Chris de Sa

The plaintiff, Sapex Canada Inc., brought an urgent motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging that the sale of a property by one of the individual defendants, Dieneen Lepp, indicated an attempt to dissipate assets to avoid judgment.

The defendants argued that the action, proceeding under Simplified Procedure, precluded injunctive relief and that the requirements for a Mareva injunction were not met.

The court found it had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in Simplified Procedure actions but ultimately dismissed the motion, concluding there was no real and genuine risk that the defendants were dissipating assets for the purpose of avoiding judgment.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff claimed entitlement to the proceeds of her deceased husband's investment accounts, alleging an oral agreement that they would remain beneficiaries on each other's accounts, and asserting a constructive trust.

She also sued the investment firm for failing to notify her when the deceased changed his beneficiaries to his children.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the investment firm had no duty to disclose the deceased's personal financial decisions, and the plaintiff failed to establish a constructive trust or agreement, noting she had already received a substantial portion of the estate.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 9 rights following his arrest and the search of his home, seeking exclusion of a firearm under s. 24(2).

Police had intercepted communications indicating a firearm transaction and followed the seller to the applicant's residence.

When police attempted to arrest the men in the driveway, they fled into the house.

The court found the arrest and search incident to arrest were lawful, and the warrantless entry into the home was justified by hot pursuit and exigent circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff municipality obtained a judgment against the defendant in a related tort action.

Shortly before the trial of that action, the defendant transferred his property to his mother for significantly less than market value.

The plaintiff brought an action to set aside the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.

The defendants failed to file statements of defence and were noted in default.

The court applied the 'badges of fraud' doctrine and found the transfer was made with the intent to defeat creditors.

The court granted default judgment and set aside the property transfer.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to comply with an approved screening device demand at a RIDE check.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons by failing to address the investigating officer's failure to record the interaction, and that the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework when assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient when read in the context of the trial record, and that there was no error in the application of the burden of proof or the assessment of the evidence.

The applicant, charged with domestic violence offences across two informations, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total anticipated delay was nearly 35 months.

The court deducted delay caused by the complainant's failure to attend the first trial and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court also found the Crown's decision to join the two informations was reasonable and did not reflect indifference to the applicant's Charter rights.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants sold a residential property to the respondent, who failed to close the transaction after multiple extensions.

The applicants subsequently resold the property in a falling market for a substantially lower price and sought damages for the difference in purchase price and carrying costs.

The court awarded damages of $817,756.08, compensating the applicants for the drop in property value and carrying costs, but excluded claims for real estate commissions not paid on the original transaction and renegotiated interest.

The applicant sought a declaration of ownership by adverse possession over a portion of the respondent's land, as well as an order to remove a fence and trees.

The respondent argued the application was an abuse of process because the applicant had previously brought a similar claim in 2017, which was dismissed.

The court agreed with the respondent, finding that the issue of adverse possession over the subject lands had already been determined in the prior action, where it was established that the previous owners had no intention to exclude the true owners.

The application was dismissed on the basis of res judicata.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and a default judgment of $278,821.41.

The defendant's insurance adjuster had inadvertently missed communications from the plaintiffs' counsel, leading to the default.

Applying the five-part test from Mountain View Farms, the court found the failure to defend was due to inadvertence, the defendant moved promptly upon learning of the judgment, and there was an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was granted and the default judgment was set aside.

The applicant landlord and respondent tenant could not agree on the prevailing market rent for a three-year lease renewal of a property used as a Montessori school.

The landlord brought an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) for a determination of the minimum rent.

The parties submitted competing expert appraisal reports, with the landlord's expert suggesting $23.00 per square foot and the tenant's expert suggesting $12.00 to $14.00 per square foot.

The court considered the property's specific use, zoning, amenities, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, ultimately determining the appropriate market rent to be $18.00 per square foot.

The plaintiffs commenced an action for breach of contract in 2018 and the defendant counterclaimed.

After pleadings were exchanged, a trial record was served, and discoveries were held, the plaintiffs brought a motion to stay the action and refer the dispute to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had waived their right to arbitration by initiating the claim and taking significant steps in the litigation, and that ordering arbitration at this late stage would be unfair to the defendant.

The third-party defendant brought a motion for security for costs against the defendant/third-party plaintiff on the eve of trial, citing the latter's recent insolvency.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party delayed in bringing the motion despite knowing of the financial issues months earlier.

Ordering security for costs at this late stage would necessitate an adjournment, prejudicing all parties and delaying a trial on the merits.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against the defendant for the outstanding balance on a conditional sales agreement for a vehicle.

The defendant argued she was pressured into signing the agreement by a third party and did not understand the documents due to a language barrier, raising defences of duress and non est factum.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, rejecting the duress defence as there was no evidence the dealership was aware of any pressure, and rejecting the non est factum defence due to the defendant's carelessness in signing without reading or asking questions.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving and appealed on the basis that his section 9 Charter rights were violated due to arbitrary detention.

He was held in custody for six hours after completing his breath test.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, finding the police conducted an ongoing assessment and reasonably detained him due to his high level of intoxication and risk of repeating the offence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the law and dismissed the appeal.

The defendants brought a motion to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on a commercial property after the plaintiffs refused to close the transaction.

The plaintiffs argued the agreement was part of a larger five-property deal and that the defendants acted in bad faith by only waiving conditions on one property while restructuring the vendor take-back mortgage.

The court found that while the plaintiffs raised valid concerns about the defendants' conduct, the defendants had a triable claim to an interest in land and had invested substantially in development plans.

The court granted the CPL on the condition that the defendants' principal provide a personal indemnity undertaking.

Following a previous decision awarding the Estate Trustee full indemnity costs, the court issued this endorsement to correct the costs amount.

The court noted that further costs had been incurred and a subsequent draft order with updated costs had been filed on consent.

The Estate Trustee's full indemnity costs were updated to $19,907.93.

The applicant, a federal inmate, challenged his involuntary transfer from a minimum-security to a medium-security institution and the corresponding increase in his security classification.

He argued the decision was procedurally unfair, unreasonable, and lacked evidentiary foundation.

The court found that the Correctional Service of Canada complied with its disclosure obligations by providing sufficient summaries of withheld confidential information.

The court also held that the Warden's decision was reasonable, as the applicant's escalating deceitful and intimidating behaviour demonstrated he could no longer be safely managed in a minimum-security environment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving and 'over 80', arguing that the Crown's cross-examination of its own police witness during a blended trial and voir dire resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when he was not permitted to contact his father to arrange counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the procedural irregularity did not render the trial unfair and that the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant sought to contact his father for emotional support rather than to retain counsel was entitled to deference.

The appeal against sentence was allowed to the extent of setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The Estate Trustee brought a motion for directions regarding the payment of unsecured debts allegedly owed by the deceased to his son and son-in-law.

The debts arose from unpaid wages and financial assistance provided to the deceased over many years.

One of the beneficiaries opposed the payment, arguing the claims were statute-barred and lacked corroboration.

The court found that the deceased had acknowledged the debts and intended to repay them upon the sale of his property.

The court also found that the claims were not statute-barred as they were contingent loans, and alternatively, the son and son-in-law were entitled to the funds on the basis of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

The court ordered the debts to be paid from the estate.

The defendant, Nima Priyeshakbari, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's claim, which asserted allegations of fraud, conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and insufficient particularity regarding an interest in land and documents/conversations.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to unlawfully convert a property in which she had invested, selling it below market value to deprive her of her investment.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for striking pleadings, accepting the plaintiff's alleged facts as true unless patently ridiculous.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim met the necessary particularity requirements for fraud and conspiracy, noting that knowledge can be alleged as a fact without pleading circumstances.

The court also clarified that the Land Titles Act does not ban trusts but rather defines how third parties deal with registered owners.

The motion to strike was dismissed.