Gladys I. Pardu

The appellant, Anibal Rivera, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was consent, specifically regarding condom use.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: the trial judge's application of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis, the alternative finding of fraud vitiating consent, and the use of the complainant's hospital attendance to support her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard, the fraud analysis was superfluous but not inconsistent with the primary finding of non-consent, and the complainant's hospital visit was appropriately used to corroborate her evidence regarding condom use and not to suggest that pursuing charges enhanced credibility.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the dismissal of his "faint hope" application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had applied the 2011 amendments, which increased the judicial screening threshold from "reasonable prospect" to "substantial likelihood." Relying on R. v. Dell, the appellant argued this retrospective application violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the violation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling that the "reasonable prospect" threshold applies to s. 745.6 applications for offences committed between January 9, 1997, and December 2, 2011, and remitted the application for a new screening hearing.

The appellant, Marcy McMahon, appealed her eight-month custodial sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine, which was imposed after a guilty plea and joint submission.

Fresh evidence was admitted, demonstrating that the appellant was unaware of the legal availability of a conditional sentence at the time of her sentencing due to a recent change in law (R. v. Sharma).

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, substituting the custodial sentence with a 23-month conditional sentence followed by one year of probation, finding the proposed sentence fit given the circumstances and the appellant's rehabilitation.

Roger Poirier (appellant) sued multiple defendants for fraud and misrepresentation related to a failed business investment.

He settled his claim with one defendant, Jerry Friedberg, but failed to disclose this settlement to the other defendants for six months.

The motion judge stayed the action against the remaining defendants, finding the non-disclosure to be an abuse of process.

Poirier appealed, arguing the motion judge applied an incorrect legal test and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that immediate disclosure of settlement agreements that fundamentally alter the litigation landscape is mandatory, and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings, regardless of prejudice to the non-settling parties.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula appealed its conviction for damaging Piping Plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The appeal raised issues regarding the interpretation of "damage" under the Act and the admissibility of expert evidence from a Ministry biologist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's interpretation of "damage" as including actions that make habitat less attractive, useful, or valuable from the species' perspective, and affirming the admissibility of the expert's evidence, despite concerns about impartiality, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and the evidence of another expert was sufficient.

The appellant, J.W., appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his discreditable conduct (public nudity) that occurred several years after the charged offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge incorrectly admitted this evidence, as its probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The court emphasized that the similarities between the discreditable conduct and the charged offences were generic and lacked a sufficient nexus, and that the trial judge did not adequately assess the moral and reasoning prejudice, even in a judge-alone trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Jayco, Inc. appealed the dismissal of its action against the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.

Jayco sought recovery of legal costs and interest incurred while successfully contesting a GST/HST assessment.

The claims were based on theories of common law indemnity (as a statutory agent under the Excise Tax Act) and private law duty of care (negligence) owed by the CRA during an audit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that no common law right to indemnity exists for statutory agents in this context, nor does the CRA owe a private law duty of care to taxpayers during administrative audits, distinguishing such audits from criminal investigations.

The appellant sought a declaration of sole ownership of a property based on adverse possession under the Real Property Limitations Act, arguing exclusive possession and payment of expenses for over ten years.

The trial judge found a 65% interest for the appellant and 35% for the respondents, ordering sale.

On appeal, the respondents raised a new issue: the property was registered under the Land Titles Act, which bars adverse possession claims unless the limitation period ran before registration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Land Titles Act issue was dispositive, as the property was registered in Land Titles at the time of purchase, preventing acquisition of title by adverse possession.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant had not established actual possession for the requisite period under the RPLA due to a verbal agreement, and affirmed the order for sale under the Partition Act.

The appellant, J.L., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and breach of probation, alleging errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment, including undue reliance on demeanour, incorrect use of the absence of exaggeration, and misapprehension of material evidence.

He also sought leave to appeal his global sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility determinations were entitled to significant deference and that no reversible errors were made regarding demeanour, absence of exaggeration, or misapprehension of evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a sentence exceeding the Crown's recommendation without first alerting the parties and providing an opportunity for submissions.

The sentence was reduced from three years and three months to three years.

The appellants, Gilles Jozias Overtveld, Enrique M. Jurado, and Rachida Youmouri, appealed several interlocutory orders made by a case management judge in an underlying application concerning Mr. Overtveld's capacity to manage property and personal care.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals as all challenged orders were interlocutory, not final.

The orders included dismissal of a contempt motion, a motion to strike the application, motions regarding access to Mr. Overtveld, a motion to remove counsel, and a motion for payment of accounts.

The court quashed the appeal, affirming that interlocutory orders do not finally dispose of the parties' rights.

The appellant, Georgian Properties Corporation, appealed a summary judgment that dismissed its negligence action against respondent lawyers as statute-barred.

The negligence claim stemmed from the lawyers' work on condominium disclosure documents, mortgages, and a promissory note, which were later found insufficient or oppressive by a lower court.

The motion judge had found the claim discoverable by July 7, 2017, when a judge declined to strike a factum alleging inadequate disclosure.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in holding that loss occurred when the condominium corporation refused payments, clarifying that loss in solicitor negligence cases turns on the validity or enforceability of documents, not mere non-payment by third parties.

The Court concluded that Georgian Properties did not have sufficient material facts to infer liability against the lawyers until later, given the unusual procedural history and their reasonable expectation of success on the debt instruments.

The appeal was allowed, and the limitation defence dismissed.

Andrew Henry Ting sought to set aside a single judge's decision denying leave to appeal a civil contempt finding related to his father's foreign bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion, holding that a panel generally lacks jurisdiction to review a single appellate judge's decision on leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and even if jurisdiction existed, the motion lacked merit as the original decision was sound.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings on causation were supported by evidence and the verdict was reasonable.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the three-year custodial sentence and three-year driving prohibition, finding the trial judge properly considered mitigating factors and collateral immigration consequences.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order setting aside the appellant's discharge from bankruptcy and vesting shares of a corporation (Bindaas Capital) in the trustee.

The motion judge found that the appellant, while an undischarged bankrupt, owned and operated Bindaas Capital, failed to disclose this asset, and fabricated documents to conceal his ownership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings and the discretionary decision to annul the discharge.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings or the exercise of discretion, and upheld the trustee's authority to pursue the after-acquired property.

The appellant, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, alleging six errors in the trial judge's jury charge.

The grounds of appeal primarily concerned the instructions on the use of DNA evidence, the connection of the defence theory to the facts, the limited use of expert biological evidence, the objective and critical viewing of the complainant's evidence, and whether the appellant knew the complainant did not consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the alleged errors, emphasizing that jury charges are assessed functionally and in the context of the trial as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of trafficking cocaine.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's admission and use of audio recordings and transcripts, the expert evidence relating to cocaine, and the conviction on an alternative theory of liability not explicitly advanced by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the audio recordings and transcripts, nor in the reliance on expert evidence to link drug lingo to cocaine.

Regarding the alternative theory, the court found no prejudice to the appellant, as the indictment's language covered the "offer to traffic" which was completed on an earlier date than specified for delivery, and this was part of a continuous chain of events.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of complainant credibility in the absence of expert evidence and the sufficiency of reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the complainants' reactions were psychologically normal for sexual assault victims and that the reasons for conviction, based on the strength of the Crown's evidence and similar fact evidence, were sufficient.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision to continue his detention on a charge of second-degree murder, arguing that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to a trial judge's ruling granting leave to raise a third-party suspect defence.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing the decision de novo, assumed a material change but ultimately found that the apparent strength of the prosecution's case remained very strong despite the third-party suspect evidence.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that detention was still necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the horrific nature of the crime, the vulnerability of the victim, and the overwhelming forensic evidence against the applicant.

The appellant, Elisa Romero Hategan, moved to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of her appeal and for an extension of time to perfect it.

The underlying appeal was from a summary judgment that dismissed Hategan's claims (wrongful appropriation of personality, civil conspiracy, injurious falsehood, negligence, unlawful interference with economic interests) and awarded damages for defamation against her, along with a permanent injunction.

The Court of Appeal considered the factors for extending time to perfect an appeal, including the length of delay, explanation for delay, prejudice to respondents, and merits of the appeal.

The court found the appellant's delay unreasonable and the appeal to have little or no merit, as her original claims lacked evidentiary support for false statements and the defamation counterclaim was well-founded.

The motion to set aside the dismissal and extend time was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that upheld a trial judge's refusal to enter judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case.

The jury found the defendant physicians negligent and that their negligence caused the plaintiff's severe disabilities.

The trial judge ordered a new trial, finding the jury's answers on causation insufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in refusing to enter judgment.

The court emphasized the high standard for setting aside jury verdicts and the presumption that juries understand and apply judicial instructions, even if their answers are conclusory.

The judgment of $14.9 million in damages was reinstated.