Damien R. Frost

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued that his s. 9 Charter rights were violated when police randomly stopped his vehicle in a private parking lot without reasonable suspicion.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the common law police power to randomly stop vehicles to check driver sobriety, as established in Dedman, applies on private property and does not require individualized reasonable suspicion.

Because the stop was lawful under common law, it was not an arbitrary detention.

The accused, a registered confidential informant, was charged with serious drug offences after receiving a package containing illicit drugs via a controlled delivery.

The accused testified they did not know the package contained drugs and had attempted to contact their police handler about their suspicions.

The court acquitted the accused, finding the Crown failed to prove knowledge or wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternatively, the court granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, finding the police committed an egregious abuse of process by breaching informer privilege, involving the accused's handlers in the arrest, and releasing the accused into a dangerous situation to further the investigation.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained during a Canada Revenue Agency audit of his company and subsequent search warrants, alleging breaches of sections 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant contended that the CRA auditor's predominant purpose was to investigate his alleged criminal tax liability rather than conduct a civil compliance audit.

The court found that the audit remained a bona fide compliance audit until the auditor received answers to the first query on July 14, 2010, at which point the auditor's predominant purpose shifted to a penal investigation.

The court excluded evidence obtained through the second query but admitted evidence from the first query and the search warrant execution.

The applicant massage therapist sought judicial review of a caution issued by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee regarding her advertising practices.

The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the application, as the proceeding was initiated by a Registrar's report rather than a complaint, meaning no appeal lay to the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

On the merits, the Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of natural justice and concluding that the strongly worded caution was appropriate remedial guidance rather than an unauthorized disciplinary reprimand.

Maple Lodge Farms was convicted of twenty counts of violating the Health of Animals Act and Regulations by failing to prevent undue suffering of chickens during transportation through inadequate protection from adverse weather and insufficient ventilation.

Between December 2008 and April 2010, over 25,450 chickens died during transport or upon arrival at the facility.

The corporation received a fine of $80,000 on two representative counts and a three-year suspended sentence with probation on the remaining eighteen counts.

The probation order required the corporation to expend a minimum of $1,000,000 on capital improvements to trailers, holding facilities, and transportation procedures, with oversight by an independent expert and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. was charged with two counts of transporting animals in a manner likely to cause undue suffering due to undue exposure to weather, contrary to section 143(1)(d) of the Health of Animals Regulations and section 65(1) of the Health of Animals Act.

Count 7 involved the transportation of 9,576 broiler chickens on December 30-31, 2008, with 711 birds (7.4%) found dead on arrival.

Count 34 involved the transportation of 10,944 spent hens on February 23, 2009, with 1,181 birds (10.8%) found dead on arrival.

The Crown alleged that inadequate protection from cold and wet weather conditions caused undue suffering and death.

The defendant argued it followed standard operating procedures and industry practices.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts, determining that the defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the prohibited acts, particularly through failures in monitoring, training, and adherence to industry guidelines.

During a blended voir dire in a prosecution for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, the Crown sought to admit a videotaped police interview with the accused.

The court assessed whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary under the common law confessions rule.

The evidence showed the interviewing officer repeatedly suggested that providing information was required for the accused’s bail report and failed to provide a police caution informing the accused that statements could be used against him at trial.

Considering the inducement relating to bail and the absence of a caution, the court found a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.

The defendant was charged with three offences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act: making a material omission in her Statement of Affairs, failing to disclose approximately $40,000 in cash to her trustee, and failing to disclose the same funds in a subsequent Statement of Affairs.

The defendant had declared bankruptcy in September 2007, omitting reference to cash seized by police in January 2007.

She later sought recovery of the seized funds in July 2008, claiming ownership.

The court found the defendant not guilty of the first and third counts but guilty of the second count for failing to inform the trustee of her ownership of the funds between September 2007 and August 2008.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 12-month sentence for offences including assault and transmitting an STI (Herpes II) to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant knew he was infected and engaged in unprotected sex, constituting a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

The court also found no error in the assault conviction or the refusal to impose a conditional sentence, noting the appellant was on probation for domestic assault at the time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and the finding that he was a dangerous offender.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on evidence of his assault on police officers at the time of arrest and failed to properly summarize the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misdirection and noting the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge gave undue weight to an expert's opinion that relied on other experts not called as witnesses.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the expert was entitled to rely on the material and the dangerous offender finding was fully supported by the evidence.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder after the victim was brutally beaten and robbed in an underground parking garage.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred by excluding out-of-court statements from a deceased third party who had confessed to the murder, by misdirecting the jury on reasonable doubt, and by misdirecting the jury on the elements of first-degree murder based on unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the third party's hearsay statements lacked threshold reliability, the reasonable doubt instruction was adequate, and unlawful confinement in the course of a robbery can provide the basis for first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault causing bodily harm and aggravated assault arising from a prolonged domestic attack followed by a brutal assault on a second victim with a meat cleaver.

The court upheld the conviction, finding that evidence of prior assaults against the spouse was admissible as part of the narrative and relevant to motive or animus, and that the limiting instruction sufficiently guarded against impermissible propensity reasoning.

On sentence, the court found two errors in principle: the aggravated assault was overstated as a case of 'stark horror', and insufficient weight was given to the offender's personal circumstances and rehabilitative prospects.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the total sentence was reduced from 12 years to nine years.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge instructed the jury that he could be found guilty as a party to murder under the combined operation of ss. 21(2) and 213(c) of the Criminal Code, even without subjective foresight of death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction using the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 213(c) and s. 21(2) violate ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting a murder conviction without subjective foresight of death, and ordered a new trial.

The accused was convicted of five offences, including rape, arising from a single incident.

At trial, the Crown improperly split its case by calling reply evidence to contradict the complainant's testimony regarding the accused's physical mobility and to introduce a new statement allegedly made by the accused.

This forced the accused to testify a second time and subjected him to cross-examination on collateral issues.

The Court of Appeal found error but applied the curative proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the rape conviction, while quashing the other convictions under the Kienapple principle.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the Crown's improper splitting of its case caused a substantial wrong that could not be cured by the proviso.

A new trial was ordered on all five counts.

The appellant attempted to repossess his vehicles while armed with a rifle, which he loaded and pointed at the victim.

He was convicted of attempted armed robbery, using a firearm while attempting to commit an indictable offence, possession of a weapon, and pointing a firearm.

The trial judge stayed the possession charge but entered convictions on the others.

On appeal, the appellant argued the multiple convictions violated the common law Kienapple principle and sections 7 and 11(h) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Kienapple principle did not prevent convictions for both armed robbery and using a firearm, as the latter requires the additional element of 'use'.

The Court also found no breach of fundamental justice under the Charter.

However, the Court quashed the conviction for pointing a firearm, finding that it offended the Kienapple principle when combined with the conviction for using a firearm.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from their acquittal on a charge of conspiracy to commit arson.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to require the case to be put to the jury.