Helen M. Pierce

In a proposed class proceeding on behalf of Crown wards allegedly physically or sexually abused before and/or during wardship, the court considered whether the pleading disclosed causes of action in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against the provincial Crown.

Applying the plain and obvious test on a motion to strike, the court held it was arguable that the Crown, as statutory guardian, owed a private law duty of care analogous to that of a parent and that its obligations could extend to protecting the wards' legal rights, including advising them of claims, preserving evidence, and considering litigation.

The court also held it was not plain and obvious that no fiduciary duty could arise, given the statutory parental relationship and the vulnerability of Crown wards.

The plaintiffs satisfied the cause of action requirement under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and the defendant's motion to strike was dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their slip and fall action for delay.

The action was dismissed after plaintiffs' counsel failed to set the matter down for trial or respond to a status notice due to inadvertence.

The court applied the Reid criteria and found that while inadvertence was shown, the motion was not brought promptly and the defendants would suffer significant prejudice.

The defendants had lost their ability to crossclaim against a co-defendant who was responsible for maintaining the premises, and maintenance records and witnesses were no longer available.

The motion to set aside the dismissal was dismissed.

The applicant sought certiorari quashing his committal for trial on second degree murder following a preliminary inquiry, arguing there was no evidence of the requisite mens rea beyond manslaughter.

Applying the narrow jurisdictional scope of certiorari review, the court held that committal may only be disturbed where there is no evidence on an essential element of the offence.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including the applicant's return with a knife, the force of the stabbing, the resulting fatal wound, and his conduct afterward, could reasonably support an inference of the mental element for murder.

The application was therefore dismissed.

On an interim passing of accounts in a contentious estate administration, the court addressed disputes between co-estate trustees concerning estate assets, reimbursements, distributions, and the administration of a special-needs trust for a beneficiary.

Applying the resulting trust framework from Pecore, the court held that funds in a joint RBC account with an adult child formed part of the estate because the surviving joint holder failed to prove a gift of survivorship.

The court approved certain estate disbursements and reimbursements for house expenses, funeral-related expenses, and electrical work, but disallowed others, including unnecessary telephone and cable charges and a reimbursement claim for probate fees already paid from estate funds.

Because income tax liability, the beneficiary trust, and the state of the accounts remained unresolved, the court ordered further steps and a final passing of accounts.

In this costs decision following a successful trespass trial, the plaintiffs sought full indemnity costs or, alternatively, partial indemnity costs to the date of their offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court held that the plaintiffs' April 1, 2014 offer to settle complied with Rule 49.10(1) and that the trial judgment was more favourable than the offer.

The court further found that the responding parties' conduct, both in the underlying trespass and throughout the litigation and trial, warranted substantial indemnity costs beyond the ordinary rule-based consequences.

After excluding costs related to an interim injunction for which no costs had been awarded or reserved, the court fixed costs at $36,418.86 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST.

In a costs decision following a civil trial arising from an unpaid commission dispute, the court considered proportionality, the parties' relative success, and their litigation conduct.

The plaintiff recovered modest damages while the defendants abandoned most of a substantial counterclaim during trial.

The court held that both sides had taken unreasonable positions and had escalated the litigation beyond what was at stake, but found the plaintiff was proportionately more successful.

Rejecting the request for substantial indemnity costs, the court fixed costs in the plaintiff's favour at $25,000 inclusive.

Following a successful negligent investigation trial, the plaintiffs sought recovery of full expert disbursements and prejudgment interest from the date of the search and arrest.

The court held that while retaining a standard-of-care expert was reasonable, the expert evidence was of little assistance and the recoverable expert fee should therefore be reduced by half.

On prejudgment interest, the court held that the cause of action for negligent investigation was complete only when the criminal proceedings ended in acquittal, and fixed the commencement date accordingly.

The court declined to shorten the prejudgment interest period under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act despite delay by prior plaintiffs' counsel.

The accused brought a constitutional application alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter following a roadside stop, detention, arrest, and search that led to the discovery of marijuana in a vehicle.

Police stopped the vehicle while investigating a reported gasoline theft based on a vague suspect description and observations they considered suspicious.

The court found the officers lacked reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was connected to the reported offence, rendering the investigative detention arbitrary.

Because the detention and arrest were unlawful, the subsequent search of the vehicle and seizure of marijuana were also unlawful.

Applying the s. 24(2) test from Grant, the court excluded the seized marijuana and the accused’s statements as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

In a corporate governance dispute among shareholders and directors of closely held corporations, the individual plaintiffs moved for an order appointing independent counsel to oversee and control the corporate plaintiffs.

The applicants argued that independent counsel was necessary to represent the corporations’ interests where conflicts existed between shareholders and directors.

The court held that appointing independent counsel would add cost and delay while providing no practical benefit, particularly because the corporate claims had been stayed and any counsel would require instructions from directors who were defendants in the litigation.

The court concluded that such counsel would face an unavoidable conflict of interest and could not act effectively.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle collision on the basis that the plaintiff was operating an uninsured vehicle.

The defendants relied on s. 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act and evidence indicating the vehicle was not insured and not properly registered to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argued that his proof of insurance was destroyed in a post‑collision fire and that his memory loss prevented him from identifying his insurer.

The court held the defendants established a prima facie case that the plaintiff was uninsured and that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence capable of showing a genuine issue for trial.

As a result, the statutory bar against recovery applied and the claim was dismissed on summary judgment.

The court determined costs arising from three related procedural motions in a partnership dispute among lawyers.

One motion compelled the departing partner to attend cross‑examination on an affidavit filed in a pending summary judgment motion; another sought a further and better affidavit of documents; and a third sought removal of a lawyer as solicitor of record.

The court addressed whether a represented lawyer‑litigant could recover costs for personal legal work performed on the file.

Applying authority including Fong v. Chan, the court held that a represented litigant who is a lawyer cannot recover personal time at counsel rates without proof of opportunity cost.

The court further emphasized the principle of reasonableness in costs and reduced the amounts claimed, awarding limited costs on the first two motions and none on the solicitor‑removal motion.

Following dismissal of a civil action alleging assault, unlawful arrest and detention, and breaches of Charter rights against several police-related defendants, the successful defendants sought costs of a ten‑day trial.

The plaintiff opposed the amount, arguing the bill of costs was excessive, that some issues were not fully successful, and that personal financial hardship should mitigate the award.

The court reviewed the lengthy procedural history, the defendants’ partial indemnity rates, the existence of a prior offer to settle, and the defendants’ complete success on the core liability issues.

Finding the bill of costs reasonable and modest given the complexity and duration of the proceeding, and noting the absence of evidence supporting impecuniosity, the court awarded the defendants their costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, inducing breach of contract, intentional interference with economic relations, and claims for aggravated and punitive damages arising from a failed joint venture concerning a key‑cutting machine.

Applying the “plain and obvious” test from Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., the court held that the pleadings sufficiently disclosed causes of action for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and inducement of breach of contract.

However, the claims for intentional interference with economic relations and interference with prospective economic relations were struck as they lacked the necessary allegations that a third party had an actionable claim against the defendant.

Claims for aggravated and punitive damages were also struck for lack of particularization but with leave to amend.

Certain evidentiary paragraphs were struck for breaching pleading rules.

The plaintiff managed a resort under an oral commission-based agreement and sued following termination of the relationship.

The court determined the plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than a dependent contractor and therefore not entitled to reasonable notice of termination.

The defendants breached the agreement by failing to pay commissions on revenues received prior to termination, and were also liable for modest damages for conversion of personal property and for unjust enrichment relating to additional services performed as the defendants’ de facto Canadian agent.

The court rejected claims for further commissions, punitive damages, and most conversion damages.

The defendants succeeded on a counterclaim for possession of two boat motors.

During a lawful strike at the plaintiff’s manufacturing facility, the employer sought variation of a prior court order governing picketing and requested an injunction against certain strike activities.

Evidence showed incidents of delay, intimidation, and obstruction at the picket line, including targeted delays of supervisory staff and confrontations with delivery vehicles and bus passengers.

The court emphasized that picketing is constitutionally protected expressive activity but may be limited where unlawful conduct occurs.

Applying the modified interlocutory injunction test for labour disputes, the court held that the threshold requirement of demonstrating unsuccessful reasonable efforts to obtain police assistance had not been met.

The injunction was denied, but the court varied earlier orders to simplify wait‑time rules, expand the pedestrian corridor for bus passengers, and clarify police enforcement obligations.

The applicant First Nation sought an interim injunction to prohibit provincial ministries from authorizing a wind farm development on its traditional territory, pending judicial review regarding the Crown's duty to consult.

The court dismissed the motion as premature, finding that the Director had not yet made a decision on whether to issue the renewable energy permit.

Without a decision, the court could not determine if there was a serious issue to be tried or if irreparable harm would occur.

Owners of forested property commenced an action alleging neighbouring landowners constructed a roadway that encroached onto their land, cutting trees and altering the terrain.

The defendants denied liability and advanced a counterclaim for defamation arising from letters sent to neighbours describing the dispute.

The court accepted survey evidence establishing that a road approximately six metres wide encroached for nearly 200 metres onto the plaintiffs’ land and concluded the defendants intentionally continued using the road despite notice and a court order.

The court found the conduct constituted trespass and awarded compensatory damages for rehabilitation costs, survey expenses, and related losses, as well as damages at large and punitive damages.

The counterclaim in defamation was dismissed for lack of evidence of defamatory publication or reputational harm.

The plaintiffs, an auto recycling business and its owner, sued the lead investigator and the Thunder Bay Police Services Board for negligent police investigation after being acquitted of multiple counts of possession of stolen property.

The court found the police investigation was negligent because the officers failed to familiarize themselves with auto recycling industry practices, misunderstood the relevant law, ignored and failed to document innocent explanations, and failed to secure seized property.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $1,581,116.62 in damages, including compensation for lost business income, legal fees, property damage, and non-pecuniary losses for reputational harm and emotional distress.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent’s statement of claim under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking a declaration that the respondent was a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had commenced a civil action asserting that he was a separate legal entity from the person involved in ongoing family proceedings and sought declarations granting him superior title and possession of his children.

The court held that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, duplicated issues already before the family court, and constituted an abuse of process.

After reviewing the respondent’s extensive litigation history and repeated disregard of court orders, the court found that he persistently commenced meritless proceedings and conducted litigation in a vexatious manner.

The action was struck and the respondent was declared a vexatious litigant prohibited from commencing further proceedings without leave of the court.

Following separation and a prior custody order granting joint custody with the children residing with the mother, the applicant sought current and retroactive child support while the respondent sought changes to access arrangements.

The existing order had suspended child support due to the significant travel required for access after the mother relocated with the children.

The court held that travel expenses for access do not replace the obligation to pay child support and that reasonable arrangements for child support must be ensured under the Divorce Act.

The respondent was ordered to begin paying guideline child support based on his income and to pay retroactive support from the date the application was commenced.

The court otherwise largely upheld the existing access structure, making only a minor order regarding the children’s communication device.