G. Dennis Lane

The successful applicant sought costs of $98,000 on a substantial indemnity basis following a judicial review of a decision revoking his licence.

The court noted the substantial consequence of the matter and the time required, but found the claimed amount exceeded what was reasonably recoverable and what the respondent might have anticipated.

The court fixed the applicant's costs at $60,000.

The appellant tenant, who suffered from schizophrenia, appealed an eviction order issued by the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal.

The respondent landlord had issued notices of termination due to the tenant's screaming and disruptive behaviour.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred by failing to apply the Human Rights Code.

The Court held that the Tribunal is bound to consider whether a disabled tenant can be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship to the landlord before exercising its discretion to evict under the Tenant Protection Act.

The eviction order was set aside on terms that the tenant's family be notified to intervene if disruptive behaviour occurs.

The applicant, a non-profit charity providing services to developmentally disabled individuals, sought judicial review of a Ministry decision terminating its funding and directing another agency to take over its operations and property.

The Ministry made the decision without notice, citing a loss of confidence following a series of serious occurrences.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the decision was the exercise of a statutory power and thus amenable to judicial review.

The court held the decision was illegal and made without jurisdiction because the Ministry failed to obtain the required order in council under the Ministry of Community and Social Services Act.

Furthermore, the decision was patently unreasonable and breached the duty of fairness owed to the applicant.

The applicant, a non-profit organization providing services to developmentally disabled individuals, sought judicial review of the Ministry's decision to terminate its funding without notice and direct another agency to take over its operations and property.

The Ministry cited a loss of confidence following several 'serious occurrences'.

The Divisional Court held that the Ministry's actions constituted the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review.

The Court found the decision to be illegal, patently unreasonable, and a breach of the duty of fairness, as the Ministry failed to obtain the required Order in Council to seize the property and failed to provide the applicant with fair warning or an opportunity to respond.

The application was granted, and the Ministry was ordered to restore funding and return management to the applicant.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario (CLO) acted as litigation guardian and legal representative for a minor.

When the minor reached the age of majority, she requested her file.

The CLO treated the request under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) and refused to disclose portions of the file, claiming exemptions under s. 19 (Crown counsel litigation privilege) and s. 13 (advice to government).

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Commissioner had standing to participate.

The Court dismissed the application, finding that the CLO is not 'Crown counsel' when acting for a minor and that s. 13 does not apply to advice given for the benefit of a private client.

The CLO's fiduciary duties to the client precluded withholding the file.

The appellant investors appealed an order disqualifying their counsel and his merged law firm from continuing to represent them in a complex litigation against the respondent promoters.

The disqualification arose after the investors' law firm merged with another firm that had previously acted for the promoters in preparing the offering memorandum at the heart of the dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the merged firm failed to implement an ethical wall at the time the merger became effective, creating an irreconcilable conflict of interest and a risk of sharing confidential information.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary child support and rescind over $20,000 in arrears.

He argued that his income had severely diminished due to depression and that the motions judge erred in imputing an annual income of $40,000 based on his past work in family businesses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to meet his onus of establishing a material change in circumstances.

The majority held that the motions judge was entitled to conclude that his income was difficult to discern and that a trial of an issue was not required.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' judicial review application on the grounds of delay, the respondents sought costs.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity scale, reducing the claimed amounts due to excessive hours, duplication of effort by multiple lawyers, and unexplained disbursements.

Costs were fixed at $18,000 plus disbursements for the respondent union and $14,000 plus disbursements for the respondent locals.

Following a successful appeal granting summary judgment on liability and directing an assessment of damages, the appellant sought costs on a full indemnity basis pursuant to a lease provision.

The respondents argued that costs should be reserved to the assessment judge, as the true magnitude of the appellant's victory would only be known once damages were assessed.

The Divisional Court agreed with the respondents and ordered that the costs of the appeal and the motion for leave be in the discretion of the judge hearing the assessment of damages.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review as premature, the court considered written submissions on costs.

The self-represented applicant argued that costs should be awarded against the successful respondent due to alleged improper conduct in its prosecution of her.

The court found that these allegations were matters still before the Law Society Committee and it would be premature to consider them.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $1,500.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Registrar to revoke his registration as a motor vehicle dealer.

The revocation was based on the appellant's failure to disclose a criminal record, failure to disclose an outstanding judgment, and selling a vehicle without properly disclosing the correct odometer reading.

The Divisional Court found clear and cogent evidence that the appellant breached his registration conditions, allowed an unregistered salesperson to sell a car, and submitted a fraudulent bill of sale to deceive the Tribunal.

The appeal was dismissed and the revocation upheld.

The appellants, minority shareholders in a family investment company, appealed the dismissal of their application for an oppression remedy under s. 248(2) of the Business Corporations Act.

They alleged that the company's directors engaged in oppressive conduct by paying improper management fees to a director's holding company and by making an undocumented loan to the company president.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the management agreement was a reasonable business arrangement and that the loan, while poorly documented, was made in the best interests of the company and did not unfairly prejudice the appellants.

The Crown sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that required it to continue funding Intensive Behavioural Intervention (IBI) therapy for a six-year-old autistic child, despite the program's maximum age limit of six.

The motion judge had granted the mandatory order based on the RJR-MacDonald test, finding that the child would suffer irreparable harm without continued treatment and that the balance of convenience favoured the child.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and rejecting the Crown's argument that the order amounted to a suspension of the legislation.

The tenant brought a motion to vary an order that set conditions for his appeal, specifically the requirement to pay rent arrears and ongoing rent.

The tenant had not paid any arrears and his appeal had previously been dismissed for non-compliance.

As the tenant continued to refuse to pay the arrears he admitted were owing, the Divisional Court found no merit in the motion and dismissed it, awarding costs to the landlord.

The self-represented plaintiff appealed an order striking his statement of claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff had sued his former solicitor for failing to provide a letter confirming the plaintiff's version of events regarding a property sale, claiming damages for mental anguish.

The Divisional Court held that while a witness is absolutely immune from suit for acts related to giving evidence, it was not plain and obvious that a solicitor owes no duty to provide their own recollections to a former client.

The appeal was allowed in part to permit the plaintiff to amend his claim to seek only a statement of the solicitor's recollections, without any claim for damages.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict assessing her general damages at $35,000 and future loss of income at zero following a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

The appellant argued that questions posed by the jury during deliberations showed they considered irrelevant matters, and sought a new trial or reassessment of damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's recharge cured any potential issues with the jury's questions, and that the jury's verdict on damages was not so unreasonable and unjust as to warrant appellate intervention.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the revocation of their motor vehicle inspection station and mechanic's licences.

The Director alleged that false statements were made in numerous safety standards certificates and that inspections were incompetently performed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence accepted by the Tribunal provided clear and cogent proof to support the Director's proposed action.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order that adjourned his trial, prohibited him from seeking further disclosure, required payment of child support arrears before allowing a motion to vary support, and ordered $15,000 in costs thrown away.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

Specifically, the motion judge improperly relied on unsworn material from the Continuing Record, prohibited a statutory right to move for varied support, awarded substantial indemnity costs without evidence, and disqualified an expert witness without assessing competence.

The order was stayed pending the appeal.

The husband sought leave to appeal an order that adjourned a trial, prohibited him from seeking further disclosure, required payment of child support arrears before allowing a motion to vary support, and ordered $15,000 in costs thrown away.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The motion judge had improperly relied on the continuing record without notice to the parties, prohibited the exercise of a statutory right to seek a variation of support, and awarded substantial costs without evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Racing Commission's decision to suspend him for 74 days and fine him $1,000 for an equine drug violation.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the penalty was unreasonable, as the respondent treated his prior offences differently than in a previous hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the penalty was within the applicable guidelines and not patently unreasonable.