Frank N. Marrocco

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board upholding the College of Psychologists' refusal to register him for supervised practice.

The appellant held a PhD in Developmental Psychology that was not accredited by the Canadian Psychological Association.

The Board found that under the 2015 regulation, it could only consider the appellant's doctoral program itself, not his extensive subsequent clinical experience, to determine equivalency.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's interpretation of the regulation was reasonable, despite expressing concerns about the fairness of the rigid regulatory requirements.

The appellant, an early childhood educator, appealed a discipline committee's order that he pay $257,353.76 in hearing costs after being found guilty of professional misconduct for sexually abusing a child.

The appellant argued the committee lacked jurisdiction to award costs because it found his conduct during the hearing was not unreasonable, relying on the tribunal's rules and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the committee to interpret its home statute as granting broad discretion to award costs following a finding of misconduct, which prevailed over any conflicting procedural rules.

Following an appeal regarding reduced security under the Construction Lien Act, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The appellant was awarded $7,000 in partial indemnity costs for a successful stay motion.

The respondent, having been successful on the main appeal, was awarded $15,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The applicant union sought judicial review of three Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions regarding an application for certification in the construction industry.

The union argued that the bargaining unit should be limited to licensed sheet metal workers and registered apprentices, and that the Board breached procedural fairness by altering the proposed bargaining unit description without submissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness as the union failed to seek reconsideration on that issue.

The Court also held that the Board's decision to include unlicensed workers in the bargaining unit was reasonable, as it appropriately focused on the work performed on the application date rather than licensing status under collateral legislation.

The Divisional Court issued an endorsement to correct an accidental slip in its previous reasons for judgment dismissing the applicant's application.

The court amended paragraph 34 of the reasons pursuant to Rule 59.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to accurately reflect that the agreement as to costs was between the applicant and the University of Toronto, not the union.

The applicant was ordered to pay agreed costs of $8,000 to the University.

In the context of a family law dispute, moving non-parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order refusing to release a Ferrari from impound.

They brought a motion to strike portions of the respondent's factum and casebook, arguing they relied on facts without evidence.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding it would unnecessarily delay the leave to appeal hearing, and instead permitted the moving non-parties to file a reply factum outlining their objections.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaint that his union breached its duty of fair representation.

The union had withdrawn five of his six grievances regarding his termination and settled the final one.

The Board dismissed the complaint following a consultation process, finding the union acted reasonably and honestly.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the Board's process was procedurally fair and its decision was reasonable, transparent, and intelligible.

The appellant contractor appealed a motion judge's order vacating its construction lien upon the respondent owner posting security in an amount significantly less than the lien claim.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by resolving complex factual issues regarding unapproved change orders and an extended duration claim on a summary motion under s. 44(2) of the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the law by reducing security only where the evidence failed to establish a reasonable basis for the amounts claimed, though it varied the order to correct a conceded mathematical error.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a College committee's decision regarding an emergency physician's conduct.

The physician had begun completing a Form 1 under the Mental Health Act after the applicant staged a suicide attempt, but stopped when the applicant admitted it was faked.

The applicant sought the unconditional removal of the incomplete Form 1 from his hospital chart.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable, as the Personal Health Information Protection Act does not grant patients the right to demand the destruction of their medical records.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her motion for leave to appeal a summary judgment that dismissed her $5,000,000 solicitor negligence claim.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act limits its jurisdiction to final orders for amounts not exceeding $50,000.

Because the court lacked jurisdiction, the motion to set aside the Registrar's order was dismissed.

No costs were awarded due to the plaintiff having been misdirected by court staff regarding the proper appellate court.

The applicant sought an extension of time to bring a motion to vary or set aside an order that affirmed the Registrar's dismissal of his judicial review application for delay.

The underlying application concerned police street checks.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant's delay in seeking the extension was unreasonable, there was no reasonable explanation for the entirety of the delay, the respondents would suffer prejudice, and the merits of the appeal were not high.

The appellant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Board erred in law by determining the individual appellant was a tenant, as the lease was solely in the name of his numbered company.

The court ordered the individual's name removed as a party but upheld the eviction order against the numbered company, finding the Board acted reasonably in refusing an adjournment request.

The appellant appealed from a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order terminating his occupancy and a review order dismissing his request for reconsideration.

The appellant argued that the consent order was invalid because he was the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant and could not waive his rights to continue the tenancy under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the appellant had acquired the rights of a tenant, he was entitled to consent to the termination of the tenancy under s. 37(3) of the Act, and there was no evidence of mutual mistake, fraud, or other grounds to set aside the consent order.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Environmental Review Tribunal upholding a Director's order under s. 18 of the Environmental Protection Act.

The order required the appellants, as owners or former owners/occupiers of a contaminated source property, to delineate contamination that had migrated to off-site properties.

The appellants argued s. 18 was limited to future events and on-site remediation, contrasting it with the fault-based s. 17.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's broad interpretation of s. 18—that it permits off-site orders and applies to existing, ongoing, and future adverse effects—was reasonable and consistent with the modern principles of statutory interpretation.

The applicant, Toronto Community Housing Corporation, sought judicial review of a grievance arbitration award that reinstated an employee who had been dismissed for cause.

The employee, a Tenant Services Coordinator, was alleged to have improperly sublet his unit and kept a rent payment.

The arbitrator found insufficient evidence of misconduct and reinstated him.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable, noting she ignored or improperly discounted evidence, including a rent receipt and written statements, and failed to assess credibility.

The Court quashed the award and remitted the matter for a rehearing before a different arbitrator.

The Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) sought judicial review of a decision by the Niagara Police Services Board denying an extension of time to serve a Notice of Hearing on two police officers for neglect of duty.

The Divisional Court had previously quashed the Board's first refusal.

On reconsideration, the Board again refused the extension, substituting its own interpretation of case law for the Divisional Court's previous findings.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, holding that the Board was bound by stare decisis to accept the Court's previous findings, and quashed the Board's second decision.

The appellant was injured in an all-terrain vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal adjudicator found the vehicle was not an automobile and denied benefits.

The Executive Chair reconsidered the decision, cancelled it, and ordered a rehearing.

Both parties appealed the reconsideration decision to the Divisional Court.

The court dismissed both appeals, finding the Executive Chair's decision to order a rehearing was reasonable given the complexity of the case and the need to resolve factual disputes regarding the vehicle's status.

The court also held that an appeal does not stay a request for reconsideration under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The applicant First Nation sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of Exploration granting a mining exploration permit to a corporate respondent on lands within the applicant's traditional territory.

The applicant argued the Crown failed to properly discharge its duty to consult.

The Divisional Court found that the Crown and its delegate had created clear expectations for a community meeting and a Memorandum of Understanding, but abruptly changed course without explanation to expedite the permit for commercial reasons.

The court held that the consultation process lacked genuine engagement and failed to maintain the honour of the Crown.

The application was granted, the permit was set aside, and the matter was remitted for adequate consultation.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario, which upheld an arbitrator's decision dismissing his claim for accident benefits.

The applicant had settled his claim in 2003 after eight years of litigation but purported to rescind the settlement in 2014, arguing the settlement disclosure notice did not comply with the Settlement Regulation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's Delegate reasonably and correctly applied binding Court of Appeal precedent establishing that the regulation's strict disclosure requirements do not apply to settlements reached after a court action has commenced.

The applicants sought an extension of time to perfect their appeal from a Small Claims Court decision regarding a brokerage fee.

Their appeal had been dismissed for failing to perfect it within one year.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to explain the delay, did not attempt to pay for the required transcript over the course of the year, and did not demonstrate that the proposed appeal had merit.