Frank N. Marrocco

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from a Master's decision, the successful police respondents sought costs.

The Crown did not seek costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1), noting the appellants had claimed $40 million in damages and made serious allegations against the police in a factually complex action.

The court awarded the police respondents $4,000 in costs, representing a reasonable reduction from their partial indemnity costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application.

He alleged his former employer, the Ottawa Catholic School Board, failed to accommodate his return to work from a medical leave by improperly requiring him to attend an independent medical examination (IME).

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably concluded that the employer had a bona fide reason to question the treating physician's medical information and was justified in requesting an IME.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's refusal to admit post-application evidence regarding the accommodation process.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Social Benefits Tribunal decision that upheld the termination of her ODSP benefits and established an overpayment of over $22,000 due to undisclosed assets.

The applicant had a statutory right to appeal the Tribunal's decision to the Divisional Court but failed to do so, instead bringing an application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial review is a discretionary remedy not available where an adequate alternative remedy exists, and the applicant demonstrated no exceptional circumstances to justify bypassing the statutory appeal process.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding them liable for breach of a sponsorship agreement.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the existence of the contract and the refusal to draw an adverse inference for failing to call a witness.

However, the court allowed the individual appellant's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in piercing the corporate veil to hold him personally liable, as there was no evidence the corporation was used for an improper purpose or that he agreed to personal liability.

The tenant, who lived in rent-geared-to-income premises, appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order for non-payment of rent.

The tenant argued the rent increases were unlawful.

The Board ruled it lacked jurisdiction to determine the lawful rent under s. 203(a) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that because the tenant's rent was not payable under the Housing Services Act, s. 203(a) did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of the rent charged.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that converted an application into an action and ordered a trial, and relied on unsworn material from a responding party.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge had inherent jurisdiction and discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure to receive the unsworn material in the interests of justice, and that the decision did not raise matters of general or public importance beyond the immediate parties.

A plaintiff, unsuccessfully prosecuted for murder, sued police investigators and Crown attorneys for various torts.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the Crown due to prosecutorial immunity and struck a cross-claim for contribution, but allowed a cross-claim for indemnity based on negligent legal advice to proceed.

The Crown defendants sought leave to appeal this decision.

Leave to appeal was granted, as the motion judge failed to adequately consider policy reasons against recognizing a duty of care from Crown attorneys to police, which raised doubts about the correctness of the order.

The applicant, a professional engineer, sought judicial review of a decision by the respondent's Complaints Committee refusing to refer his complaint against another engineer to the Discipline Committee.

The applicant alleged the other engineer engaged in professional misconduct by inappropriately sharing confidential shop drawings with a competitor and having a conflict of interest.

The Divisional Court found that while the Complaints Committee's written reasons were defective for lacking transparency, the record before the Committee provided ample justification for its decision.

Applying the principles from Newfoundland Nurses, the court supplemented the reasons with the record and concluded the decision was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a costs order made following a summary judgment motion regarding the closure of bank accounts.

The Divisional Court refused leave, finding that the motion judge made no error in principle and the costs award was not plainly wrong.

The motion judge appropriately considered the factors under Rule 57.01, including the importance of the issue, the applicant's voluminous written questions, and the parties' settlement offers.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The original action alleged negligence by police and Crown attorneys, and claims of terror, intimidation, assault, and unauthorized searches by police, stemming from a private prosecution that resulted in an acquittal.

The Master's decision was based on the appellants' failure to explain the delay, their lack of promptness in moving to set aside the dismissal, and the presumption of prejudice to the respondents.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's discretionary decision, noting that the appellants' action was also unlikely to succeed due to prosecutorial immunity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants sued the police and the Crown for negligence and other torts related to a criminal investigation and prosecution.

The action was administratively dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

The appellants unsuccessfully moved before a Master to set aside the dismissal.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's application of the test to set aside an administrative dismissal, noting the appellants failed to adequately explain the delay, were not prompt in moving to set aside the order, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the respondents.

The appeal was dismissed.

Dr. Stephen Rose James sought leave to appeal portions of a motion judge's order that certified a class action and defined common issues, specifically regarding the wording of the breach of standard of care common issue and the certification of punitive damages as a common issue.

The court granted leave to appeal the breach of standard of care issue, finding serious debate regarding the procedure followed when the motion judge amended the common issue post-hearing without submissions.

However, leave to appeal the punitive damages common issue was refused, as it was deemed common to the class and not an issue extending beyond the parties' interests.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal two orders: one dismissing their recusal motion against the Case Management Judge and awarding costs on a full indemnity scale, and another for costs of $32,681.83 for the unsuccessful recusal motion.

The court refused leave to appeal the recusal decision, noting no conflicting decisions and that the Court of Appeal had already confirmed the bias claim was unfounded.

The court also refused leave to appeal the costs order, finding no error in principle or that the award was plainly wrong, as the recusal motion was ill-conceived and unsubstantiated.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed in its entirety with costs of $5000.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a Case Management Judge's interlocutory order refusing to recuse herself for alleged bias, as well as the order requiring them to pay $32,681.83 in costs on a full indemnity scale for the unsuccessful recusal motion.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no broad significance to the recusal issue, and no error in principle in the discretionary costs award.

The moving parties were ordered to pay $5,000 in costs for the leave motion.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Toronto Transit Commission from implementing random drug and alcohol testing for safety-sensitive employees pending the outcome of a policy grievance arbitration.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any privacy breaches or wrongful dismissals could be compensated with damages.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the significant public interest in transit safety and evidence of a workplace drug and alcohol problem.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review concerning the duty to consult on a wind farm project, the successful respondents sought costs.

The court noted the complexity of the issue, the significant financial stakes of the $240 million project, and the applicant's 15-month delay in commencing the application.

The court awarded costs of $50,000 plus disbursements and HST to each of the two respondent groups, while the respondent Minister did not seek costs.

The applicant brought an application questioning the validity of the Royal Proclamation 1763.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The court found the application had no chance of success and dismissed it as frivolous.

The court also exercised its inherent jurisdiction to revoke any fee waiver the applicant may have had in the proceeding, noting that allowing meritless claims impedes access to justice.

The applicant sought to vary a decision made under Rule 2.1.01 that dismissed a motion for leave to appeal a previous refusal of leave to appeal.

The court held that where a statute grants a right of appeal conditional upon leave, there is no appeal from a decision refusing leave on the merits.

As the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested remedy, the motion to vary was dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 as having no chance of success.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal a $40,000 costs order made following a summary judgment motion.

The applicant missed the 15-day deadline due to procedural confusion, mistakenly attempting to appeal directly rather than seeking leave.

The court granted the extension, finding the applicant had a firm intention to appeal, reasonably explained the delay, and the respondent would suffer no irrevocable prejudice.

The court ordered the leave application to proceed in writing.

Following the release of a decision on an appeal, the parties attended before the Registrar to settle the order.

The appellant and the respondent each provided a version of the order.

The judge directed the Registrar to sign the respondent's version as it reflected the decision.

The appellant subsequently attempted to appear before the judge to settle the order.

The judge held that the order had been settled and the proceeding was at an end.