Deena Baltman

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to exclude documents and internet search evidence recovered from a laptop seized at the time of his arrest on terrorism charges relating to alleged attempts to join the group Al‑Shabaab and counselling another person to do so.

The court conducted a voir dire addressing the relevance and admissibility of ideological, military, and internet‑search material found on the computer.

Applying the principles governing relevance, bad character evidence, and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect, the court held that documents found in an accused’s possession may be admissible circumstantial evidence of knowledge or intent even without proof the accused read or adopted their contents.

The court admitted certain materials and internet search terms relevant to motive, knowledge, and intent, while excluding or limiting others whose prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The court also rejected the argument that admission of the evidence violated the accused’s Charter freedoms of religion or expression.

In a terrorism prosecution, the accused sought to exclude evidence that he had expressed sympathy for individuals associated with terrorism, including Omar Khadr, members of the Toronto 18, and persons detained under security certificates.

The court assessed the admissibility of the statements by balancing probative value against moral and reasoning prejudice.

Evidence relating to the accused’s comments about Khadr and the Toronto 18 was excluded because it carried significant risk of prejudice and would require lengthy contextual evidence that could confuse the jury.

However, a brief conversation concerning security certificates was admitted because it was relevant to the accused’s fear of surveillance and was not unduly prejudicial.

The court also declined to permit an additional challenge for cause question relating to the accused’s views on the security certificate process.

The accused applied to exclude recorded conversations obtained through a consent wiretap authorization under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code in a terrorism prosecution alleging attempted participation in, and counselling participation in, a terrorist organization.

The accused argued the supporting affidavit failed to establish reasonable grounds and improperly relied on Islamophobic assumptions.

The court held that the affidavit, read as a whole, provided ample grounds to believe offences under s. 83.18 had been or would be committed and that relevant information would be obtained through interception.

The judge also rejected the claim that investigative conclusions were improperly influenced by discriminatory assumptions.

The application to exclude the intercepted communications was dismissed.

In a terrorism prosecution, the accused sought to introduce expert evidence from a sociologist regarding the prevalence of Islamophobia and the tendency to associate Muslims with terrorism.

The defence argued the evidence would assist the jury in interpreting conversations with an undercover officer and in assessing evidence of the accused’s online searches relating to terrorism.

Applying the admissibility framework for expert evidence under R. v. Mohan and the two‑stage analysis described in R. v. Abbey, the court found the proposed testimony unnecessary and highly speculative.

The expert had no knowledge of the accused or the undercover officer and could not meaningfully link general social attitudes to the facts of the case.

The court concluded the evidence would provide little probative value and risk confusing the jury, and therefore excluded it.

In a terrorism prosecution alleging attempted participation in and counselling participation in the activities of Al‑Shabaab, the Crown sought to call an expert on Somalia and the organization’s history, structure, ideology, and recruitment practices.

Following a voir dire, the court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence from Mohan and the two‑step analysis in Abbey.

The court found the proposed testimony concerned subject matter beyond the knowledge of a typical Canadian jury and was logically relevant to issues of knowledge, intent, and interpretation of internet activity and recorded conversations.

The expert was held to be properly qualified and not shown to be biased, and the probative value of the contextual evidence outweighed any potential prejudice.

The court therefore permitted the expert evidence, with caution against using “consistent with” language suggesting ultimate issue conclusions.

The accused brought a constitutional motion challenging the validity of several anti‑terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code, including the definitions of “terrorist group” and “terrorist activity” in s. 83.01 and the participation offence in s. 83.18.

The accused argued the provisions were overbroad, vague, and violated the presumption of innocence and Charter freedoms by criminalizing attempts and counselling related to participation in terrorist groups.

The court held that s. 83.18 creates a substantive offence requiring proof of both participation and a specific intent to enhance a terrorist group’s ability to carry out terrorist activity.

Relying on appellate authority including Khawaja and Nadarajah, the court found the provisions neither vague nor overbroad and concluded that the mens rea requirements significantly limit the reach of the offence.

The constitutional application was dismissed in its entirety.

The accused in a terrorism prosecution brought motions challenging the constitutionality of s. 577 of the Criminal Code, which permits the Attorney General to prefer a direct indictment, and alleging abuse of process arising from the loss of a preliminary inquiry.

The accused argued that bypassing the preliminary inquiry deprived him of judicial screening and the opportunity to cross-examine a key undercover officer.

The court held that longstanding appellate authority confirms the constitutionality of s. 577 and that there is no constitutional right to a preliminary inquiry or to discovery through that process.

The preferment of a direct indictment is an exercise of core prosecutorial discretion reviewable only for abuse of process or Charter violations.

Given the extensive disclosure provided and the absence of evidence of misconduct, the accused failed to demonstrate any infringement of Charter rights.

The respondent sought costs following a proceeding.

The court found the time spent and rates claimed by the respondent's counsel to be reasonable.

However, the court made a downward adjustment to the costs claimed because the court had appointed amicus curiae, which raised real legal issues that the respondent was obliged to address.

Costs were fixed at $6,250 payable by the opposing party to the respondent.

The accused applied for a bail review seeking release pending trial on several fraud-related charges.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary ground under s. 515 of the Criminal Code, arguing there was a substantial likelihood the accused would commit further offences if released.

The court considered the proposed release plan involving multiple sureties, including the accused’s elderly father as primary surety.

The judge found the father unsuitable due to age, inability to effectively supervise, and the accused’s past exploitation of his parents, including causing them to lose their home.

Given the accused’s significant fraud record and the inadequacy of the proposed supervision plan, the Crown established a substantial likelihood of reoffending.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by an adjudicator at the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.

The applicant had requested information from the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation regarding a $20 million winning lottery ticket he claimed was stolen from him.

The adjudicator upheld the OLGC's redaction of a Draw Report and found that the OLGC had conducted a reasonable search for records in its custody or control.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the OLGC was not required to obtain records from third parties like Lotto Québec or the Interprovincial Lottery Corporation, as it did not have control over those records.

The applicant Ministry sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision reinstating a Transportation Enforcement Officer who was terminated after pleading guilty to off-duty indecent acts.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and upheld the termination, finding that the Board's decision was unreasonable.

The Board misapprehended medical evidence regarding the employee's long-term risk of reoffending and unreasonably diminished the significance of the Millhaven criteria for off-duty conduct, particularly the negative impact on the employee's credibility as a peace officer required to testify in court.

The contractor responsible for snow and ice maintenance brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that both the plaintiffs’ slip-and-fall claim and the co-defendants’ cross‑claim were barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that a genuine issue requiring trial existed regarding discoverability of the contractor by the plaintiffs, given evidence that counsel made inquiries with the insurer and was told no other maintenance contractor existed.

However, the cross‑claim for contribution and indemnity by the condominium owner and manager was statute‑barred because they had actual knowledge of the contractor’s involvement and were served with the statement of claim more than two years before asserting the claim.

Summary judgment was therefore granted dismissing the cross‑claim but denied regarding the plaintiffs’ main action.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a preliminary decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board finding that the union's certification application fell within provincial jurisdiction.

The respondent union argued the application was premature because the employer had other non-constitutional grounds for opposing certification that had not yet been decided.

The Divisional Court agreed, holding that absent exceptional circumstances, proceedings before administrative tribunals should not be fragmented.

Finding no exceptional circumstances, the court quashed the application as premature.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory order denying the production of certain medical records.

The motion judge had refused production based on the assumption that the individual whose records were sought had cerebral palsy and could not serve as a proper comparator.

On appeal, counsel clarified that there was no conclusive diagnosis of cerebral palsy.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered production, noting that the trial judge retains the discretion to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.

The offender was sentenced after a jury conviction for procuring a person to become a prostitute and controlling the complainant’s movements for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to s. 212 of the Criminal Code.

The evidence established that the offender began a relationship with a vulnerable young woman, later directing her into prostitution, imposing earning quotas, and exercising substantial control over her activities for approximately 18 months while living off her earnings.

The offender also pleaded guilty to uttering threats against another complainant.

The court rejected the defence request for a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the prolonged exploitation and control involved.

A penitentiary sentence of three years was imposed for the prostitution offences, with a concurrent six‑month sentence for uttering threats, along with a firearms prohibition and DNA order.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the insured vendor in an action alleging misrepresentation and breach of contract arising from the sale of a residential property with undisclosed prior fire damage.

The court applied established principles governing the duty to defend, including the “mere possibility” threshold and the requirement to determine the true nature of the claim rather than relying on the labels used in the pleadings.

Although the plaintiffs amended their statement of claim to remove the word “fraudulent” from the allegation of misrepresentation, the underlying facts necessarily implied deliberate deception because the vendor knew of a prior fire and an insurance payout.

The court held that the claim could only be characterized as intentional deceit, which fell outside the policy’s coverage for unintentional bodily injury or property damage.

Summary judgment was granted declaring that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify.

In a large fraud prosecution involving alleged diversion of payroll source deductions, the accused brought a pre‑trial application alleging that tax authorities improperly used civil audit powers to gather evidence for a criminal investigation, contrary to the principles in R. v. Jarvis.

The Crown moved to summarily dismiss the application under Rule 34.02 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The court held the accused lacked standing to challenge searches and production orders affecting third parties because they had no reasonable expectation of privacy in those locations or records.

The court further found there was no evidentiary basis to support the allegation that the tax authority’s audit powers were used for a predominant criminal investigative purpose.

The application was therefore dismissed without a full hearing.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking a stay of fraud charges on the basis of issue estoppel and abuse of process.

She argued that a prior civil tax proceeding in the Tax Court of Canada, resolved by consent judgment in her favour concerning liability for unremitted source deductions, determined the same central issue as the criminal prosecution.

The court held that issue estoppel requires a prior judicial determination on the merits and that a consent judgment does not constitute such a determination.

The court also found the record insufficient to establish that the civil and criminal proceedings addressed identical issues.

As the prerequisites for issue estoppel were not met, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with fraud relating to alleged diversion of payroll source deductions owed to the Canada Revenue Agency, brought a motion to quash a subpoena issued to their former solicitor requiring the production of files.

They argued the subpoena process violated their s. 8 Charter rights and that the Crown was required to obtain the documents through a search warrant complying with the guidelines in R. v. Lavallee.

The court held that the subpoena did not constitute a search or seizure because the documents remained in the lawyer’s custody and were merely brought before the court without state access.

Alternatively, the court held that a subpoena is a valid mechanism for compelling production of records from a lawyer’s office and may constitute a less intrusive alternative to a search warrant, provided protections for solicitor‑client privilege are respected.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a $9 million class action settlement and Class Counsel's fee agreement regarding a C. difficile outbreak at the defendant hospital.

The outbreak affected approximately 223 patients, 91 of whom died.

The court reviewed the settlement terms, which allocated funds based on the duration and severity of symptoms, and considered factors such as litigation risk, the recommendation of experienced counsel, and the single remaining objection.

Finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, the court approved the settlement and the proposed legal fees of 21.5%.