Christine L. Tier

The appellant appealed his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as his 18-month consecutive sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant deposited a shank in a fellow inmate's pocket at a detention centre.

The sole ground of the conviction appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and rejecting the appellant's claims that counsel coerced him not to testify or failed to pursue evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 18-month consecutive sentence fit given the appellant's horrendous criminal record, even when considering the totality principle.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the death of his domestic partner, whose body was never found.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the appellant's sister, to whom he confessed and who helped him dispose of evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the jury instructions were flawed regarding post-offence conduct, his confession, the lack of a Vetrovec warning, and the manslaughter charge, and that a mistrial should have been ordered due to prejudicial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's instructions and mid-trial cautions adequate to ensure a fair trial.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction on grounds including an inflammatory Crown opening, failure to repeat a W.D. instruction for a jury question, misstating expert psychiatric evidence, and errors in the provocation charge.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions adequately addressed the Crown's opening and the jury's questions, and that the charge on provocation and expert evidence was fair.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a medium secure unit rather than a minimum secure unit.

The Board relied on the appellant's recent alcohol use, antisocial activities, and elopement risk.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision was reasonable and reflected the least onerous and least restrictive alternative, given the appellant's history of violence when intoxicated and his treating psychiatrist's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and possession of child pornography relating to a young girl.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, misapprehended evidence, and improperly used child pornography evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence and appealed his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or factual findings.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed as it lacked sufficient probative value.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year global sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm against her ten-year-old son, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence in making credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any alleged errors did not meet the test for material misapprehension of evidence under Lohrer, and noting the complainant's evidence was corroborated by physical scarring.

The appellant appealed from convictions entered by a judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant tendered fresh evidence by way of an agreed statement of fact.

The Crown consented to the admission of the fresh evidence, the setting aside of the convictions, and the ordering of a new trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed and ordered a new trial pursuant to s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a high yield investment scam.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert profiling evidence, giving confusing jury instructions on conspiracy, and admitting preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence was properly admitted and the preliminary inquiry evidence met the statutory requirements.

However, the trial judge erred in his conspiracy instructions by presenting it as an 'all or nothing' proposition and failing to properly explain the Carter stages.

The conspiracy convictions were set aside.

The court also reduced one appellant's restitution order by two-thirds to reflect the shared responsibility of all three co-accused.

The appellant challenged a penitentiary sentence imposed following a manslaughter conviction arising from failure to provide necessaries of life to a young child who died after severe burns and delayed medical treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the sentencing judge overstated moral blameworthiness, failed to properly weigh remorse, rehabilitation, restraint, and other mitigating factors, improperly relied on a victim impact statement, or imposed a sentence outside the acceptable range.

The court held that the sentencing judge properly focused on the deliberate withholding of urgently required medical care to protect the offender from blame, and that denunciation and deterrence properly predominated.

However, the Crown conceded an error in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed only to increase credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the effective sentence to nine years and six months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, finding that his exercise of authority vitiated her consent, and rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's credibility findings were justified and supported by the evidence of the appellant's reign of terror and religious indoctrination in the household.

The court concluded the appellant's exercise of authority vitiated the complainant's consent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, he argued the complainant consented, relying on evidence from the complainant's former common law spouse.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, characterizing the issue as mistaken belief in consent and failing to address the spouse's evidence.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the courts below fundamentally misunderstood the defence advanced and failed to consider critical evidence, rendering the reasons inadequate for appellate review.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after shooting his sister and her fiancé.

At trial, the defence conceded the shootings and intent but argued provocation, while the Crown argued the murders were planned and deliberate 'honour killings'.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence on the cultural context of honour killings and in failing to give a W.D. instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was relevant, balanced, and properly admitted, and that the jury instructions as a whole correctly conveyed the burden of proof without setting up a credibility contest.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault and uttering threats and received a suspended sentence.

Almost three years later, he applied for an extension of time to appeal, which was dismissed by the summary conviction appeal court.

The accused then filed a notice of application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Crown brought an application to have the leave application determined by a single judge in advance of the appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that a single judge has jurisdiction under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code to deny an application for leave to appeal.

The Crown's application was granted and the accused's application for leave to appeal was refused for lacking merit and failing to raise a significant question of law.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the impact of his despondent mental state on the proof of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the issue was not raised at trial and was negated by the appellant's own testimony.

The trial judge properly found all essential elements, including mens rea, established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a cautionary charge regarding his flight from the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence of flight was relevant to link the appellant to the apartment, and the risk of it being used for consciousness of guilt did not require a caution.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was entirely warranted on the facts.

The appellant appealed his provincial offences convictions, including operating a motor vehicle without insurance, failing to wear a seatbelt, and operating without a validated permit.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that the appellant had automobile insurance at the time of the offence.

The conviction for operating without insurance was set aside and an acquittal substituted.

The appeal regarding the remaining charges was dismissed as the appellant provided no substantive defence or explanation for missing his first court appearance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the finding of murder during forcible confinement under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code was unreasonable.

The appellant contended that the act of killing was not discrete from the act of confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the appellant confined the victim by tying him up, beat him, and subsequently strangled him, taking advantage of the dominance gained through the confinement.

The appellant mother was convicted of child abduction under s. 282(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after taking her two children to Singapore for seven months, depriving the father of his court-ordered access.

The trial judge imposed a 12-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge made no errors in concluding the mother intended to deprive the father of access.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and substituted an absolute discharge, noting the hardship a criminal record would cause the appellant's professional travel and the fact she had already served her conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, including a dangerous offender finding.

He alleged bias regarding the appointed expert and relied on his own affidavit.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's affidavit not credible and concluded that trial counsel's agreement to the expert's appointment was justified.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

The Crown conceded the error.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the Johnson framework to find no reasonable possibility that the designation would have been different.

The court noted the appellant's high risk to reoffend, diagnoses of pedophilia and sexual sadism, and unsuitability for control in the community.