Christine L. Tier

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences involving five complainants and designated a long-term offender.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting bad character evidence without a limiting instruction against propensity reasoning and by allowing inadmissible reply evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the admission of highly prejudicial evidence regarding the appellant's character, combined with the Crown's closing address and the trial judge's failure to caution the jury, rendered the trial unfair.

The curative proviso could not apply.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions and long-term offender designation were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the one-year sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was inadequate given his lengthy criminal record.

The Court of Appeal agreed the sentence was inadequate but declined to re-incarcerate the respondent, as he had already served the eight-month custodial portion of his sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing it was inconsistent with his acquittals on related false pretence charges involving cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in the appellant's favour by acquitting him on certain false pretence counts despite evidence of stopped payments, this did not render the fraud conviction inconsistent or unreasonable.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a minor complainant, arguing the trial judge failed to properly assess the complainant's evidence and ignored contradictory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inconsistencies in the evidence were not so significant as to require specific mention by the trial judge, and that the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the lower court.

The Court of Appeal noted the appeal should have been brought before a Superior Court judge, but dealt with it ex officio.

On consent of the Crown, the appeal was allowed and the probation order was varied to delete the words 'or place of worship' and to add a new term.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to address the totality principle given the remnant of a prior sentence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle, that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, and that the fresh evidence did not warrant interference.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for offences that terrorized his former wife and others, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's disregard for court orders.

The sentence was held not to be manifestly unfit.

The appellant appealed her conviction and 16-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidence of abusive conduct by the Crown.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the custodial term to six months plus three years' probation, taking into account the appellant's current pregnancy with twins and the risk of her babies being taken from her if born in prison.

The accused appealed their conviction, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, while the Crown appealed the imposition of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

On the sentence appeal, the Court agreed with the Crown that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offences and principles of deterrence.

However, based on fresh evidence demonstrating the accused's rehabilitation, good conduct, and family support over the past year, the Court declined to alter the sentence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his nine-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in the W.D. instruction to the jury and unnecessarily instructed on the distinction between attempt and mere preparation under s. 24 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range for attempted murder in a domestic context, where deterrence is paramount.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge misapprehended an important piece of evidence given by the appellant, which may have affected her assessment of his credibility, entitling the appellant to a new trial.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable based on self-defence, but the Court of Appeal held it was open to a trier of fact to accept the complainant's evidence regarding the sequence of events.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered, with a recommendation that the Crown consider the frailties in the complainant's evidence and that the appellant had already served his sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences related to an incendiary fire and insurance fraud.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's financial motive and his alteration of an alarm system certificate to maintain insurance coverage.

The verdict was deemed reasonable.

The custodial sentence was upheld as being within the acceptable range.

The restitution order of $473,000 was reduced by $170,000, representing the agreed amount realized from the sale of the lands by the insurer.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing his statements to the police were involuntary.

The trial judge found that an officer had assaulted the appellant in an elevator prior to the interview but ruled the subsequent statements voluntary because they were not temporally connected to the assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the test for voluntariness, as the assault undermined the officers' credibility and the temporal connection was not broken.

The statements were ruled involuntary and inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a serious assault where he acted in concert with a co-accused to beat the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on self-defence or prior inconsistent statements, nor in the refusal to adjourn the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle by refusing a conditional sentence or in the term of imprisonment imposed.

The appellant challenged both conviction and sentence arising from historical sexual assault allegations made by his daughter.

The appeal focused on credibility findings, alleging reversal of the burden of proof, misuse of prior inconsistent statements, inadequate scrutiny of the complainant’s evidence, and misapprehension of evidence bearing on motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and the W.(D.) framework to the evidence as a whole, permissibly inferred bias from independently proven statements, and was entitled to accept the complainant’s core evidence despite inconsistencies on peripheral matters.

The court also held the verdict was not unreasonable under the Biniaris standard and found no basis to interfere with sentence.

The appellants pleaded guilty to fraud exceeding $5000 for operating an elaborate modelling agency scam that defrauded hundreds of victims of over $400,000.

They were sentenced to custodial terms of two years less a day and 15 months.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred by not imposing conditional sentences, citing disparity with a co-accused and the fact that they now had a young child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the custodial sentences were amply justified by the appellants' roles in the enterprise and the devastating effects of the fraud on the victims.

The appellant appealed his conviction, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas and introduce fresh evidence of his innocence.

The Court of Appeal found that the pleas were voluntary and unequivocal, and that his request to withdraw them was a calculated scheme to manipulate the system to obtain bail over the holidays.

The fresh evidence of innocence was rejected as incredible under the Palmer test.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order quashing a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit following a single-vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code, the officer need only reasonably suspect that a person operating or in care or control of a vehicle has alcohol in the body; the suspicion need not separately extend to operation or care and control.

The court further held that the trial judge was entitled on the evidence to find that the respondent had not relinquished care and control of the vehicle when the roadside screening demand was made.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the conviction and sentence restored.

The appellant appealed a 12-month custodial sentence imposed after a guilty plea to two welfare fraud charges over $5,000 arising from the same facts.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating custody as presumptively required and by concluding that a conditional sentence was unavailable for welfare fraud.

Applying the conditional sentence framework under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, the court found the statutory requirements were met, noting the appellant's remorse, parental responsibilities, employment history, upgrading efforts, favourable pre-sentence report, and substantial restitution.

The custodial sentence was set aside and replaced with a conditional sentence of two years less one day, including house arrest and community service.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after guilty pleas to impaired driving and impaired driving causing bodily harm arising from two serious alcohol-related collisions seven months apart.

The court held that the sentencing judge erred in law by failing to give proper weight to general deterrence and denunciation in the context of repeat impaired driving with extremely high blood alcohol readings and bodily harm.

Applying the conditional sentence framework under s. 742.1, the court concluded that a community-based sentence was not proportionate to the gravity and cumulative character of the offences.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the six-month conditional sentence was replaced with a five-month custodial term, with probation terms varied.