CITATION: Ellis v. Wernick, 2017 ONSC 1461
COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-561149
DATE: 20170303
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
PATRICK ELLIS
Applicant
– and –
MICHAEL WERNICK
Respondent
Self-Representing
Not Present
HEARD: In writing
Rule 2.1.01 Ruling
MARROCCO A.C.J.S.C.
[1] The applicant brings this application against the respondent, the Clerk of the Privy Council, intending to question “the validity of the Royal Proclamation 1763 as placed within Canadians (sic) Charter of Rights and Freedoms…”
[2] The applicant claims in part that the Royal Proclamation 1763 is “inconsistent with the duties, obligations and responsibilities of a Judahite ruler thus of no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistencies”. The applicant also claims that “there may be a duality in so far as the function of the Royal Proclamation 1763 dependent upon whether a Judahite ruler or pagan common-law ruler is placed on the English Throne of Thorns.”
[3] The respondent asks the Court to dismiss this application pursuant to Rule 2.1.01. The Registrar notified the applicant of the respondent’s request by mail which was returned with a note indicating that the applicant had moved.
[4] It is sufficient to say that the applicant’s application has no chance of success, is therefore frivolous and dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1 .01.
[5] Whether or not the applicant has a Fee Waiver is not clear and so my order in this regard is conditional and made in the interests of resolving all aspects of this matter.
[6] The Superior Court of Justice is a court of inherent jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. The court’s inherent jurisdiction permits it to regulate its own practice and to prevent the abuse of its process. In a recent decision in Hok v. Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench stated at paras. 24-25: “The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, a superior court of inherent jurisdiction, possess an inherent jurisdiction to restrict future and hypothetical litigation by an abusive litigant.… [T]his Court's authority to restrict court access is not solely derived from the Judicature Act and/or Family Law Act or restricted by this legislation but rather co-exists with it.”
[7] Sections 4.3-4.7 of the Administration of Justice Act provide two ways of obtaining a fee waiver. Under section 4.3 a court clerk or registrar must issue a fee waiver if a person meets specified conditions regarding income. For example a fee waiver must be granted if the applicant receives income assistance under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act. The fee waiver order applies to all future steps in the proceeding.
[8] Section 4 of the Act leaves nothing to the court staff’s discretion when issuing the fee waiver certificate: as long as the financial conditions are met, the certificate must be issued.
[9] The Act does not specifically consider revocation of the waiver. The Act’s silence on the question of the revocation of a fee waiver leaves a legislative gap on this question which the court can fill by resorting to its inherent jurisdiction. See Comeau’s Sea Foods Ltd. v Canada (Minister of fisheries and oceans), 1997 CanLII 399 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 12 where the court recognized the lack of directions in the legislation with regards to revocation of authorizations previously given as a legislative gap. In addition, the Divisional Court held in Wagowsky v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (1997), 103 O.A.C. 226 (Div. Ct.), a gap in a by-law to the extent that it gave no direction as to whether the decision maker could rescind an authorization previously given..
[10] It is necessary however to consider the legislation as a whole to determine whether quashing a fee waiver would be contrary to the legislative intent reflected in the administration of justice act. I recognize that revoking a fee waiver is capable of impeding access to justice. However it is also true that allowing litigants to bring meritless claims also impedes access to justice. For example the Ontario Court of Appeal in Picard vs. London Police Services Board 2010 ONCA 643 said at para. 25 “Access to justice is not a passport that entitles the bearer to pursue endlessly and prosecute interminably hopeless causes.... To deny meritless claims is not to curtail access to justice, rather to facilitate access to justice by making room for legitimate claims.” In the same vein the Supreme Court of Canada made the following observation in the Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia vs. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SEC 59 at para.47 ““Of course, hearing fees that prevent litigants from bringing frivolous or vexatious claims do not offend the Constitution. There is no constitutional right to bring frivolous or vexatious cases, and measures that deter such cases may actually increase efficiency and overall access to justice.”
[11] Accordingly I am satisfied that the Superior Court of Justice continues to have jurisdiction over the revocation of a fee waiver previously given.
[12] In the event that the applicant has a fee waiver in this proceeding, it is revoked. In addition, no further fee waivers are to be issued to the applicant in connection with this proceeding or any proceeding related to this proceeding without an order of the court
MARROCCO A.C.J.S.C.
Released: 20170303
CITATION: Ellis v. Wernick, 2017 ONSC 1461
COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-561149
DATE: 20170303
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
PATRICK ELLIS
Applicant
– and –
MICHAEL WERNICK
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARROCCO A.C.J.S.C.
Released: 20170303