Roy Frederick Olaf John Karlstedt

The Children's Aid Society sought findings of risk of physical harm, emotional harm, and emotional harm with treatment not provided under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act regarding two children.

The mother had a history of inappropriate physical discipline, verbal abuse, and failure to engage with professional services.

The father did not participate in the proceedings.

The court found that both children were in need of protection and ordered them into interim Society care for six months with access to the mother at the Society's discretion.

This decision addresses an application under sections 276 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's sexual activity in a sexual assault trial.

The accused sought to adduce evidence of prior consensual penetrative intercourse with the complainant to explain the presence of his DNA, and evidence of other male DNA found on the complainant to suggest an alternative perpetrator.

The court ruled that both types of evidence were admissible, with limitations, as they were relevant to issues at trial and had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, after considering the factors in subsection 276(3).

The Crown brought a late application to introduce discreditable conduct evidence after the accused re-elected to be tried by judge alone shortly before trial.

The Crown argued the re-election changed its trial strategy, as it had not intended to put the highly prejudicial evidence before a jury.

The court dismissed the application, refusing to grant leave to extend the time under the Rules of Criminal Practice, finding that admitting the late application would be unfair to the accused, who did not know the case he had to meet, and would likely cause trial delay.

The applicant's family law application was struck due to her failure to comply with undertakings and court orders.

The respondent sought costs on a full recovery basis, citing the applicant's unreasonable behaviour and an unaccepted offer to settle.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, noting the applicant's difficulties as a self-represented litigant and her inability to discuss the offer to settle with counsel.

The applicant was ordered to pay $17,000 in costs.

The claimant law firm sought costs for two motions regarding the enforcement of Certificates of Proof of Claim for unpaid solicitor accounts.

The debtor opposed and sought costs, arguing he was entirely successful on one motion and partially successful on the other.

The court found that success was divided, as the debtor succeeded on one motion but failed in his request to have the accounts assessed, while the claimant was substantially successful on the second motion.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and ordered that neither party be awarded costs.

A law firm sought orders permitting enforcement of two Certificates of Proof of Claim obtained under the former Creditors’ Relief Act by issuing writs of seizure and sale against a former client for unpaid legal accounts arising from matrimonial litigation.

The debtor argued the certificates were invalid due to breaches of the Solicitors Act, including commencing recovery proceedings while accounts were under assessment and bringing a claim within one month of delivering a bill.

The court held that proceedings under the Creditors’ Relief Act constituted an “action” for the purposes of the Solicitors Act.

As a result, the first certificate was a nullity due to breach of s. 6(4), while the second certificate was partially unenforceable because part of the claim violated s. 2(1).

The sheriff was directed to enforce the second certificate only for the reduced amount calculated by the court.

Following the settlement of a family law trial, the respondent sought costs of $11,012.50 plus disbursements.

The applicant opposed the quantum, arguing the issues were simple and the respondent's preparation time was excessive.

The court found the respondent was entitled to costs due to his reasonable offers to settle and the applicant's failure to provide financial disclosure.

Costs were fixed at $7,500 for fees plus $57 for disbursements, plus HST, and characterized as an incident of child support.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their slip and fall action for delay.

The action was dismissed after plaintiffs' counsel failed to set the matter down for trial or respond to a status notice due to inadvertence.

The court applied the Reid criteria and found that while inadvertence was shown, the motion was not brought promptly and the defendants would suffer significant prejudice.

The defendants had lost their ability to crossclaim against a co-defendant who was responsible for maintaining the premises, and maintenance records and witnesses were no longer available.

The motion to set aside the dismissal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion seeking child support and spousal support, while the respondent brought a motion seeking access to one of the children.

The respondent stood in the place of a parent to the applicant’s older child but argued that support should not be payable because the child’s biological father had a support obligation and because their relationship had broken down.

The court applied s. 5 of the Child Support Guidelines and held that, given the limited evidence regarding the biological father’s enforceable support obligation, the step-parent respondent should pay full guideline child support on an interim basis.

The court also awarded nominal interim spousal support based on the respondent’s limited ability to pay and adjusted the access schedule to maximize the child’s contact with the respondent while accommodating his work schedule.

A status review proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act involving six children of Ms. K. with two different biological fathers.

The Children's Aid Society sought to determine whether the children remained in need of protection.

Ms. K. sought custody of the S children and opposed the Society's involvement.

Mr. S. sought custody of the four S children and child support.

The court found that neither group of children remained in need of protection.

Custody of the S children was awarded to Mr. S., with no access granted to Ms. K. at that time.

The G children were returned to Ms. K.'s custody.

Child support was ordered.

The court declined to make a vexatious litigant order despite evidence of prolonged litigation.

The court granted a motion to change a child support order after finding a material change in circumstances caused by the moving party's workplace injury and resulting income shift.

The variation was made retroactive to January 1, 2006.

Income for support purposes was recalculated using allocated WSIB loss-of-earnings benefits, a 30% gross-up for non-taxable amounts, and limited inclusion of repayment shortfalls.

No additional income was imputed after April 19, 2011.

For the adult children's post-secondary costs, the court required each child to contribute 50% of available employment income and student loan resources, with the moving party responsible for the remaining balances and specified guideline support periods.

The court also ordered payment of historic section 7 dental expenses and left costs for further written submissions if not agreed.