Giuseppe Cipriano

The accused, charged with possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 1,427 days (approximately 47 months).

The primary issue was whether certain periods of delay should be attributed to the defence, including adjournments for bail, a change of election to the Ontario Court of Justice, and a subsequent re-election to the Superior Court of Justice.

The court found that while the defence was responsible for some delay, the net delay was 1,027 days (approximately 34 months), which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

As the Crown did not rely on any exceptional circumstances, the court found a violation of s. 11(b) and entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, Ezra Harely, appealed his convictions for possession and production of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and his 18-month custodial sentence.

The appeal raised three grounds: a flawed s. 8 Charter analysis and admission of seized evidence, improper jury instructions, and the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's s. 8 Charter analysis or findings of fact regarding the search warrants, no reversible error in the jury charge, and no unfitness or error in principle in the imposed custodial sentence given the scale of the operation and the need for deterrence and denunciation.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred in her analysis of circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the analytical framework by examining evidence in a piecemeal fashion, scrutinizing individual pieces against a reasonable doubt standard, and requiring the Crown to negate speculative inferences.

The court held that the trial judge failed to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence as a whole and that alternative inferences inconsistent with guilt must be reasonable, not merely speculative.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, convicted of fentanyl trafficking, sought bail pending his application for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown opposed, arguing the application was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court found the proposed application for leave had low to nil chances of success, as the Court of Appeal had already thoroughly addressed the Charter issues.

The court emphasized the high public interest in enforceability, particularly given the gravity of large-scale fentanyl trafficking, which outweighed the applicant's health concerns.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The appellant, a pharmacist, was convicted of trafficking in fentanyl, fraud, and public mischief, and sentenced to 14 years' incarceration.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's Charter rulings (s. 11(b), s. 7, s. 8) or assessment of evidence, including the handling of a Vetrovec witness.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to sufficiently apply the principle of restraint for a first-time offender with health issues.

The sentence was reduced from 14 years to 12 years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Garofoli application.

The core issue was the credibility of a first-time confidential informant whose information was corroborated by police surveillance and other evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment of the informant's credibility or the overall reliability of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court rejected an overly granular approach to assessing informant credibility factors, emphasizing a holistic assessment.

The applicant, having been found guilty of conspiracy to commit human smuggling, challenged the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 117(3.1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The applicant argued the provision violates s. 12 of the Charter as it would be grossly disproportionate when applied to a reasonably foreseeable hypothetical offender who plays a minor role for little profit.

Applying the framework from R. v. Nur, the court agreed that a three-year sentence for a minor participant would be grossly disproportionate and shock the conscience.

The court further found the infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, declaring the mandatory minimum provision unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

Michael Kilbride, charged with drug trafficking, sought a review of his detention order under s. 525 of the Criminal Code after being initially detained on primary and secondary grounds.

The court considered a new bail plan involving residential drug addiction treatment at the Salvation Army's Anchorage program.

The judge found that the comprehensive program, coupled with support from a CMHA worker and diligent counsel, mitigated the primary and secondary ground concerns, including the risk of reoffence and failure to appear.

The court also considered the applicant's asthma and the COVID-19 pandemic as factors favoring release, concluding that continued detention was not necessary.

The accused, Mark Sealy-Ward, was charged with 11 counts related to careless storage of firearms and ammunition, possession of prohibited firearms and weapons for dangerous purposes, and possession of Schedule I and II substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial proceeded over five days, with the Crown presenting circumstantial evidence linking the accused to drugs, firearms, and drug trafficking paraphernalia found in his vehicle.

The defence argued lack of knowledge and control.

The court found the accused guilty on 10 of the 11 counts, concluding that the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly pointed to guilt and that the alternative inferences proposed by the defence were mere suppositions.

The accused, Forhad Choudhury, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 47 months.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court found that a significant portion of the delay (approximately one year related to setting the first trial date) was attributable to the defence due to unavailability and implicit waiver.

Another period of delay (approximately five months after a guilty plea was struck) was attributed to the Crown due to an incorrect legal position on the definition of possession of a firearm.

However, even with this attribution to the Crown, the net delay remained below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

Consequently, the court found no breach of the accused's s. 11(b) rights, and the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant, Mark Sealy-Ward, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained following a traffic stop, arrest, and subsequent searches.

The defence argued arbitrary detention, failure to advise of reasons for detention and right to counsel, and unlawful search of the vehicle and trunk.

The court found the traffic stop and initial arrest for marijuana possession lawful, and the search of the vehicle and trunk incident to arrest also lawful.

However, the court found a breach of the defendant's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter due to delay in providing the caution.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the breach was not serious, the impact on the defendant's Charter interests was not severe, and society's interest in the adjudication on the merits of reliable evidence (drugs, shotgun, ammunition) outweighed the breach.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit certain text messages for the truth of their contents in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected, citing concerns about necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay.

The court ruled that two of the four contested text messages were admissible for the truth of their contents under the present intentions and co-conspirators’ exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding that they met the necessity and reliability requirements despite the declarant's availability.

The other two messages were deemed to lack probative value for their truth.

During a trial, the Crown sought to introduce intercepted telephone conversations to show the state of mind of the witnesses, rather than for the truth of their contents.

The defence objected, arguing the Crown must first attempt to refresh the witnesses' memories or establish past recollection recorded.

The court ruled that the intercepted communications were admissible as real evidence without a preliminary voir dire or the need to exhaust the witnesses' memories, allowing the Crown to play the recordings and ask the witnesses to comment.

Sam Tsega was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of Tsega's marijuana use and dealing to establish opportunity, motive, context, and witness credibility.

The defense argued inadmissibility due to lack of support for inferences and prejudicial effect outweighing probative value.

The court applied the Handy/L.B. framework, finding the evidence relevant and material to central issues, and while discreditable, its probative value significantly outweighed any minimal prejudice, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The evidence was deemed admissible.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court statements made by two accomplices who refused to testify at the accused's trial for second degree murder.

The accomplices had previously given statements to police and one had testified at his own trial.

Applying the principled approach to hearsay, the court found that the police statements met the test for threshold reliability due to corroborating evidence and circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

However, the court excluded the prior trial testimony of one accomplice, finding that the leading cross-examination by the Crown at that trial undermined its reliability and admission would negatively impact trial fairness.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge found that the investigating officer lacked the required reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code, rendering the demand an unreasonable search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

The breathalyzer results were excluded under s. 24(2), leading to an acquittal.

On appeal, the court held that the officer’s testimony demonstrated a misunderstanding of the legal threshold for making a screening demand and supported the trial judge’s finding that the officer did not possess the necessary subjective belief.

The exclusion of the evidence and resulting acquittal were upheld.

The accused applied for severance from two co‑accused in a terrorism conspiracy prosecution so that he could be tried separately in provincial court rather than jointly before a superior court jury.

The court considered the discretion to order separate trials under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the factors governing severance where multiple accused are charged.

The evidence against the co‑accused involved extensive wiretaps, surveillance, and complex terrorism‑related allegations expected to require months of trial time, while the case against the applicant relied primarily on a single intercepted conversation and limited corroborative evidence.

The court found that a joint trial would create significant prejudice due to the disparity in the evidence and the risk that the jury would improperly associate the applicant with highly prejudicial evidence admissible only against the co‑accused.

Severance was therefore necessary in the interests of justice to ensure a fair trial.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity contrary to ss. 83.19 and 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after a recorded meeting in which he discussed forming a group to support violent jihad with two individuals already engaged in a terrorist conspiracy.

The Crown relied heavily on wiretap evidence capturing the meeting and argued that the accused had agreed to join the conspiracy.

The accused testified that he only feigned agreement to avoid confrontation and had no genuine intention to participate.

The court rejected significant portions of the accused’s testimony but concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he sincerely intended to join the conspiracy.

The court held that while the accused may have sympathized with jihadist causes, the evidence left a reasonable doubt as to whether he had the requisite mens rea to agree to the conspiracy.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking disclosure of an affiant police officer’s notes, leave to cross‑examine the affiant, and exclusion of evidence obtained under a general warrant.

The court ordered disclosure of the officer’s notes subject to redaction to protect the confidential informant and granted leave to cross‑examine the affiant on issues relating to the reliability of the informant and alleged omissions or misstatements in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

After cross‑examination, the court found the ITO fundamentally deficient, containing misrepresentations and lacking reliable evidence capable of establishing reasonable and probable grounds.

The general warrant was set aside and the search deemed warrantless, engaging the accused’s Charter rights.

The matter was adjourned for continuation of the application regarding exclusion of evidence.

The applicants brought a defence motion seeking exclusion of all evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at a specified property.

In light of the Crown’s stated position and the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Rocha, the court granted the application.

The ruling excluded all evidence obtained through the execution of the search warrant.

The court indicated that more detailed reasons would be provided if requested by counsel and invited further submissions regarding the impact of the ruling on the charges and any potential trial.