David Ian Anber

The appellant appealed her conviction for fleeing the scene of an accident.

At trial, the only evidence identifying her as the driver was her confession to the arresting officer.

The Crown did not hold a voir dire to prove the voluntariness of the confession, and the defense moved for a non-suit after the Crown closed its case.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, relying on evidence from a pre-trial application that was not blended into the trial.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that admitting the confession without a voir dire was a fundamental error and that the conviction was unreasonable without admissible evidence identifying the appellant as the driver.

An acquittal was ordered.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges of robbery and disguise with intent.

The Crown's case relied on DNA evidence found on two pieces of clothing used as a disguise, which were discovered near the scene of the robbery shortly after it occurred.

The applicant argued that without proof of when the DNA was deposited, there was insufficient evidence to commit him.

The reviewing judge dismissed the application, finding it was open to the preliminary inquiry judge to conclude there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict.

An appeal from a conviction under section 159(3) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to move into another lane for an emergency vehicle if safe to do so.

The appellant argued that the offence could only be committed upon passing a stopped emergency vehicle, not upon approaching it.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on the interpretation that the obligation to move lanes is triggered "upon approaching" a stopped emergency vehicle.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding the statutory language clear and unambiguous.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was found passed out in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with a high blood alcohol content.

The trial judge rejected his defence that he intended only to sleep in the vehicle, finding he failed to rebut the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge also found a realistic risk of danger even without an intention to drive.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's factual findings and application of the law, dismissing the appeal.

The applicant brought a motion to stay charges of impaired driving and "over 80" on the basis of a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges were laid on June 24, 2014, with the information sworn on July 9, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for one day but was not completed until April 13, 2016, with judgment delivery delayed until February 7, 2017.

The total delay was 26 months, or 24 months after deducting defence delay.

The court found that the net delay of 24 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The young person appealed a conviction for attempted robbery arising from a meeting arranged through an online classified ad.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were insufficient regarding the identification evidence, which included surveillance video and IP address tracking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the identification and the trial judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and breach of recognizance arising from a parking lot altercation.

The trial judge had ruled that the complainant could not have consented to a fight because of the nature of the injuries sustained.

The appeal court found this was an error of law, as one cannot consent to the intentional infliction of bodily harm, but the mere fact that bodily harm resulted does not automatically vitiate consent.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant brought a motion for an order declaring a mistrial due to ineffective assistance of counsel following her conviction on charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The court examined whether counsel's conduct fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance and whether such conduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The court found that while certain trial strategy decisions were reasonable, critical failures in file preparation and transfer, inadequate disclosure of key evidence to trial counsel, and insufficient preparation for cross-examination of expert witnesses fell below the standard of care.

The court determined that the reliability of the verdict was called into question and declared a mistrial.

The offender was convicted of human smuggling under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for his role as a courier transporting undocumented individuals from the US border to Toronto.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought a 15-month conditional sentence.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the organized nature of the scheme and the exploitation of his brother against mitigating factors including a positive pre-sentence report, financial desperation, and lack of related criminal record.

The court concluded that a 15-month conditional sentence, followed by two years of probation, would adequately address denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence, rendered an unreasonable verdict, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were clear, logical, and demonstrated an awareness of the frailties of eyewitness evidence.

The court concluded the identification evidence, supported by circumstantial factors such as the driver's physical description and a distinct limp, reasonably supported the conviction.

The accused was charged with two alcohol driving offences under section 253(1) of the Criminal Code: impaired operation and operation with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged the accused had care and control of a motor vehicle on May 19, 2013.

The accused admitted to being too impaired to drive but contested whether he was in care and control.

The trial judge found that the accused did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion, there was no realistic risk he would change his mind and drive, and there was no realistic risk of unintentional motion creating danger.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking approximately 26 pounds of marijuana found in the trunk of a car he was driving.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in relying on his knowledge of a small amount of marijuana in the console and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence supported the inference that he knew about the marijuana in the trunk.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the amount of drugs seized.

The accused was sentenced following jury convictions for assault causing bodily harm and two counts of forcible confinement, along with a guilty plea to assault.

The offences arose from a vigilante-style attack in which the accused and several associates forcibly removed two individuals from a nightclub and violently assaulted them in an alley after suspecting them of vandalizing a vehicle.

The assault resulted in severe and permanent injuries, including a traumatic brain injury and significant psychological disorders.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the planned, group-based nature of the revenge attack and the profound harm to the victim.

After weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a global custodial sentence of three and a half years.

Following a jury verdict finding the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm and forcible seizure, and a guilty plea to a further assault charge, the Crown applied under s. 523(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code to revoke the accused’s bail pending sentencing.

The court considered the seriousness of the violent offences, the significant and permanent injuries suffered by the victim, and the prospect of a substantial custodial sentence.

The court also reviewed the accused’s prior criminal record, outstanding charges for a similar group assault while on recognizance, and concerns about the adequacy of a proposed surety.

While primary grounds for detention were minimal, the court held that secondary and particularly tertiary grounds justified detention to protect the public and maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

During a criminal jury trial, the court addressed whether defence counsel could use visual aids such as cartoons, stick-figure diagrams, and graphical illustrations during closing submissions.

The trial judge ruled that visual depictions created by counsel that were not admitted through witness testimony risked misleading the jury and effectively amounted to counsel giving evidence.

The court also rejected a proposed visual continuum illustrating the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on Supreme Court of Canada authority cautioning against analogies or illustrative scales for that standard.

The judge held that such materials could distort the fact‑finding process and improperly represent the evidence.

Defence counsel was therefore prohibited from using the proposed visual aids during closing address.

During a criminal jury trial, the accused brought a motion for a mistrial alleging a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias arising from various rulings and trial management decisions.

The motion relied on the judge’s handling of a juror scheduling issue, evidentiary rulings including a voluntariness voir dire and past recollection recorded, and discussions concerning possible modes of participation following the close of the Crown’s case.

The court applied the test for reasonable apprehension of bias from Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board) and R. v. R.D.S. The court held that disagreements with rulings or expressions of difficulty understanding counsel’s arguments do not establish bias and that the judge’s conduct reflected ordinary trial management obligations.

The motion for a mistrial was dismissed.

During a criminal jury trial for assault causing bodily harm, the Crown brought an application to admit part of a witness’s prior written statement under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness had prepared a statement within days of the incident but, at trial nearly three years later, lacked present memory of the accused’s detailed participation in the assault.

The court applied the criteria articulated in appellate jurisprudence requiring a reliable record, timeliness, absence of current memory, and the witness’s present confirmation of the statement’s accuracy.

Finding that the witness personally prepared the statement shortly after the event, had been sober, and vouched for its accuracy despite memory loss at trial, the court held the evidentiary requirements were satisfied.

The probative value of the statement was found to outweigh any prejudice, which could be mitigated through jury instructions and cross‑examination.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, dangerous driving, and refusing to provide a breath sample following a serious driving incident on July 18, 2012.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found breaches of the Charter regarding the timing of the breath demand and the provision of rights to counsel, but declined to exclude any evidence.

The court found that the accused's extreme intoxication rendered any Charter breaches of negligible effect on his actual interests, and that the police acted in good faith throughout.

The Crown sought a ruling that a recorded telephone call made by the accused to the Ottawa Police Reporting Centre reporting vandalism to a vehicle was voluntary and admissible under the common law confessions rule.

The court considered whether there was some evidence that the accused made the call, whether the civilian police call-taker constituted a person in authority, and whether the statement was voluntary under the principles in R. v. Oickle.

The court found sufficient evidence from identifying information provided during the call to allow a jury to infer that the accused made the call.

Even assuming the call-taker could be considered a person in authority, the statement was voluntary because the accused initiated the call, provided information freely, and there were no threats, promises, oppressive circumstances, or police trickery.

The appellants appealed their convictions for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable, that he erred in his assessment of eyewitness identification evidence, gave insufficient reasons, improperly relied on post-offence conduct, and failed to consider self-defence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were reasonably supported by the evidence of independent eyewitnesses who observed the group assault.

The court held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in his credibility findings, properly applied the law regarding parties to an offence, and correctly assessed the post-offence conduct of fleeing the scene.