David Paul Finley

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the strangulation of his wife.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial but overwhelming, pointing to the appellant having killed his wife at home and then attempting to stage a robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions, in admitting statements made to police after the appellant had asserted his right to counsel, and that the Crown made improper remarks in closing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in admitting the police statements because their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value, the error was harmless given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence.

The curative proviso was applied, and the appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and numerous other offences arising from a robbery and shooting at a sporting goods store.

At trial, the Crown relied on similar fact evidence from five other armed robberies to prove the identity of the appellant as the shooter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of two of the other robberies, as they lacked striking similarity to the charged offences and failed to establish a nexus to the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, robbery, and other offences following a jury trial.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and on first degree murder during the course of a forcible seizure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge on reasonable doubt substantially complied with the required standard and that there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude the appellant was a substantial and integral cause of the victim's death during a forcible seizure.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after killing the victim with a hammer and knife.

At trial, his sole defence was self-defence.

A key Crown witness, the appellant's former partner, gave testimony that differed from her initial police statements.

To explain the inconsistencies, the Crown called expert evidence on Battered Women's Syndrome and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the expert evidence constituted impermissible oath-helping and that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were flawed.

The Court of Appeal found that while the expert evidence improperly crossed the line into oath-helping, the error occasioned no substantial wrong given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence against self-defence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, but the sentence appeal was allowed, reducing the parole ineligibility period from 15 to 12 years.

The appellant, a police officer, was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon and obstruction of justice after a knife was found in his son's desk at school.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the appellant on both counts, finding no evidence that the knife's handle was made of metal, an essential element of the prohibited weapon charge.

The Crown successfully applied to the Superior Court to set aside the discharge.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the discharge, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error by failing to consider circumstantial evidence or by improperly weighing the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, threatening death, unlawful confinement, and breach of undertaking, as well as his designation as a long-term offender.

The offences were committed against his wife over an eight-day period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's evidence and the verdict was not unreasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the long-term offender designation was well founded on evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse and a substantial risk of re-offending.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death, failing to comply with a recognizance, impaired driving, and driving while suspended after striking and killing two pedestrians while highly intoxicated.

The trial judge imposed a total sentence of 12 years, reduced by 18 months for pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the nine-year sentence for criminal negligence causing death as fit given the severe aggravating factors.

However, the Court found the total sentence of 12 years was a marked departure from customary sentences and varied the total sentence to 10 years.

The Court also held that the sentence for impaired driving should be served concurrently, not consecutively, with the criminal negligence sentence.

The accused was found near an overturned car following a single-vehicle accident.

He smelled of alcohol, had facial injuries, and was talking gibberish.

The arresting officer arrested the accused for impaired driving but delayed making a breathalyzer demand for 59 minutes due to concerns for the accused's health, waiting until a doctor gave permission to speak to him.

The trial judge acquitted the accused of refusing to comply with a breathalyzer demand, reasoning that since there was insufficient evidence he was the driver, he was not obligated to take the test.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law and that the demand was made 'as soon as practicable'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and that the demand was made as soon as practicable given the legitimate medical concerns.

The appellant and his co-accused were charged with the second degree murder of their 14-month-old child.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the co-accused was committed for trial and the appellant was discharged.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge and commit the appellant to trial.

The appellant appealed the certiorari order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry justice must have engaged in impermissible weighing of evidence, thereby committing jurisdictional error.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four counts of indecent assault and sought leave to appeal his 18-month sentence.

The appeal on conviction was based on the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding credibility, identity, and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the jury charge and dismissed the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by stating inadequate supervision made a conditional sentence inappropriate, but ultimately held that an 18-month custodial sentence was fit given the nature of the historical offences against a young child.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of sexually assaulting two 15-year-old complainants.

The trial judge found that the complainants' bizarre and contradictory evidence was due to 'bolus drinking' and relied on a letter written by one complainant to find a lack of consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, as one complainant had consumed very little alcohol, and the letter suggested consensual activity that was later regretted.

The Court set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding that while the trial judge erred, the verdicts were not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing his summary conviction appeal.

Under s. 839 of the Criminal Code, the appeal was restricted to questions of law alone.

The appellant argued that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in failing to find that the trial judge should have drawn adverse inferences against the complainant and investigating officer.

The Court of Appeal held this was a question of fact, not law.

The Court also rejected arguments regarding equality rights, fresh evidence, and an inappropriate question by Crown counsel during cross-examination.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for first degree murder after forcibly confining his former partner and subsequently stabbing her tenant to death.

The preliminary inquiry judge found that s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, which classifies murder as first degree if committed while committing an enumerated offence (here, forcible confinement), does not require the victim of the murder and the enumerated offence to be the same person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while such an alleged error by a preliminary inquiry judge is jurisdictional and reviewable on certiorari, the judge did not err in his interpretation.

Section 231(5) only requires a close temporal and causal connection between the murder and the enumerated offence, not that the victims be identical.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaking and entering, kidnapping, and several sexual offences against a nine-year-old child, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the DNA evidence, which was not completely consistent with the appellant's guilt and contained exculpatory elements.

Consequently, the convictions for the sexual offences were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The convictions for breaking and entering and kidnapping were upheld.

The sentence was reduced and the order delaying parole eligibility was set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions and three-year sentence for four arson-related charges.

He argued that his section 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained fire marshal samples without a warrant, that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence would not have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter even if a breach occurred, the trial judge's comments did not reverse the burden of proof, and there was no miscarriage of justice resulting from trial counsel's performance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The accused was convicted of first degree murder.

Years later, he applied to the Minister of Justice for a review based on fresh evidence.

The Minister referred the matter to the Court of Appeal under s. 690 of the Criminal Code for an opinion on whether the evidence was admissible, and if so, to determine the appeal.

The Court of Appeal concluded the evidence was inadmissible and did not proceed to determine the appeal.

The accused sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the application for leave.

The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that the Court of Appeal had only provided an advisory opinion under s. 690(c), which is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with an approved screening device demand, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and that the criminalization of the refusal under the Criminal Code infringed his rights against self-incrimination and to counsel under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the police officer's standard practice of checking the mouthpiece.

Furthermore, the Court found that the primary goal of roadside screening is preventive, the results cannot be used at trial, and the intrusion is minimal.

Therefore, the criminalization of the refusal does not infringe the principle against self-incrimination or the right to counsel.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside his acquittal for impaired driving and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under section 9 of the Charter, finding the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that the officer's subjective opinion was supported by objective facts, including the appellant's physical condition, apparent evasion of a RIDE program, and the discarding of open beer bottles by a passenger.

Crown appeal from the dismissal of an appeal from acquittals on impaired driving and driving over 80 charges.

The court held that the requirement in s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable" does not require police to have a breathalyzer technician available at every detachment at all times or to organize themselves so samples are taken as soon as possible.

The proper inquiry is whether the samples were taken within a reasonably prompt time in the circumstances, including where relevant the way the police were organized and why.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in law on the impaired count by proceeding on the basis that breathalyzer readings could be used to prove degree of impairment absent expert evidence, and may have applied the wrong test for impairment.

Leave was granted, the appeal allowed, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial directed on both counts.

Criminal appeals from convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery arising out of a series of planned and attempted armoured car robberies, together with sentence appeals concerning compensation orders and one custodial term.

The court rejected challenges to the trial judge’s Vetrovec instruction, the use of contextual evidence under the Carter conspiracy framework, the refusal to edit a prior manslaughter conviction, the handling of alleged threat evidence, the in-court identification ruling, and the claim that the verdict was unreasonable.

However, the court held that the jury was not properly instructed on the impermissible use of bad character and propensity evidence led against one appellant by a co-accused.

The appeal of one appellant was dismissed in full, while the other appellant’s conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered; the compensation order appeal was dismissed.