Giuseppe Cipriano

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking disclosure of an affiant police officer’s notes, leave to cross‑examine the affiant, and exclusion of evidence obtained under a general warrant.

The court ordered disclosure of the officer’s notes subject to redaction to protect the confidential informant and granted leave to cross‑examine the affiant on issues relating to the reliability of the informant and alleged omissions or misstatements in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

After cross‑examination, the court found the ITO fundamentally deficient, containing misrepresentations and lacking reliable evidence capable of establishing reasonable and probable grounds.

The general warrant was set aside and the search deemed warrantless, engaging the accused’s Charter rights.

The matter was adjourned for continuation of the application regarding exclusion of evidence.

The applicants brought a defence motion seeking exclusion of all evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at a specified property.

In light of the Crown’s stated position and the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Rocha, the court granted the application.

The ruling excluded all evidence obtained through the execution of the search warrant.

The court indicated that more detailed reasons would be provided if requested by counsel and invited further submissions regarding the impact of the ruling on the charges and any potential trial.

The applicant, facing terrorism charges, elected to be tried in the provincial court.

The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the indictment, arguing that s. 577 does not apply to an accused who elected a provincial court trial and that overriding his election violated his s. 7 Charter rights.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that s. 577 broadly permits direct indictments regardless of the accused's election, and that there is no constitutional right to a trial by a judge alone in a specific court.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by not treating the admission of a BlackBerry text as late disclosure and by erroneously referring to a witness as an alibi witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the issue was admissibility, not late disclosure, and the trial judge's rejection of the witness's evidence was well-founded.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of a certiorari application to quash his committal to stand trial on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of the proceeds of crime, and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the order refusing to quash the committal and dismissed the appeal.

The 74-year-old appellant appealed an order suspending his conditional sentence and directing him to serve 21 days in custody for breaching an alcohol prohibition.

The appellant filed fresh evidence showing his health had significantly deteriorated, including a bladder cancer diagnosis.

Given his age, time already served, and worsening medical condition, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the order to time served.

The appellant appealed an extradition order, arguing there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the offence set out in the Authority to Proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was at least a scintilla of reliable evidence, particularly from an undercover officer and a co-conspirator, showing the appellant knew the laundered monies were the proceeds of trafficking in a controlled substance.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson and break and enter, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, relying on post-offence conduct, and accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness without confirmatory evidence.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant, while in custody, hired an accomplice to burn down his ex-girlfriend's chip stand and break into her home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof, his use of a letter written by the appellant, or his reliance on the victim's testimony as confirmatory of the accomplice's evidence.