G. Dennis Lane

The appellant appealed an order dismissing their claim that the respondent's mortgage amounted to a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no evidentiary foundation capable of supporting an inference of fraud.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of s. 267(1) of the Railways Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's determination that maintenance is a necessary part of the operation of a subway system.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant abandoned its appeal following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Crystalline Investments Ltd. v. Domgroup Ltd. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned but exercised its discretion under Rule 61.14(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to award no costs.

The appellants, former senior executives of the respondent corporation, appealed a trial judgment finding that no 'change in control' had occurred to trigger generous compensation provisions in their employment contracts.

During a period of financial difficulty, a shareholder group accumulated proxies for over 35 percent of the voting shares to requisition a special meeting to replace the board of directors.

A settlement was reached before the meeting, and the executives subsequently claimed payouts from a trust fund established for change of control scenarios.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that the mere accumulation of proxies did not confer the right to control or direct the voting power of the corporation, and thus did not constitute a change in control under the agreements.

The appellant, a former director and executive, appealed a trial judgment that set aside his employment contract using the oppression remedy under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The appellant argued the oppression remedy should only be available to minority shareholders unable to use normal corporate machinery, and that the trial judge improperly substituted her view for the Board's business judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the oppression remedy addresses abuse of power and is not limited to minority shareholders.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the Board's process in approving the contract was seriously flawed and fell outside the range of reasonableness.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also refused despite the respondents failing to prove fraud, given the appellant's egregious conduct.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding no case for equitable set-off and refusing a stay of execution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that although the motion judge erred in finding no basis for piercing the corporate veil, he correctly concluded there was no case for equitable set-off because the debt was incurred to a different company prior to a merger.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant a stay of execution due to the lack of connection between the claims.

The applicants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a successful application against the Ministry of Community and Social Services, which had cancelled its contract with the applicant charitable organization and seized its property without authority.

The Divisional Court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, noting the government's unfair treatment of the applicant and the complexity of the proceedings.

Costs were fixed at $120,000 plus GST.

The respondent's registration as a motor vehicle dealer and salesman was revoked due to odometer tampering.

He later re-applied for registration, but the Registrar proposed to refuse the application based on his past misconduct, including criminal fraud convictions.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal restored his registration, accepting his argument that the fraud was due to bad paperwork and a dishonest employee.

The Registrar appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred fundamentally by allowing the respondent to relitigate the essential element of criminal intent from his fraud convictions.

The Tribunal's decision was set aside and the Registrar's proposal to refuse registration was restored.

The defendant's motion for leave to appeal an order permitting the plaintiff to use the pseudonym Jane Doe was dismissed.

The court subsequently received written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought $10,998 plus disbursements on a partial indemnity scale, while the defendant argued costs should be fixed at no more than $2,500.

The court adjusted the hourly rates claimed by the plaintiff's counsel, noting that maximum rates were not appropriate for this type of case.

The court fixed the plaintiff's partial indemnity costs at $6,000 plus disbursements and GST.

The successful appellants sought costs of their appeal and the application for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs to either party.

The court noted that both parties contributed to the jurisdictional error below, the appeal raised a novel and complex issue regarding the interplay between the Libel and Slander Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the appellants' conduct throughout the proceedings justified the case management judge's initial concerns about abuse of process.

The applicant, a teacher with multiple sclerosis, sought judicial review of the Human Rights Commission's decisions refusing to refer her complaints of discrimination and reprisal to a Board of Inquiry.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decisions were not patently unreasonable as there was ample evidence to support its conclusions regarding the school board's accommodation efforts and the union's representation.

The Court also rejected the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness, including an argument based on the doctrine of legitimate expectations.

The applicants brought a motion before a panel of the Divisional Court to set aside the decisions of a single judge, who had refused to set aside earlier orders dismissing their motions for leave to appeal due to their counsel's failure to attend.

The applicants argued that their counsel had a scheduling conflict and received insufficient notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the single judge applied the correct test under Rule 37.14 and properly concluded that counsel's failure to attend was a choice rather than the result of accident, mistake, or insufficient notice.

The court also upheld the single judge's costs awards.

The applicant sought judicial review of a municipal licensing committee's decision to refuse the renewal of her body rub parlour licence due to by-law violations.

The applicant argued that the hearing lacked natural justice because the committee consisted solely of elected officials and relied on uncorroborated evidence from police and by-law officers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory framework explicitly confided the decision to the municipality itself, the hearing was procedurally fair, and the committee's reliance on uncontradicted eyewitness evidence was not patently unreasonable.

The applicant brought a motion to review an order imposing terms on a stay of a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The College sought to stay the motion because the applicant failed to pay a prior costs order.

The Divisional Court decided to hear the motion in the public interest despite the unpaid costs.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the court has broad jurisdiction under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure to impose terms when granting a stay.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services refusing to consent to the abolition of the municipal police force unless the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) agreed to binding arbitration regarding the hiring of a specific officer.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Commission's jurisdiction under section 40(3) of the Police Services Act is limited to ordering arbitration between a police board and a member regarding severance pay.

The Commission had no statutory authority to order the OPP to submit to arbitration regarding an officer's suitability for employment.

The condition was set aside and the Commission was directed to consent to the termination.

The applicant employer association sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing its application for final offer selection to amend a collective agreement.

The applicant argued the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the application and was required to choose one of the two final offers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under the pragmatic and functional approach, the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was subject to a patently unreasonable standard of review.

The court held it was not patently unreasonable for the arbitrator to conclude that the existence of a competitive disadvantage had to be verified before an offer could be selected, and that the arbitrator's factual findings were supported by evidence.

The appellants, plaintiffs in a defamation action against a newspaper and others, appealed an order requiring them to post security for costs under Rule 56.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in law by not applying section 12 of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court held that section 12 provides a specific, more onerous procedure for security for costs in libel actions involving newspapers, which takes precedence over the general provisions of Rule 56 pursuant to Rule 1.02(1)3.

The applicant appealed a decision denying a property tax exemption for its children's camp.

The application judge had found the camp was primarily recreational and did not qualify as a place for the 'care of children' under s. 3(1)11 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the camp's primary purpose was the care of children in a special educational setting, integrating special needs children with others.

The court held that the application judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to recognize the charitable and educational nature of the care provided.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which found him guilty of professional misconduct and revoked his certificate of registration.

The charges related to his conduct during a patient's unsuccessful resuscitation, his use of heavy sedation for nerve blocks, and his prescription of high-dose opioids for chronic pain patients.

The Divisional Court upheld the Committee's findings regarding the resuscitation and the use of sedation, finding them reasonable based on the evidence.

However, the Court set aside the findings related to opioid prescriptions and a toxic dose of Marcaine, concluding the Committee ignored crucial defence expert testimony and relied on a charting error.

The penalty of revocation was set aside as excessive and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted Committee.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting the respondent's application for the sale of five commercial properties under the Partition Act.

The parties were co-tenants, and the respondent, holding a minority interest, refused to consent to the appellants' management and leveraging plans after the appellants acquired their majority interest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that a co-tenant has a prima facie right to compel a sale under the Davis test, and that the respondent's conduct was not malicious, oppressive, or vexatious, but rather a predictable response to a business relationship breakdown.