violations.

The Justice of the Peace had quashed the certificates, deeming them "too vague" or "not specific" regarding the location of the alleged offences.

The Superior Court found that the certificates were complete and regular on their face, as the location was sufficiently identified by highway number and district, and the accused were served at the roadside, thus having knowledge of the location.

The court also noted that the prosecution could have sought amendments at trial and that there was no application to quash the charges.

The application for certiorari was granted, and the Justice of the Peace's orders were set aside.

The applicant and respondent, sisters, disputed the administration of their mother's and uncle's estates.

The applicant sought reimbursement from the respondent for alleged personal payments for home repairs, executor's compensation, and an alleged gift from the uncle's estate.

The respondent sought repayment of a loan from the applicant to their mother's estate.

The court dismissed the applicant's claims regarding home repairs and executor's compensation, but ordered the respondent to reimburse Frank's estate $5,000 for unauthorized post-mortem withdrawals.

The court also ordered the applicant to repay Mary's estate $5,500.77 for the outstanding balance of a loan.

The appellant, Zachary Leonard, appealed a decision where a reviewing judge, upon a breach of a conditional sentence, collapsed consecutive conditional sentences and ordered a custodial sentence that exceeded the maximum allowable for summary conviction offences.

The Superior Court of Justice considered whether consecutive conditional sentences merge for the purpose of reviewing a breach and if the reviewing judge exceeded her jurisdiction.

The court found that conditional sentences do not merge for breach review purposes and that the reviewing judge erred in principle by imposing a custodial sentence of 207 days, which exceeded the 180-day maximum for summary conviction offences under the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence adjusted, and the appellant ordered released to resume his conditional sentence.

The applicants, Gina Gustafson and Juanita Curle, sought an order to wind up two corporations, Norall Group Inc. and Norall Group Contracting Inc., and a declaration of share ownership.

The respondents, Bruce Johnson and Allan Curle, opposed the winding up and claimed that the applicants held their shares in trust for their husbands.

The court found that the shares were validly gifted to the wives, rejecting claims of estoppel by convention, resulting trust, and constructive trust.

The court determined that the corporations had become dysfunctional due to management disputes, tax evasion convictions of the directors, and cessation of business, which prejudiced the shareholders.

Consequently, the court ruled it was just and equitable to wind up the corporations.

The applicant estate trustee sought a declaration that a life insurance beneficiary designation was invalid, arguing that an attorney for property cannot make a testamentary disposition.

The deceased policyholder, who was mentally competent but physically disabled by multiple sclerosis, had directed his attorney for property to change the beneficiary designation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the attorney acted as an amanuensis or agent (by procuration) rather than a substitute decision-maker.

The court held that the change was a valid declaration under the Insurance Act, and the newly designated beneficiaries were entitled to the proceeds.

The applicant, a minority shareholder and former employee of a closely-held corporation, sought an oppression remedy or winding up order against the majority shareholder.

The applicant alleged oppressive conduct regarding unilateral business expansion decisions and his subsequent exclusion from the company.

The court dismissed the oppression claim, finding the applicant's reasonable expectations were not breached and he had voluntarily withdrawn from the business.

However, finding that the relationship between the parties had irretrievably broken down, the court granted relief under the 'just and equitable' provisions of s. 207 of the Business Corporations Act, ordering a trial of an issue to determine the fair market value of the applicant's shares and the terms of their purchase.

The applicant father brought a motion to change an existing joint custody order, seeking sole custody and primary residence of the 12-year-old child.

The child had been living with the respondent mother in northwestern Ontario, while the father lived in southern Ontario.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the mother's inadequate care, her failure to facilitate access, and the child's strongly expressed wish to live with his father.

Applying the best interests of the child test under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court awarded sole custody to the father, finding he offered a more stable plan and was better able to meet the child's needs.

The access schedule was varied to provide fewer but longer visits, and no child support was ordered given the mother's low income and the costs of access.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking to vacate a scheduling order for the defendants' motion to strike, and seeking leave to amend his statement of claim.

The plaintiff had previously delivered an email abandoning an earlier motion but argued it was not abandoned because he did not file the notice.

The court held that Rule 37.09(1) only requires delivery, not filing, of a notice of abandonment, and alternatively, the motion was deemed abandoned under Rule 37.09(2) because the plaintiff failed to appear.

The plaintiff's current motion was dismissed as an abuse of process because he failed to provide a draft of the proposed amended pleading and had previously refused to attend the scheduling hearing he now sought to vacate.

The plaintiff and defendant, both financial advisors, entered into a partnership agreement.

The defendant's licence was later suspended for misconduct.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for return of moneys, and the defendant counterclaimed.

The plaintiff then issued a third party claim for contribution and indemnity against their former employers, alleging they knew of the defendant's misconduct.

The third parties moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under s. 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court granted the motion, holding that s. 18 creates an absolute two-year limitation period for contribution and indemnity claims that is not subject to discoverability principles.

Even if discoverability applied, the plaintiff had discovered the claim before the limitation period expired.

The appellant pleaded guilty to uttering threats, theft, and fraud.

He appealed the one-year custodial sentence imposed for uttering threats, which arose from Twitter posts expressing support for ISIS and offering to ensure 'something happens' if given Canadian addresses.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, had already served the sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice exercised its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence based on public sensitivity to terrorism, noting the appellant's cognitive limitations, lack of sophistication, and the limited public alarm caused by his actions.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served (four months).

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the respondent, an Indigenous man convicted of sexual assault.

The respondent had a lengthy criminal record involving 18 violent offences over nearly 30 years.

The court considered Gladue factors but found the respondent's severe childhood trauma did not mitigate the high risk of future violent and sexual re-offending.

The court declared the respondent a dangerous offender based on a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that lesser measures would not adequately protect the public.

The plaintiff landlord sued the defendant tenant, a dental corporation, for breach of a commercial lease after the tenant abandoned the premises and stopped paying rent.

The tenant counterclaimed, arguing the landlord fundamentally breached the lease due to pest infestations, garbage, improper back charges, and unreasonably withholding consent to sublet.

The court found no fundamental breach, noting the tenant continued to operate for years despite the alleged issues and failed to provide sufficient information for proposed sublets.

The court also found the landlord reasonably mitigated its damages.

The landlord was awarded $86,615.97 for unpaid rent, utilities, and the cost of removing tenant improvements.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The charge, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, remained outstanding for approximately 905 days from arrest to the hearing of the application.

The court applied the Morin framework and found extensive delay attributable to the Crown, particularly relating to late and incomplete disclosure and failures to attend scheduling courts.

Institutional delays also contributed, while only limited time was waived by the accused.

The court concluded the Morin guidelines were exceeded and the delay was unreasonable, warranting a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, a police officer charged with trafficking oxycodone, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the hearing of the application was approximately 45 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the applicant's actions, including changing counsel multiple times, and waiver by defence counsel.

The court concluded that the remaining institutional and Crown delay fell within acceptable guidelines and dismissed the application.

The plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation representing aboriginal communities, brought an action for trespass and damages against the defendants, who claimed to be the elected representatives of a member First Nation.

The plaintiff moved to strike portions of the defendants' statement of defence and their entire counterclaim.

The court struck certain paragraphs of the statement of defence that pleaded irrelevancies, with leave to amend one paragraph.

The court also struck the counterclaim in its entirety, finding that claims for interference in an election or internal governance are not causes of action known to law, and that the allegations of defamation and injurious falsehood lacked the necessary elements and particulars.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after deliberately using a vehicle to intimidate and cut off a cyclist during a dispute arising from a drug transaction.

The collision propelled the cyclist into a building, causing fatal head injuries.

The court considered Gladue factors, including the accused’s Indigenous background, family circumstances, addiction history, and efforts at rehabilitation.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the deliberate endangerment of road users and the decision to flee the scene, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

Consecutive sentences were ordered for criminal negligence causing death and leaving the scene.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike portions of a reply in a defamation action.

The underlying action alleged defamatory statements and economic interference arising from publications about forestry practices in the Canadian boreal forest.

The reply pleading introduced allegations concerning a decades-long history of alleged unlawful campaigns by environmental organizations unrelated to the pleaded claim.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge’s order permitting the expanded reply because it risked significantly broadening the scope of the litigation beyond the pleaded dispute.

Leave to appeal was granted given the importance of defining the permissible scope of reply pleadings and the risk of prejudice, delay, and unnecessary litigation costs.

In a wrongful dismissal action with a counterclaim alleging conversion of drilling equipment, the plaintiff sought leave under Rule 36.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to examine two non‑party witnesses before trial in order to preserve their testimony.

The witnesses were elderly and resided outside the jurisdiction, and one had a history of medical issues.

The court considered the discretionary factors under Rule 36.01(3), including convenience, risk of unavailability, and the uncertain timing of trial.

Finding no prejudice to the defendants and recognizing the prudence of preserving evidence while memories were fresh, the court granted leave for the videotaped examinations before trial.

The parties separated after a long-term marriage.

The husband subsequently declared bankruptcy, leaving the wife solely responsible for their joint debts, and defaulted on the mortgage of the matrimonial home, triggering a power of sale that depleted the home's equity.

The court dismissed both parties' claims for retroactive child support.

The court awarded the wife retroactive spousal support from the date of the husband's bankruptcy, ongoing compensatory spousal support of $900 per month, and an unequal division of net family property due to the husband's unconscionable depletion of family assets.