Elizabeth Jackson

The Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit hearsay evidence from a co-accused, Jerome Bent, who refused to testify.

The accused, Shakeil Wheatle, was charged with first-degree murder.

The motion relied on the principled exception to the hearsay rule, requiring assessment of necessity and reliability.

The court found necessity was met due to Bent's refusal.

For reliability, the court distinguished between parts of Bent's statement that incriminated himself and were corroborated, which were deemed inherently trustworthy and admissible, and parts that incriminated Wheatle, which lacked sufficient trustworthiness and corroboration, and were therefore inadmissible.

The court emphasized the lack of opportunity for cross-examination and the circumstances of the statement (jailhouse discussion) as undermining procedural reliability for the parts incriminating Wheatle.

The applicant, Shakeil Wheatle, charged with two separate murders, brought a pre-trial motion seeking severance of the two murder counts.

The court granted the severance, finding no factual nexus between the two homicides, differing strengths in the Crown's case for each, and a significant risk of prejudice to the accused if the counts were tried together.

The decision emphasized the importance of avoiding impermissible inferences and the complexity of jury instructions in such circumstances.

Dellan McMorris was found guilty of first-degree murder in the 2012 killing of Delano Coombs.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered the circumstances of the planned and deliberate murder, the profound impact on the victim's family, and the defendant's background, including his prior criminal record and efforts to complete high school while in custody.

The mandatory sentence for first-degree murder is life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 25 years, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

The court emphasized general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and the societal abhorrence for gun violence.

The defendant, Dellan McMorris, brought a motion for a directed verdict in a first-degree murder trial, arguing insufficient evidence regarding his identity as a perpetrator.

The court reviewed the legal framework for directed verdicts, which requires determining if a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court conducted a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence presented by the Crown, including telephone records, witness testimony, and DNA evidence on a discarded hoodie.

The motion was dismissed, as the court found that a reasonable jury could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown applied to admit an edited audiorecording and transcript of a co-accused's (Jerome Bent) guilty plea to first-degree murder as substantive evidence in the defendant Dellan McMorris's trial.

Bent, who was expected to refuse to testify, had pleaded guilty to the murder of Delano Coombs.

The defence argued that a co-accused's plea is inadmissible except for credibility.

The court, applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, found the plea and edited portions of the agreed statement of facts to meet the threshold reliability and necessity requirements, allowing their admission as substantive evidence against McMorris, but only to prove Bent's culpability, not to directly implicate McMorris.

This ruling addresses a voir dire to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of a statement made by the defendant, Dellan McMorris, to police regarding his cell phone number.

The statement was obtained during a traffic stop where McMorris was a passenger.

The Crown sought to admit this statement in a murder trial.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary, alleging a police threat to charge McMorris with possession of a stolen vehicle if he did not cooperate, and also sought exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter for alleged violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10.

The court found the police officers' notes incomplete and their testimony less reliable, while the defendant's testimony regarding the threat was sufficiently credible to raise a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

Consequently, the statement was deemed inadmissible.

The court declined to rule on the Charter application.

This ruling addresses two applications concerning the admissibility of hearsay declarations by Jerome Bent in the murder trial of Dellan McMorris.

The defence sought to admit Bent's July 2012 declarations, asserting Bent was the principal shooter and McMorris merely present.

The Crown sought to admit Bent's April 2013 declarations, which implicated McMorris.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that neither set of declarations met the threshold reliability requirement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court highlighted issues with inconsistent statements, lack of contemporaneous recording, Graham's motivation and credibility, and the absence of independent confirmatory evidence directly implicating McMorris.

The defendant brought a motion for a directed verdict on a charge of threatening a justice system participant (Justice Bruce Young) with intent to provoke fear and impede duties, contrary to s. 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the motion, finding that the *actus reus* (non-verbal threat of violence) was ambiguous, as the defendant's actions could plausibly be interpreted as an attempt to escape rather than a threat.

Furthermore, the *mens rea* (specific purpose of impeding duties) was not established beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant's actions could have been an expression of anger after a detention order had already been made, and there was no evidence of an intent to impede future duties.

The accused, Joel Coveny, faced charges including intimidation of a judge.

During an interview with police concerning an unrelated robbery, Coveny made statements about the intimidation incident.

The Crown sought to admit these statements.

The defence argued that the police breached Coveny's s. 10(b) Charter rights by failing to re-caution him when the investigation shifted to the intimidation charges.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) when Detective Lemaitre specifically questioned Coveny about what "set him off" regarding the court incident, as this inquiry realistically expected a self-incriminating response about his state of mind.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the specific utterance regarding Coveny's state of mind (found on page 16 of the transcript), finding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the inadvertent nature of the breach.

Other spontaneous utterances were not excluded.

The accused, charged with attempting to intimidate a justice participant and escaping custody, brought an application for the jury to take a view of the courtroom at the Old City Hall Courthouse where the alleged offences occurred.

The accused argued that a view was necessary because the Courts of Justice Act prohibited photography of the courtroom.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory prohibition against photography did not apply to the scenes of crime photographs produced by the Crown.

The court concluded that the photographs, drawings, and other evidence would adequately permit the jury to understand the courtroom layout, and there was no real advantage to taking a view.

Two accused were charged with possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of a prohibited device, and possession of a prohibited firearm without a licence after police discovered a loaded handgun and over-capacity magazine in a closet in their shared apartment during execution of a search warrant.

The Crown relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge and control.

The defence argued that guests attending a party at the apartment had access to the room and closet and may have placed the firearm there, and adduced alternate suspect evidence relating to individuals with prior firearm convictions.

Applying the principles governing circumstantial evidence and the framework in R. v. W. (D.), the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge of the firearm.

Both accused were acquitted.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of Delano Coombs.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to admit a 3.5-hour audio-recorded statement made by Jerome Bent, a separately charged co-accused, to an undercover police agent (Jermaine Graham) for the truth of its contents.

The defence sought to admit a separate, unrecorded statement by Bent regarding a hoody he allegedly dropped at the scene.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay evidence under the necessity and reliability test.

While necessity was conceded, the court found that the Crown's proposed hearsay evidence did not meet the threshold reliability standard due to multiple frailties, including: the declarant's initial untruthfulness about the accused's involvement, leading and suggestive questioning by the undercover agent, minimal corroborating evidence directly linking the accused to the murder, and the absence of visual cues critical to assessing credibility.

The defence application regarding the hoody statement was similarly rejected despite substantial corroborating evidence, as the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability beyond the corroboration.

Both applications were dismissed.

The offender was found guilty of possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession without a license after fleeing a crowded club where shots were fired.

The court considered the serious risk to the public, the offender's prior criminal record, and the breach of a prohibition order as aggravating factors, balanced against his youth and rehabilitative prospects.

A total sentence of 54 months was imposed, with credit for 27.5 months of pre-trial custody.

On a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, the applicant challenged a detention order arising from drug trafficking and firearm-related charges after searches of his residence and his father's residence.

The court found the justice of the peace materially erred by adopting exaggerated Crown submissions that overstated the nexus between the evidence and authorities involving mid-to-high level trafficking and loaded firearms.

The court also found a material change in circumstances based on the first-time suretyship offered by the applicant's mother.

Applying the secondary and tertiary ground analyses, the court held detention was not necessary and ordered release on a recognizance with strict house arrest and communication conditions.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought applications to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a wiretap authorization, and a Garofoli application to exclude the intercepted communications.

The applicants argued that the ITO relied heavily on confidential informants and lacked sufficient detail to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The court dismissed the application to cross-examine, finding no evidentiary basis to suggest it would elicit testimony discrediting the statutory preconditions.

The court also dismissed the Garofoli application, concluding that the redacted ITO and judicial summary provided sufficient evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the interceptions would afford evidence of the offences.

Sentencing for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of proceeds of crime following a judge-alone trial.

The court considered the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code and the concept of the mandatory minimum as an "inflationary floor" in firearm sentencing jurisprudence.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s relatively modest record and the severe immigration consequence of automatic deportation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Aggravating factors included the dangerous combination of a loaded handgun and drug trafficking activity.

The court imposed the three‑year mandatory minimum for the firearm offence with a consecutive one‑year sentence for drug trafficking, resulting in a four‑year global sentence, with enhanced pre‑trial custody credit at 1.5:1 due to harsh remand conditions.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and discovered a handgun, drugs, and cash.

The accused admitted possession of a quantity of cocaine and proceeds of crime but denied possessing the handgun and a second quantity of drugs, alleging police fabricated evidence.

Applying the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.), the court accepted the evidence of Emergency Task Force officers that the handgun was found in the accused’s waistband during the arrest and rejected allegations of fabrication.

The court found inconsistencies and improbabilities in the accused’s testimony and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the firearm.

However, the court had a reasonable doubt regarding the additional quantity of drugs allegedly discovered in the apartment due to irregularities in the handling and documentation of exhibits, and convicted only on the quantity the accused admitted possessing.

The accused was sentenced after being found guilty of unlawful possession of a loaded restricted firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court found the accused was carrying a loaded handgun, drugs, ammunition, cash, and two cell phones consistent with drug trafficking activity.

Despite being a youthful first offender with no prior record, the court emphasized the serious public safety risks associated with the combination of firearms and drug trafficking.

The court determined that a fit sentence before credit was four years’ imprisonment.

Applying enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code and additional credit for strict house‑arrest bail conditions, the court imposed a final custodial sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment.

A judicial interim release hearing for two accused charged with robbery while armed with a firearm, forcible confinement, possession of prohibited weapons, and possession of property obtained by crime, as well as possession of opium poppy including heroin.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that both accused had reversed onus due to prior weapons convictions and current bail conditions.

Despite proposed sureties and electronic monitoring, the court determined the release plans were insufficient given the serious nature of the charges, the apparent strength of the Crown's case based on recent possession doctrine, and the extensive criminal histories of both accused.

Both accused were detained.

The accused applied for severance from a multi-accused drug trafficking indictment and sought a judge-alone trial rather than a jury trial proceeding jointly with co-accused.

He argued prejudice arising from the loss of his chosen mode of trial, trial delay, financial hardship due to the anticipated length of a joint trial, and potential “guilt by association.” The court reviewed the governing principles under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code and leading authorities addressing the presumption in favour of joint trials where accused are alleged to have acted in concert.

The court found an evidentiary nexus between the accused and co-accused through the alleged drug trafficking network and concluded that the asserted prejudice could be managed through jury instructions and procedural accommodations.

The applicant failed to establish that a joint trial would work an injustice.